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Abstract 
The legal fields of Mergers and Acquisitions, Competition Law, and Intellectual Property are all 
well-researched areas with a long history of case law as well. However, at the intersection of 
these legal fields, there are some important areas that are studied less extensively, although they 
impose a significant practical effect on the economical and scientific progress of society. 
One such area lies at an intersection of Mergers and Acquisitions, Antitrust Laws on anti-
competitive practices, and Patents, specifically the case when important patents remain unutilized 
by the companies after the merger or acquisition happens. This scenario may occur for many 
reasons, from negligence or inability to thoroughly consider the potential of each item in the 
patent portfolio of all companies involved in the merger and acquisition, all the way to deliberate 
action taken to acquire companies solely for their patent portfolios, because they are perceived 
to pose a future risk to the acquiring company’s current business lines. 
In this dissertation, I will attempt to prove that even though the scenarios where patents remain 
unutilized after the merger or acquisition happens are not desirable for the economy and society, 
as many national and international legal frameworks on anti-competitive behavior clearly state, 
the current national and international organizations do not currently have effective operative 





The methodology I will use is the following: 
I will first examine the three different legal fields, their definitions, the objectives of the 
legislator, some of their most important practical implications in the fields where they intersect 
from the perspective of our study: Mergers and Acquisitions, Antitrust Laws and Patents. I will 
pay attention that I describe not only the theory, but the practice of these legal fields as well, by 
investigating the current laws, treaties and case law. Understanding that these legal fields each 
present a wide topic, I will focus my investigation on the European Union and United States laws 
and practices, with occasionally some other international examples as well. 
In the following chapters, I will investigate the practical implications of the scenario where 
patents remain unutilized after certain mergers and acquisitions, to be able to show the magnitude 
of the issue by interpolating the relatively scarce economic data available on this subject. The 
scarcity of data is understandable if we think about the fact that it will not be in the interest of 
the companies involved to publish such data, and since the problem has not yet been recognized 
as a major study subject, there are not enough secondary sources where this data could be 
gathered either. However, for the purposes of my argument, it is enough to prove the existence 
of the problem, prove that it is not covered by effective measures of the EU and US institutions 
to prevent these scenarios, identify the companies involved and hold them accountable. This will 
already show that the objectives of the legislator are not met in the scenarios when patents remain 
unutilized after certain mergers and acquisitions. My attempts to illustrate the magnitude of the 
problem will only serve as an emphasizing factor that it needs urgent and operative action from 
national and international policymakers. 
In order to make my dissertation as practical as possible, I have decided to include a detailed case 
study from the European merger control case law where a patent with great importance was left 
unutilized after a merger. The patent in question was about Gallium Nitride RF Power 
Transistors, and - as we will discuss - it was fundamental in the development of today’s 4G and 
5G telecom network infrastructure. In fact, in this case, the competition authority’s sole focus on 
market concentration may have been the cause of the acquiring company’s decision to leave the 
patent unutilized. The fact that development in this area hasn’t stalled was entirely due to other 
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companies taking over and developing their own patents, own technology, and own production 
facilities. 
I will also establish an operational framework for a new office of national or international 
competition authorities, which I am calling the Innovation Protection Office. The proposed 
operational framework is intended to establish some practical solutions to protect customer 
access to the officially recognized innovative advantage of patents and ensuring their utilization. 
I will review the current legal framework for applicable laws and procedures by which this goal 
can be achieved. There could be many other operational guidelines, processes, or organizational 
structures that would achieve the same result. Therefore, my main goal in establishing and 
describing this operational framework is to offer future legislators interested in the problem and 
the solution some useful tools to govern public policy. 
Finally, I will draw my conclusions on the research I have presented in this dissertation and 





1. Fields of Study 
 
 “The value of an idea lies in the Using of it” - Thomas Edison. 
 
This chapter presents a discussion on the meaning, scope, and relevant areas of study. It includes 
a brief discussion of the need for merger control along with the statement of the problem, the 
objective of the study, research methodology, and hypothesis. It examines the comparative 
historical study of mergers along with other legal fields. 
The legal fields covered include Mergers and Acquisitions in Corporate Law, Anti-Competitive 
Practices in Antitrust Law, and Patents in Intellectual Property Law. 
The main laws in the European Union to govern such anti-competitive practices are defined in 
Article 102 (b)  (former Article 82) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.1 
Through an analysis of current regulations in the fields of Mergers and Acquisitions, Antitrust 
Law and Intellectual Property, and an analysis of the current practices and operation of law 
enforcement agencies responsible for competition and intellectual property (competition 
authorities and patent offices) in the EU and the US, as well as through case studies of company 
acquisitions when important patents remained unutilized, I will attempt to investigate the 
following hypotheses: 
1. Acquisitions where patents remain unutilized are undesirable and present a 
significant issue. 
2. Current national/international organizations do not have effective measures to 
prevent or mitigate them. 
3. There is sufficient legal basis to prevent or mitigate them. 
Afterwards I will propose a solution by presenting an operational framework for a new office of 
the competition authority (prior & post-Merger and Acquisitions). 
 
1
 Eur-lex.europa. (2008, May 09). Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union - 
PART THREE: UNION POLICIES AND INTERNAL ACTIONS - TITLE VII: COMMON RULES ON 
COMPETITION, TAXATION AND APPROXIMATION OF LAWS - Chapter 1: Rules on competition - Section 





Figure 1 Research Tasks 
 
The structure of this thesis will follow the research tasks as described above. In this current 
chapter (Chapter One) I am presenting the fields of study to provide a solid foundation of not 
only the legal theory of each legal field (Mergers and Acquisitions, Antitrust Law and Intellectual 
Property), but will observe the practice as well, especially in the EU and US context. 
In the second chapter I will focus on the first hypothesis, and investigate the scenario of 
acquisitions where patents remain unutilized, including the existence, significance and effects of 
the issue. 
In the third chapter I will focus on the second hypothesis, the EU and US institutions responsible 
for competition and intellectual property, the competition authorities and patent offices, and 
investigate their organizational structures and processes. 
In the fourth chapter I will focus on the third hypothesis and the solution proposal. I will 
investigate the current laws and procedures that could form the legal basis of the proposed new 
office of the competition authority. Then I will design the new organization, including its 





1.1. Mergers and Acquisitions Laws and Regulations 
 
This chapter makes a modest attempt to glimpse into the vast domain of mergers and acquisitions 
vis-à-vis the regulatory authorities' role. The subject area is undoubtedly quite vast. But the 
endeavor has been made to assess the volatility of the situations within different regulations 
around the world. 
In this chapter I will investigate the legal field of Mergers and Acquisitions, both from the 
theoretical and from the practical point of view. In the first subchapter I will look at the theory, 
definitions, and types of mergers and acquisitions, the benefits of mergers, especially at the 
intersection of mergers and intellectual property. This overview will serve as a theoretical 
foundation of the legal field. In the second subchapter I will look at the recent mergers and 
acquisitions trends, laws and regulations around the globe. This overview will serve as a practical 
foundation of the legal field.  
Merger control regimes across the globe have a common concern. It is, how does one ensure that 
the merger proposal evaluation is stringent on all qualitative parameters, and that has been the 
case. Once the process is complete, the merged entity's future remains stable, and the market is 
not rendered less competitive. This apart, there are socio-economic concerns that are supposed 
to be satisfactorily addressed in the evaluation processes from a more extensive sustainability 
perspective by the concerned regulator.  
In the international economic state of affairs, our corporations and business companies are within 
recent formations and restructurings for survival and growth. On the one hand, we tend to view 
international corporations to sustain our identity within world economic forces' teeth. Such a 
scenario has propelled the countries worldwide to review our existing laws, especially antitrust 
laws, to tackle misuse of innovative ideas and monopoly. 
The global economic turmoil presented a variety of new challenges. Company entities across the 
planet were forced to require aggressive steps to decrease payments and scale back liabilities and 
closely examine business restructuring to survive and grow. Merger and Acquisitions are 
researched for many decades in educational fields like finance, economics, law, and alternative 
thoughts. 
The business world is extremely challenging. Hence it is volatile. It constitutes the very fabric of 
a country's economic health. Even the political spectrum of a country is often described as merely 
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applied economics. The area of Merger control regulation is vast as well as multi-layered. Its 
regulatory complexity is intertwined with the problem of the creation of a robust merger control 
regulation. Multidimensional analysis of the potential impact centers of any merger or acquisition 
requires a detailed understanding of the process of Mergers and Acquisitions from a systems 
perspective. 
The creation of state-specific regulatory guidelines is aimed at preventing the abuse of the rights 
of these specific impact centers indirectly owing to the adverse impact of mergers and 
acquisitions. The goal of the present research is to identify the effect.  
Although it is technically imprecise to use the term mergers, acquisitions, and Merger and 
Acquisition interchangeably, for our investigation purposes, I will use them as synonymous 
phrases since the protection of customer access to innovation concerns all these areas. 
1.1.1. Definition 
“Mergers are like marriages. They are the bringing together of two individuals. If you wouldn’t 
marry someone for the ‘operational efficiencies’ they offer in the running of a household, then 
why would you combine two companies with unique cultures and identities for that reason?” - 
Simon Sinek2 
In this chapter, I will first investigate the theory of mergers and acquisitions by reviewing the 
definitions of mergers and acquisitions, and the different types of mergers and acquisitions. This 
is fundamental to understand this legal area. 
Then I will take a look at the advantages that companies can achieve with mergers or acquisitions, 
to understand the benefits and motivations of the companies involved. This will be important to 
be able to grasp the incentives of the corporate behaviors that can be seen in the scenario of my 
thesis, acquisitions where patents remain unutilized. 
In the discussion of the benefits of mergers and acquisitions, I will focus especially on the 
intersection of two legal areas, Mergers and Acquisitions and Intellectual Property. I believe it is 
essential to understand the interplay of the two legal fields, because that is exactly where the 
scenario of my thesis lies. 
 
2




The terms mergers and acquisitions might usually be confused and appear similar. However, the 
two of them have different meanings. 
Mergers could also be of assorted sorts, and so will acquisitions be. There are a few terms like 
“demerger,” “spin out,” and “spin-off” that an area unit wants to denote the method by which an 
organization separates into totally different firms.3 The term "Mergers associated Acquisitions" 
is an expression of a technique referring to the company sector. When one company purchases 
associates from other similar size companies, both the firms move to become one.4 The two firms 
sometimes proceed to merge once they feel that they will be able to do something they cannot do 
independently. They are combining two different firms, typically by giving the stockholders of 
one company securities, with the acquired/merged company surrendering their stock.5 
A merger is primarily a technique of inorganic growth. The acquisition is a method of an 
organization that acquires management power over another company referred to as a target 
company. Mergers and acquisitions are unit actions through which firms look for economies of 
scale, efficiencies, and increased market visibility. Mergers and Acquisitions may involve one 
firm buying another – in this case, there is no stock or consolidation exchange as a replacement 
company. Acquisitions are usually friendly, and all parties feel glad about the deal, whereas 
sometimes acquisitions are more hostile.6  
Hence, Merger and Acquisition (M&A) refers to the process of merging or acquiring all or parts 
of other companies' property rights under certain conditions to have the controlling rights and is 
a critical business behaviour to pursue complementarity between companies from different 
dimensions such as resource, channel, brand, and technology. Proper Merger and Acquisition 
behavior has the benefit of changing the market structure and increasing market power, 
generating economies of scale and other synergies, having tax advantage, or serving managerial 
ambitions. Merger and Acquisition plays an increasingly important role in the highly competitive 
 
3 Investopedia Mergers and Acquisitions. (2020, April 21). De-Merger Definition. investopedia.com. Retrieved 
October 20, 2020, from https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/demerger.asp. 
4
 Roberts, A., Moles, P., Wallace, W. (2003). Merger and Acquisitions. Retrieved October 20, 2020, from 
https://ebs.online.hw.ac.uk/EBS/media/EBS/PDFs/Mergers-Acquisitions-Course-Taster.pdf 
5 Black Law Dictionary. (2007). (Centennial Edition ed., Vol. 6th Edition). West Publication. 
6
 Coyle, B. (2000). Finance Risk Management; Corporate Finance, M&A. CIB Publication. 
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business environment and is a useful tool that companies adopt to sustain or even extend their 
competitive advantages.7 
“A merger or an acquisition in a company can be defined as the blend of two or more companies 
into one new company or corporation. The main difference between the above mentioned lies in 
the manner in which the combination of the companies is carried out.”8 Just like us, even a 
company, throughout its journey, passes through many phases and may acquire another company 
for its expansion or even to handle competition in the market. 
In summary, there are four basic forms of acquiring another firm: 
1. Merger or consolidation 
2. Acquiring stocks 
3. Acquiring assets 
4. Total Cash Deal acquisition 9 
 
A merger is the foremost common way of acquiring another firm. In general, a merger is the 
absorption of one company by another company, including all its assets and liability. There could 
also be several reasons for a corporation to go for a merger, like market access, finance, resources, 
productivity, or a rise of the shareholder's belt, etc. 
Although mergers are generally beneficial to the shareholders, some mergers might have a 
negative impact, i.e., they will not augment the earnings per share of the merged company. This 
might happen when the mergers are undertaken to expand the capitalization and customer base 
of the corporate as per one of the Indian case study examples in the merger of Bank of Punjab 
with Centurion Bank.10 However, by merging with major competitors, an organization is in a 




 (Roberts et al., 2003) 
8
 Moskovicz, Abraham. (2018). Mergers and Acquisitions: A Complete and Updated Overview. International 
Journal of Economics & Management Sciences. 07. 10.4172/2162-6359.1000540. 
9
 Jain, S. (2010). Mergers & Acquisitions & the IPR Issues Involved. http://www.legalservicesindia.com. 
Retrieved October 20, 2020, from http://www.legalservicesindia.com/article/503/Mergers-&-Acquisitions-&-the-
IPR-Issues-Involved.html 
10
 Financial Express. (2005). Centurion Bank and Bank of Punjab to consider merger. Financial Express. 






In another case, a merger brings together two companies that make different but complementary 
products. This might also involve purchasing an organization that controls an asset an 
organization utilizes somewhere in its supply chain. 
 
Any business or corporation may enter into a merger in order to combine an extremely profitable 
company with a less profitable/loss-making company so as to use the losses of the loss-making 
company as a tax write-off to cover its profits while expanding the company as a whole, as seen 
in the merger of Skipton's construction company with Chesham's loss-making. Skipton, Britain's 
fourth-largest construction firm, is believed to be one of the stronger construction firms by the 
Financial Services Authority. The acquisition of Skipton resulted in a rise in pre-tax earnings of 
£63.5 million in 2009, compared with £22.5 million in 2008. The goal of the merger was to boost 
Skipton's capital base.11 
 
Acquisition 
While a merger is joining one firm with another firm, an acquisition is the purchase of another 
firm. In order to execute a sale deed, one firm purchases the other firm. In an acquisition, either 
a few or all the assets and liabilities of another firm are purchased or assumed. It deals with 
another company's purchased shares. The understanding of Merger, Acquisition, or even the term 
Takeover, depends on its own specific factor and the use of these terms tends to imbricate.12 
Some advantages of Mergers over Acquisitions are discussed below: 
1. No cash requirement in mergers. 
2. Accomplished tax-free for both parties. 
3. Allows the target company to realize the potential of the merged entity. 
4. Allows shareholders of smaller entities to own a smaller piece of a larger pie, increasing their 
overall net worth. 
 
11
 Reuters Staff. (2010, February 24). Skipton to take over rival Chesham. Retrieved October 20, 2020, from 
https://uk.reuters.com/article/skipton-chesham-idUKLNE61N01N20100224 
12




5. Privately held company mergers allow the target company shareholders to receive a public 
company's stock.13 
 
Kinds of Mergers 
Mergers are grouped into three categories depending on the characteristics and nature of the 
companies. Collectively, globalization and global financial changes have contributed greatly to 
the case of multinational mergers and acquisitions. Global mergers and acquisitions take various 
forms, such as horizontal mergers, vertical mergers, conglomerate mergers, congeneric mergers, 
reverse mergers, dilutive mergers, accretive mergers, and others.14  The differences of each 
merger are elaborated, taking various case studies. “Mergers between competitors are considered 
‘horizontal,’ between suppliers and customers as ‘vertical’, and between other firms as 
‘conglomerate’. ”15 Nagy (2016) differentiates between three types of non-horizontal mergers: 
“Non-horizontal effects may be vertical, portfolio or conglomerate.” 16 
 
1. Horizontal 
The term horizontal, it denotes the merger of same line business entities, i.e., companies 
manufacturing, rendering, producing, or engaged in the same kind of products or services. For 
instance, companies engaged in similar lines of business merged together to consolidate the 
market share, and to ward off competition. “For horizontal mergers, the theory of exploitative 




 Sridhar, N. (2004). Strategic Financial Management for CA Final (4th ed.). Shroff Publishers & Distributors 
pvt. Ltd.: Mumbai. page 1100 
14
 Mittal, R. (2011, December 11). Methods of Financing International Mergers and Acquisitions. scribd.com. 
Retrieved October 20, 2020, from https://www.scribd.com/document/76563542/About-International-Mergers-and-
Acquisitions 
15




 Nagy, Cs.I. (2016, 06). ‘Hungary’. International Encyclopaedia of Laws: Competition Law. Edited by 
Francesco Denozza, Alberto Toffoletto. Alphen aan den Rijn, NL: Kluwer Law International. ISBN 978-90-411-
3368-7 page 240 
17
 Kaiser, H. F. (2009, 1). A Primer in Antitrust Law and Policy. Berkeley Law. Retrieved October 20, 2020, from 
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/php-programs/courses/fileDL.php?fID=381 page 22 
16 
 
The merger between Exxon and Mobile in 1998 allowed both the companies a larger share of the 
global oil and gas market. “Exxon and Mobil megamerger of the oil industry reunited the major 
disintegrated divisions of Standard Oil which had once controlled approximately 90% of oil 
production in the United States. In 1998, Exxon and Mobil merged in a deal valued at $81 billion. 
The merged entity became the third-largest company in the world at the time of announcement. 
The merged company was called ExxonMobil Corp. The merger created one of the world's 
preeminent oil companies with revenues of $200 billion and worldwide production of 2.5 million 
barrels of oil a day. The combined ExxonMobil with a market capitalization of $237.53 billion 
became the third-largest company in the world behind General Electric and Microsoft.”18 
From the Indian perspective of mergers, the case of Tata Oil Mills Company (Tomco) with 
Hindustan Lever Ltd (HLL) in India on 28th December 1994. HLL issued over 28 lakh shares to 
Tomco shareholders that leveraged Tomco’s distribution network in favor of HLL. Similarly, 
with the merger of Electrolux India and Intron with Electrolux Kelvinator, the company emerged 
as a market leader in washing machines and refrigerators.19 
 
2. Vertical  
The term vertical, it denotes “merger of companies engaged in different stages of production in 
an industry, being complementary to each other. The merger could be either up-stream when the 
distributing company merges with a manufacturing company or down-stream when a 
manufacturer merges with a distributor.”20 The merger of Reliance Petrochemicals Limited 
(RPL) with Reliance Industries Limited (RIL), a large-scale merger in India's corporate history, 
is an example of a downstream merger where the producer has merged with the supplier. The 
cumulative production of the new company amounted to 1.24 million barrels of oil per day, 
making Reliance the top 10 non-state refineries in the world at the time of the merger.21 RPL's 
 
18
 Kumar, B. (2019) ExxonMobil Merger. In: Wealth Creation in the World’s Largest Mergers and Acquisitions. 
Management for Professionals. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02363-8_9.  
19
 Business Standards. (2013, June 14). Hind Lever pegs Tomco merger duty at Rs 6 crore. Business Standards. 
Retrieved October 20, 2020, from https://www.business-standard.com/article/companies/hind-lever-pegs-tomco-
merger-duty-at-rs-6-crore-103112201041_1.html  
20
 (Jain, 2010) 
21
 Airy, A. (2009, February 28). Reliance Petroleum to merge with RIL. https://www.hindustantimes.com. 




special economic zone refinery does not have any such restriction and can sell in the domestic 
markets. Thus, the merger allowed RIL to sell products in the domestic market while claiming 
the tax benefits at the same time. Hence vertical mergers are often employed as a way to gain a 
competitive advantage within the marketplace. 
 
3. Conglomerate 
“In this business move, two companies from different industries or geographic locations join 
forces. In a pure conglomerate merger, the companies are completely unrelated in their product 
offerings. In a mixed conglomerate merger, the companies are looking to expand their product 
offerings or market reach by joining with another company.”22  
Conglomerate mergers are used as a method of smoothing out significant swings in earnings and 
maintaining greater continuity in long-term growth. Usually, businesses in established markets 
with low growth opportunities would aim to diversify their business through mergers and 
acquisitions. For example, General Electric Company (GE) is an American international 
company that now operates through a variety of sectors, such as Oil and Gas, Healthcare, 
Aviation, and Software Development. The group diversified its market through mergers and 
acquisitions, allowing (GE) to participate in a range of business operations, ranging from jet 
engine manufacturing to power generation, medical imaging to news and intelligence, and 
financial services to plastics.23  
 
4. Portfolio 
“Portfolio effects may accrue from the circumstance that due to the concentration the new 
undertaking’s product portfolio expands, in particular if these products are complementary.” 24 
Companies with complementary products merging may provide effects related to the product 
portfolio, such as increased potential for product bundling, forced tying etc. These effects may 
restrict buyer choice but could also reduce market price.  
 
22 Meritt, C. (2019, January 31). What Are the Three Different Types of Corporate Mergers & What Is the 
Rationale for Each Type?. https://smallbusiness.chron.com. Retrieved October 20, 2020, from 
https://smallbusiness.chron.com/three-different-types-corporate-mergers-rationale-type-74109.html 
23
 Dua & Associates, S. (2006). Joint Ventures & Mergers and Acquisitions in India : Legal And Tax Aspects (1st 
ed.). Lexis Nexis. ISBN-13 : 978-8180381249 page 224 
24




Hence mergers between companies occur depending on their nature and course of business. 
Benefits of mergers for the acquiring firm: merger of two entities or firms may bring various 
beneficial impact in both short-term as well as long-term development.25  
 
Few crucial advantages observed are discussed below: 
1. Taxation Advantages 
Mergers may take place to take advantage of tax laws, and companies having accumulated losses 
may merge with a profit-earning company that will shield the income from taxation.  
In the merger of Reliance Petrochemicals Limited (RPL) with Reliance Industries Limited (RIL) 
in India to create a petroleum and refining giant in the private sector, the motive behind the 
merger was to use the extensive tax advantage.26 
 
2. Provides a readymade market share platform with faster growth opportunities 
Businesses like cement industries and most capital-intensive industries often adopt this route for 
the growth of opportunities. If the demand for the product increases, the companies usually merge 
with similar industries instead of building a new plant to exploit the current large demand for 
products, then this mode is most beneficial and shortcuts to bring more opportunities. 
 
3. Eliminate a competitor in the market by buying it out 
Facebook was buying out Instagram and WhatsApp as well as Blackberry messenger, to 
eliminate competitors.27 Google's merger with several companies not only eliminated 
competition but also got a readymade market share leading to search monopoly.28 Merger and 





 Id.. page 224 
26
 (Airy, 2009)  
27
 Lordan, B. (2020, December 9). FTC Sues Facebook for Illegal Monopolization. Federal Trade Commission 
Press Releases. Retrieved December 20, 2020, from https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2020/12/ftc-
sues-facebook-illegal-monopolization  
28
 Rivero, N. (2020, October 20). The acquisitions that made Google a search monopoly. https://qz.com. Retrieved 
November 10, 2020, from https://qz.com/1920334/the-acquisitions-that-built-googles-monopoly-on-search/  
19 
 
4. Third Party takeover 
This is a tactic adopted by target companies that refuse to get merged with that group that is 
planning to acquire it. By adopting this, the target companies deter acquiring companies. 
 
5. Intellectual Property Issue 
In a merger, all the assets and liabilities get transferred to the acquiring company (both tangible 
and intangible). How much it is easy to value tangible assets, it becomes equally difficult to value 
the intangible assets like a trademark, copyright, patent, and designs vested in the transferee 
company. Hence another beneficial factor of merging or acquiring is to enjoy the Intellectual 
property rights, and sometimes it leads to misuse or trolling.29  
Merger & Acquisition and Valuation of Intellectual Property Rights:  
Hence as discussed above, merger and acquisition make it clear that there is no standard formula 
for the valuation of intellectual property rights, i.e., copyright, patent, and trademark. Before such 
property valuation, various factors must be taken into consideration; the most common factors, 
according to my analysis, are:30 
1. Extent of statutory protection that the Intellectual Property Right (IPR) enjoys; 
2. Value of each Intellectual Property Right (when viewed separately or as a whole); 
3. Intellectual Property rights risk, such as infringement of third-party rights or infringement 
of Intellectual Property rights by others. 
There are various approaches to valuation, like income approach, cost approach, market 
approach, etc. No universal formula exists for all businesses. Any expert needs to elaborate why 
they chose a specific method (or methods) over all the possible options. 
The related sample clause of the European Union Intellectual Property Protection arrangement 
for the redistribution of properties held by the transferor corporation in favour of the transferee 
company, including intellectual property assets, would be generally worded as follows: 
“The assignment of intellectual property rights can be made as a separate transaction of 
intangible assets, or it may occur as part of much larger acquisitions of assets such as sales of 
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business assets, mergers, or stock purchases. However, ownership of intangible assets is not 
affected by the mere acquisition of shares in a company.”31 
 
Transfer of Patent Rights 
The transferor company’s patent rights and the other assets can also be transferred to the 
transferee company under the scheme of a merger.  
“The Patents Act 1977 (PA 1977) treats patents and patent applications as personal property 
rights. Rights in inventions, patents, and patent applications can be transferred by various 
methods, including assignment or licensing; they can also be used as security to raise funds. 
Transfer of rights can occur at any stage from prior to the making of the invention to the expiry 
of the patent. Any dealing with a patent should also take account of any non-patented know-how 
related to the invention, as there may be considerable value in such technical knowledge.”32 Thus, 
Intellectual Property Rights are transferable as any other property with certain formalities. 
 
Transfer of Intellectual Property Rights In Acquisition 
 Intellectual property owned by a company, in case of an acquisition, specifically acquisition by 
way of purchase of shares of the target company, the acquirer would generally have the right to 
use the existing Intellectual Property Rights, such as the trademark of the targeted company.33 
When the selling shareholder owns the Intellectual Property Right, it does not stand transferred 
automatically. It is transferred when the selling shareholder permits such Intellectual Property 
Rights under a license or transfers the same.34 
After reviewing the principle of mergers and acquisitions, the basic concept and its relation with 
other areas of law, and the beneficial reasons that may either be misused or even contribute to 
growth, we conclude that in order to maintain industry and competitive market practices, fast-
growing companies often must combine and acquire other businesses as well. Around the same 
moment, though, total risk planning is needed in the event of a difference. Especially in the 
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current economy and a tight competitive environment, where so many private companies are 
developing, it is a challenge to maintain one's company in the market.  
Here, Charles Darwin's theory of survival of the fittest is absolutely applicable.  
Hence the merger and acquisition practices need a separate platform of regulations and 
authorities to control and keep in check as a legislative body for fairer competitive practices 
promoting sustainability. 
1.1.1. Mergers and Acquisitions Laws and Regulations around the globe 
In this chapter, the discussion has been made on the global context regarding merger and 
acquisition regulations and the understanding of the merger waves. It even discusses the 
corporate sector's experiments and experiences and the regulations/laws introduced by them to 
handle the situation arising out of mergers. Mergers may lead to any other irretrievable situations 
and issues discussed in this chapter. A further attempt has been devoted to concluding remarks 
on the problem of merger control regulation concerning the competition.  
Merger and acquisition trends give inspiration concerning the market movements. These trends 
have influenced the worldwide economy's product market, financial market, and labor market. 
Merger and Acquisition is a giant part of the company finance world. In today's international, 
competitive atmosphere, mergers are sometimes considered as the tools ensuring long-term 
survival.35 In other cases, like Cisco Systems, mergers are a strategic part of generating long-
term growth to boot; several entrepreneurs now are not building corporations for the long-term; 
they build corporations for the short run, hoping to sell the corporation for large profits.36 It is 
usually aforesaid that the right equation for a merger or a buying deal is one plus one makes 
three. The key principle behind acquiring an organization is to generate additional wealth for the 
shareholders. 
Global mergers and acquisitions are carried out in order to achieve some competitive incentives 
within the respective national markets. With the aid of international mergers and acquisitions, 
multinational companies will benefit from a range of opportunities, including economies of scale 
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and market domination. As a result, international corporations often take advantage of loopholes 
in antitrust laws, or even combine or merge each other to achieve monopoly control. 
International merger and acquisition deals or transactions help an outsized number of companies 
penetrate into new markets fast and attain economies of scale. They also stimulate foreign direct 
investment (FDI). 
To understand the concept from broader aspects, Merger and Acquisition trends provide a 
concept about the market movements. These trends are seen to affect an economy's product 
market, the securities industry, and labour market. Global markets also are considerably 
influenced by the merger and acquisition trends. The concept of merger and acquisition got more 
widely practiced from the year 2006-2007 and the structural imbalances that drove the 2007-
2009 global financial crisis.  It was marked by a spate of mergers and acquisitions everywhere 
both in developing and developed countries. The overall trend was that there was a decline within 
the number of public sector undertakings together with a hike within the number of private sector 
enterprises. This was happening because of the fact that a lot of public sector organizations 
worldwide were either acquired by large private sector enterprises or merged with them. The 
explanation to the merger and acquisition trend, as observed in 2006-2007, lay within the robust 
growth recorded by the Private Equity Funds.  
The opposite factors propelling this trend were the stress on short-term earnings growth and, 
therefore, the strict regulatory structure of public sector enterprises. This merger and acquisition 
trend towards increased privatization of public sector holdings was observed in Europe, Brazil, 
North America, and China. Europe in this period hosted a powerful investment market, which 
catered to the general public to the private sector transition of companies.37 Private equity 
transactions had been the buzzword for a global economy since 2007. 
For China, mergers and acquisitions from the general public to non-public business enterprises 
got government approval in 2006. Private equity firms were working overnight to augment 
proprietary deal flows. China was a novel case in point. There, a robust trend towards mergers 
and acquisitions involving private equity dealings comprised lots of policy and regional diversity. 
A good amount of equity capital flowed into China from the United States, Japan, Israel, and 
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Europe as retail sector investments. This was primarily aimed toward tapping China's heightened 
domestic demand.38 
As these forms of funds usually possessed a timeframe of three to five years for putting the new 
investment capital to figure, they were expected by the analysts to power heightened merger and 
acquisition activities across major global markets for the approaching decade.  
For Europe, the overall prediction was that of a high transactional demand associated with private 
equity. Analysts observed that certain European markets were characterized by different financial 
advantages and tax structures. Western European nations possessed well-oiled legal machinery 
and conducive investment climates. Specifically, Britain exhibited a robust marketplace for the 
public to private investments. After the accession of countries like Hungary, the Czech Republic, 
and Poland into the European Union, few European funds for private equity were seen to be 
abstaining from applying the 'emerging market discount', for investment in those nations.39 
Equity investment in Brazil turned attractive with a program called Novo Mercado.40 Brazilian 
pension funds are clothed to be a major investment force. Free market structure was the sole 
focus thereafter.  The domestic dealings in Merger and Acquisition executed by private equity 
investors of the USA displayed a strong international component.  
Study shows that a majority of the funds want to secure offshore partners for distribution, contract 
manufacturing, reduce tax burden or joint ventures. This kind of cross-border transaction entailed 
careful planning for tax obligations arising out of fund repatriation. “Some reasons have nothing 
to do with tax, such as achieving or expanding an international platform or more readily accessing 
the international capital markets or simply expanding in search of growth.” 41 Global buyout 
figures for 2006 were above US$ 800 billion. This was more than twice the comparable figure 
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for 2005. It constituted around 30% of United States international mergers and acquisitions.42 
However, even then, it was not a big component of the global equity and debt market. In 2006 
North America saw vigorous buyout activities, which amounted to half of the global activity in 
this field.43 
Within the arena of leveraged buyouts, Europe saw a comparatively increased activity, while 
Asia had a relatively slow rise. The biggest European buyout markets in 2006 were France, the 
Netherlands and Germany. There is no doubt that private equity was an important part of the 
stock market in the twenty-first century.44 
Recently a new incentive for mergers and acquisitions emerged, with significant political support 
in the European Union: the threat of international competition, especially from the so-called 
“Chinese champion” companies. Csorba (2020) analyzed the Siemens-Alstom merger case, 
which the European Commission investigated as well, and says the following about the 
subsequent public policy debate45: 
“Both the French and the German government lobbied intensely for the Commission to approve 
the merger. German chancellor Angela Merkel and French president Emmanuel Macron both 
publicly stated that Europe needs ‘super champions’ and ‘industrial giants’ that can succeed in 
global competition – especially against Asian, and specifically state-sponsored Chinese 
competitors, and can protect European jobs. According to the politicians, competition policy 
should support such European industrial policy endeavours. Criticism mounted after the 
prohibition, and culminated in the French and the German economic ministries issuing the 
document known in competition circles simply as the Manifesto, which briefly outlines how 
European industrial policy should change to successfully face the challenges of the 21st century 
(Manifesto [2019]). This likely intentionally provocative proposal makes several 
recommendations for the major overhaul of the institutional framework of European competition 
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policy. A couple of months later, in the framework of the Weimar Triangle, the Polish economics 
ministry joined its German and French counterparts, and they issued their proposals for the 
modernisation of competition policy together.” 46 
This merger case is a good example where the industrial goals of companies and even national 
industrial policy may come into conflict with the competition authority, and its goal of protecting 
customer interests. In other words, it is an example of an intersection of two legal fields of 
Mergers and Acquisitions, and Anti-trust Law, where the interests of the two are not aligned. 
 
In this chapter, I have reviewed the legal field of Mergers and Acquisitions, both from the 
theoretical and from the practical point of view. The understanding of the different definitions, 
types of mergers, and the benefits of such transactions, as well as the investigation of the practical 
aspects of the merger waves and trends, laws and regulations, the possible conflicts between 
industrial policy and competition policy will help in a thorough understanding of the corporate 
behavior in the scenario of my thesis, acquisitions where patents remain unutilized. 
1.2. Anti-Trust Laws on anti-competitive practices 
 
In this chapter, I am reviewing the field of Antitrust Laws on anti-competitive practices, both 
from the theoretical and the practical standpoints. As a theoretical foundation I am reviewing the 
concepts, and the recent laws in both the EU and the US. As a practical overview I am performing 
a comparative study, by examining the differences and commonalities of the United States and 
European Union Antitrust policies and regulations47. I have also decided to include relevant anti-
trust case studies at the intersection of anti-competitive practices and intellectual property, 
especially around patent misuse, to understand the motives and typical corporate behavior that 
characterizes these cases. 
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“Antitrust laws are regulations that encourage competition by limiting the market power of any 
particular firm. This often involves ensuring that mergers and acquisitions don't overly 
concentrate market power or form monopolies, as well as breaking up firms that have become 
monopolies.”48  “Antitrust laws are the broad group of state and federal laws that are designed to 
make sure businesses are competing fairly.”49 “The antitrust laws prescribe unlawful mergers 
and business practices in general terms, leaving courts to decide which ones are illegal based on 
the facts of each case.”50 There is mixed opinion regarding the implementation of antitrust laws. 
The supporting groups encourage it for open marketplace necessity, healthy competition among 
sellers giving customers lower prices, higher-quality products and services, more choices, and 
more significant innovation.  
1.2.2. Anti-Trust Laws on anti-competitive practices in the EU and US 
United States Context and developments on Antitrust in Summary: 
In the United States, the Sherman Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act, and the Clayton Act 
form the basis for antitrust legislation. However, the oldest reference to antitrust appears in the 
form of the Interstate Commerce Act (1887). This act intended to deregulate railroads; the 
Interstate Commerce Act provided that railroads must charge travelers a reasonable fee and, 
among other provisions, must make those charges public.51 
“The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at 
preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the 
unrestrained competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the 
lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time 
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providing an environment conductive to the preservation of our democratic political and social 
institutions.”52  
The Federal Trade Commission Act (1914) bans unreasonable competition tactics and misleading 
acts or activities that assume sole responsibility for the enforcement of antitrust laws.53  
The Clayton Act passed the same year 1914, concerned with particular activities that the Sherman 
Act would not restrict. For example, the Clayton Act prevented the same person from making 
business decisions for competing companies.54 
 
United States Context: Origins 
Before the year 1890, the only “antitrust” law was a common law; there was no clear 
understanding of business ethic’s' competitive factors. “Contracts that allegedly restrained trade, 
like price-fixing agreements, often were not legally enforceable, and even when enforced, they 
did not subject the parties to any legal sanctions.”55 During this time, monopolies in business 
were also within the legal realm of behaviour. In economists’ eyes, the source of the problem 
with monopolies is that they create restraints on trade. This restraint eventually results in reduced 
total economic output, which affects the well-being of producers and customers alike. The 
Sherman Act (1890) was not well defined in terms of monopoly while declaring it illegal and 
eventually there were many loopholes. However, the Sherman Act did not go so far as to delineate 
unlawful practices. “Under the Sherman Act, it appeared to a congressional committee in 1913 
that big business had continued to grow bigger and that the control of money and credit in the 
country was such that a few men had the power to plunge the nation into a financial panic.”56  
The Clayton Act, enacted in 1914, remedied this to some extent. The Clayton Act also authorized 
private antitrust lawsuits and triple fines for damages and exempted trade unions from antitrust 
regulations. The Clayton Act addressed particular activities that are not specifically restricted by 
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the Sherman Act, such as mergers and interlocking directors (that is, the same person making 
business decisions for companies who are competitors).  
The Clayton Act Section 7 prohibited mergers and acquisitions where the result ‘can dramatically 
reduce competition or threaten to create a monopoly’. The Robinson-Patman Act of 1936 
amended the Clayton Act, prohibited discriminatory pricing, facilities and allowances in 
transactions between traders. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act amended the 
Clayton Act again in 1976, to mandate corporations undertaking major mergers or acquisitions 
to alert the government in advance of their proposals.57 The Clayton Act also permitted individual 
parties to sue for triple damages if they have been harmed by actions that violate either the 
Sherman or the Clayton Act and to seek a court order restricting anti-competitive practices in the 
future. 
The credit for regulatory reform in the area of antitrust cannot be given to economists. It has all 
been the product of external forces such as globalization, investigative journalism, and political 
pressure. Some of the influential voices of the time included Ida Tarbellan.58 
One explanation why most economists were oblivious to the legislation was their assumption 
that the increased prices achieved by the perceived anti-competitive actions were more than 
compensated by the price-reducing consequences of higher operational performance and reduced 
costs. Recently, however, economists have started looking at empirical evidence to see whether 
the antitrust laws were needed.59 
 
Anticompetitive Practices 
The demarcation of transparent antitrust practices in reference to contracts in restraint of trade or 
other arrangements is not well laid out in the statutes. Specifically, how certain actions are 
 
57
 (Federal Trade Commission Guide to Antitrust, 2020) 
58
 An American writer, investigative journalist, biographer, and speaker, one of the leading muckrakers of the 
Revolutionary Era of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and a pioneer of investigative journalism, which also 
denounced the supposed power of industrial corporations ("the trusts") to increase prices and exploit customers by 
reducing production. She was born in Pennsylvania at the height of the oil boom and is best known for her 1904 
novel, The History of the Standard Oil Company. The book was published in McClure's Magazine from 1902 to 
1904 as a collection of articles. It was labeled the "masterpiece of investigative journalism" as well as the single 
most influential business book ever published in the United States," among other accolades. The work helped in 
the abolition of the Standard Oil monopoly and would lead to the adoption of the Hepburn Act of 1906, the Mann-
Elkins Act, the creation of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Clayton Antitrust Act. 
59
 (McChesney, 2017) 
29 
 
directly responsible for adversely affecting competitiveness in the industry are often left to the 
courts to adjudicate and pronounce judgments when challenges to any market developments 
between the players are brought in front of them aggrieved parties. 
When confronted with questions on the legality of practices, judges sometimes have turned to 
economists for guidance. Some of the early arrangements that came up before them included 
analyzing information sharing, resale price maintenance, etc. We have moved from a world of 
efficient market hypothesis, perfect information, and zero transaction costs assumptions in the 
analysis. 
Economists now are far more pragmatic and look at antitrust practices from a real-world supply 
chain, market dynamics, and customer behavior perspective. With the advent of technology, we 
can also leverage sophisticated empirical and computational models for the analysis of anti-
competitive activities. We may conclude that per se liability has gradually been superseded by a 
rule-of-reason analysis representing the activity's pro-competitive potential. Within the rule of 
law, the courts have become highly sophisticated in their study of the costs of knowledge and 
transactions and in the ways in which the challenged business activities can minimize them.60 
 
Vertical Contracts 
Vertical agreements refer to agreements between firms at different levels 
(upstream/midstream/downstream) in the supply chain of the industry under consideration. For 
example, a consumer electronics producer can have a vertical agreement with a retailer to market 
their goods in exchange for cheaper prices. 
Vertical agreements can have other forms, including resellers, exclusive distribution partners, 
franchisees, etc. Whether a vertical agreement genuinely limits competition and whether, in any 
situation, the gains outweigh the anti-competitive consequences will also depend on the nature 
of the business.  Vertical agreements are prevalent in most sectors as less scrutinized by legal or 
regulatory authorities as they have a shallow effect on competition compared to horizontal 
agreements.61 “Potential harm from horizontal restraints is exploitative, and harm from vertical 
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agreements is (mostly) exclusionary.”62 Some of the key benefits or motivations vertical 
agreements offer/premise include: 
● Lowered transaction costs   
● Expansion of business interests with relatively low risk   
● Eliminate a few of the many market insufficiencies like double marginalization.   
The 1950s saw the work of people like Robert Bork (University of Chicago) that showed for the 
first time that vertical mergers did not lend any special competitive advantage to either party in 
each other's industries. Instead, it only had a synergistic effect for each of them in terms of 
business expansion and economic efficiencies.63 
Later work in the 1960s showed that manufacturers used fair trade reselling market maintenance 
to create a monopoly at the retail level and encourage non-price competition between retailers. 
The reason given was that since retailers operating under fair trade agreements could not compete 
by cutting price, they instead competed by demonstrating the product to uninformed buyers. The 
resale price depended on the product sophistication as for uninformed buyers, a lot more expense 
was made on advertising and marketing.64 
 
Horizontal Contracts 
Changes in the evaluation of horizontal contracts (agreements between rival vendors in the same 
industry) have been relatively slow. These are contracts where agreements are made between 
parties at the same level in the supply chain. Generally speaking, economists remain almost 
unanimous in condemning all horizontal price-fixing.65 However, some scholars like Donald 
Dewey have indicated that price-fixing may be pro-competitive in some situations. The empirical 
research has shown that price-fixers have not earned higher than regular profits. One can find 
pre-competitive explanations for a lot of other practices employed by firms, and therefore the 
premise of price-fixing is not evidenced. 
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Starting from the work of Joe Bain and George Stigler in the 1950s, economists (and courts) 
concluded a shortage of competition in the market clearly from the fact that business had a high 
level of income concentrated among a handful of participants. It has shown empirically that 
efficiency gains are almost always the primary catalyst of revenue growth and profits from 
mergers rather than anti-competitive conduct. Eventually, economists and judges softened their 
assumptions as to the adverse anticompetitive effects of horizontal mergers.66 The various 
guidelines promulgated in the late eighties and nineties bore witness to the fact that pure 




Described in terms of the Federal Communications Commission, monopolization activities are 
any actions by an individual company that unreasonably limits competition by gaining or 
sustaining monopoly control. “Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits efforts to monopolize and 
conspire. As a first step, the courts question if the firm has "monopoly power" in every market.”67 
The intent to monopolize even without the explicit act of a merger attempt can also be seen as a 
reason enough to challenge. However, as has been seen over the decades, these sorts of challenges 
are often rejected in the courts or are not attainable because of inherent lacunae of self-inflicted 
harm (government induced entry barriers in some industries, for example national defense in 
some countries). In recent years, the most publicized monopoly dispute is the government case 
against Microsoft, that was based on unfounded empirical claims and eventually resulted in 
Microsoft's win over most of the government's allegations.68 The failure of the government case 
represents a recent general decrease in the value of monopoly cases.69  
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Concerns over monopoly have steadily declined with the recognition that different activities 
previously considered to be monopolizing devices (including vertical contracts, as discussed 
above) have pro-competitive reasons.70  
Predatory pricing strategies, condemned in the past to enhance competitiveness, have also 
gradually lost out of infamy, seen reflected in court proceedings like Matsushita Electric 
Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.71 In this case, it was strongly noted by the learned court that 
“there is a consensus among commentators that predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and 
even more rarely successful.”72 
Newer theories of monopolization started seeing the light of day in the 80s, supposedly based on 
strategic behavior (game-theoretic). Such theories postulated that companies could monopolize 
markets by raising rivals’ costs (termed ‘cost predation’). However, it remained unclear as to 
how raising a rival's costs could be a viable monopolizing strategy. Judicial scrutiny of such 
claims was at best inconclusive and obtuse.73 
In today’s world, however, economists generally accept that the most effective cartelization and 
monopoly pricing cases have involved companies that enjoy the security of government price 
regulation and government entry control from new rivals. What is lost in these cases is that the 
federal government’s monopolies are usually excluded from antitrust regulations. Municipal 




From a better economic understanding perspective, economists now realize that one undeniable 
effect of antitrust has been to penalize numerous benign practices. Both horizontal and vertical 
agreements that are useful, particularly in reducing transaction costs, have been effectively 
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banned for many years. Antitrust almost always increases transaction costs because firms must 
hire lawyers and often must litigate to avoid antitrust liability.  
“The most numerous private actions are brought by parties who are in a vertical arrangement 
with the defendant (e.g., dealers or franchisees) and who therefore are unlikely to have suffered 
from any truly anticompetitive offense. Usually, such cases are attempts to convert simple 
contract disputes (compensable by ordinary damages) into triple-damage payoffs under the 
Clayton Act.”74 
Case statistics have suggested that anticompetitive costs (for abusers of the law) may exceed any 
pro-competitive benefits of antitrust laws. The case for antitrust does not even strengthen when 
economists examine the kinds of antitrust cases brought by the government. A deeper 
understanding of the subject-matter by economists suggested unanimously that government 
enforcement of the laws the customer losses incurred from monopoly played absolutely no role 
or in some cases very nominal contribution. 
Economists examined specific antitrust cases brought by the government to see whether 
anticompetitive acts in these cases; however, the empirical answer is usually no. In price-fixing 
cases, the evidence proved that government target companies either were not fixing prices or 
were unsuccessful. Related findings are taken from acquisition case reports and numerous 
antitrust remedies sought by the government; in both cases, the results are inconsistent with the 
anti-trust objective of customer well-being.75 
It has also been found that antitrust compliance trends are driven and may have political 
forbearing entirely unconnected with economic realities. For example, in the hands of 
policymakers, antitrust has been used as a tactic of leverage against prospective companies trying 
to transfer jobs abroad or elsewhere for solely economic purposes. Particularly among 
economists, as well known in the work of economists such as Paul Rubin76, opinions about anti-
trust cases have often been motivated by a solely productivity point of concern rather than by 
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their desire to make personal gains, in the form of full-time jobs and lucrative part-time jobs as 
an expert in antitrust.  
1.2.3. Antitrust Laws and Regulations on European Union and the United States: 
Commonalities and Differences 
In this chapter, I will investigate the different characteristics of the antitrust decision-making 
practices of the European Union and United States competition authorities. Namely, the 
European Commission in the European Union and the Federal Trade Commission in the United 
States. First, I will look at the historical convergence process between the United States and the 
European Union in terms of merger control. I will pay special attention to bring relevant examples 
of the different types of merger control cases and thus examine the process of convergence 
through some practical examples as well. Afterwards, I will also look at some of the antitrust 
policies adopted by the European Union and the United States, both in principles and in practice 
as well. In order to show the practical side, I will also use some examples in this investigation. 
For our first topic, let us look at the convergence process between the European Union  and the 
United States in competition law and the merger control practices that has been going on for 
several years and has recently intensified. 
A trend toward convergence can be traced back to European Union competition law's very 
origins, and indeed of the European Union itself. The work of people like Dean Acheson (then 
Secretary of State of United States) in the 50s played a seminal role in shaping the Schuman 
Declaration, which lay the groundwork for what eventually became the European Union 
(organization of markets under one common theme).77  
The influence of United States antitrust law was profound during the early years of the 
development of competition policy in Europe and has continued ever since. One of the 
cornerstones of both the European Union and United States policy towards competition was the 
role of sound economics and the protection of customer interest.78 Though phrased in different 
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language and expression in terms of the specific statutes, both the European Union and the United 
States merger control laws are underpinned by the same economic rationale.79 There has been a 
large body of precedents built up by the European Commission and the European Courts, which 
have much coincidence of analysis with interpretative precedent in the United States’ (Clayton 
Act).80 
We now look at three specific categories of Merger and Acquisitions and spell out commonalities 
in Antitrust laws’ applications on both sides of the Atlantic. 
We will first examine cases of horizontal mergers. As we have discussed in the previous chapters 
about Mergers and Acquisitions a merger is horizontal if it involves companies manufacturing, 
rendering, producing, or engaged in the same kind of products or services. 
During investigations, one examines whether the merger would be likely to result in horizontal 
overlaps, which would strengthen a dominant position due to which effective competition would 
be significantly impeded.  
Analysis in both the European Union and the United States essentially requires examining the 
same factors, such as overall level of concentration, market characteristics, and market entry 
potential.81  
For example, in the case of the Amoco-British Petroleum merger (largest industrial merger in oil 
and gas in the 90s), the Commission and the Federal Trade Commission co-operated in their 
respective investigations of the effects of these transactions on the competition.82 
The European Union and the United States moreover see eye to eye in relation to the assessment 
of horizontal mergers where the competitive concerns arise from what we term collective or 
oligopolistic dominance, and where one would have fears that the merger might engender the 
possibility of what one terms as “coordinated interaction”.  For example, in the United States, 
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suppose two firms upon merger can engage in coordinated behaviour that harms the customers, 
thereby diminishing competition, would undoubtedly raise a red flag. This behaviour includes 
tacit or express collusion and may or may not be lawful.83  
 
In the European Union dominance tests are applied as well, to situations of oligopolistic 
dominance, as in whether it is likely that terms of coordination could be reached by the 
oligopolists, which would - on the one hand - be profitable to them, and would on the other - 
enable the detection and punishment of any behaviour deviating from the coordination. 84  Post-
merger, specific market factors like the extent of product homogeneity, degree of market-share 
symmetry between the oligopolists, and the types of transactions that show if situations are being 
created that result in collective behaviour diminishing competitiveness.85 
 
Secondly, I will look at some examples of vertical mergers. Vertical merger cases are not 
considered as harmful or risky as horizontal ones, but there have been some important cases that 
involved both the European Union and the United States. The AOC-Time Warner merger is a 
good example illustrating the approach to such mergers, which both the Commission and FTC 
examined in 2000.86 The transaction was approved on both competition authorities only with 
serious commitments from the merging companies. A common concern of “dominant position” 
was shared by both the European Union Commission and the Federal Trade Commission. Key 
issues included: 
“The key concern identified by our investigation was the combination of Time Warner's presence 
in "branded content" (music, news, films, etc..) with AOL's uniquely strong position as the only 
pan-European internet service provider (In the US, AOL was the leading ISP). Time Warner's 
position in content was further strengthened by its links with Bertelsmann. This vertical concern 
was also shared by the FTC, and our close collaboration throughout the investigation period 
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contributed substantially to a better understanding of the potential competition problems which 
the merger gave rise to, and ultimately to a better understanding of the types of remedies that 
would be necessary to allay those concerns.”87 
As we can see, even in the infrequent cases of vertical merger investigations the European Union 
and the United States have aligned their approaches significantly. 
 
Thirdly, there is the case of conglomerate mergers. Large conglomerates in merger cases could 
be understood (as we have seen in the previous chapters about Mergers and Acquisitions) as 
businesses in established markets with low growth opportunities that would aim to diversify their 
business through mergers and acquisitions. There are many commonalities in the approach the 
European Union Commission and the Federal Trade Commission take towards such deals. In 
both jurisdictions, it is widely held that except in exceptional cases, conglomerate mergers do 
not result either in direct horizontal overlaps or in vertical overlaps. They are viewed favorably 
for competition. Some of these circumstances include merged entities leveraging market power 
to directly or indirectly foreclose markets from effective competition. In other situations, such 
mergers may substantially reduce customer choice and ultimately lead to higher prices and a loss 
of welfare. For example, in the case of the TetraLaval acquisition by Sidel, the Commission 
vetoed the acquisition. TetraLaval dominated the carton packaging equipment business by 80% 
(with a market share of around 80% in the European Economic Area). Meanwhile, Sidel was the 
leading French supplier in the neighbouring market for plastic packaging equipment. “According 
to the E.C., Tetra dominated carton liquid food packaging while Sidel led the industry in 
producing plastic liquid food packaging.”88 There were concerns that the merger would have 
allowed Tetra Laval to leverage its position in the carton packaging market to the plastic 
packaging market (for instance, through tying of the two products to clients in need of both plastic 
and carton) and, therefore, to progressively eliminate competition in the later market.” 89 
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 “The E.C.’s theories are consistent with the economic model where a monopoly of one market 
(that of Tetra) is able to leverage its market power into a market with imperfect competition (that 
of Sidel)” 90 
The last part of the merger control where both the European Commission and the United States’ 
Federal Trade Commission, and the Department of Justice shows a lot of convergence is the 
applicable remedies in merger cases. 
In the European Union context, there are guidelines on remedies that must meet certain 
objectives: 
“Remedies proposed by the parties fully resolve the competition concerns raised by the 
Commission and thus eliminate the creation or the strengthening of a dominant position. 
Remedies must be clear-cut and entirely remove our competition concerns. The Notice's second 
aim is to make sure that the remedies accepted by the Commission can be implemented 
effectively and within a short period. They should not require additional monitoring once they 
have been implemented. The commitments offered must moreover contain specific details and 
procedures relating to their implementation. The Commission has also indicated that, in most 
cases, it is appropriate to appoint a trustee, who will have the responsibility of overseeing the 
implementation of the commitments. In cases of divestiture, if the parties do not succeed in 
finding an acceptable purchaser within the time frame set out in the commitments, the trustee 
must have an irrevocable mandate to dispose of the business within a given time period at no 
minimum price.” 91 
In the European Union the most important requirements in terms of remedies can be summarized 
as concrete and measurable actions that will reasonably prevent the creation or the strengthening 
of a dominant market position. A further important requirement is that the European Commission 
is looking for such actions that will not need any further monitoring after a measurable 
implementation.92 This additional requirement in my opinion severely limits the options available 
for the European Commission in protecting customer interests.  
The issue I am discussing in this thesis is such, where the customer's access to innovation may 
be limited or may cease entirely without proper supervision at least on some recurring basis. 
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Even though it is not directly the topic of our comparative investigations here, this aspect is worth 
noting, because it may provide a reasonable explanation on the causes and circumstances of the 
problem and the proposed solution I have identified in this thesis. 
Most recently, the European Union approach to remedies has been strongly influenced by the 
United States’ antitrust authorities (Federal Trade Commission, as well as the Department of 
Justice) study on the divestiture process. Furthermore, the European Union and the United States 
antitrust authorities discussed their respective approaches to remedies within the United States-
European Union working group's framework on merger control. 
As the European Union approach evolved over time, it has embraced in a much broader sense, 
failing firm defence, a well-established United States standard for mergers. A failing firm in 
merger control cases is defined by the OECD Glossary of Industrial Organization Economics and 
Competition Law as follows: “A firm that has been consistently earning negative profits and 
losing market share to such an extent that it is likely to go out of business. The concept becomes 
an issue in merger analysis when the acquiring firm argues that the acquisition of such a firm 
does not result in substantial lessening of competition since it is likely to exit the market anyway. 
If this is true, the ‘current’ market share of the failing firm may have no ‘future’ competitive 
significance and should be weighted accordingly.”93 
This defense allows a merger to proceed even with competition concerns from such a merger, 
under the extraordinary circumstances that failing the merger, the company to be acquired might 
go bankrupt in the event of a failed deal. 
The other significant area of study is the antitrust policy of the two agencies. There has been 
some convergence in this area as well. The typical agreements that are covered in these antitrust 
investigations are: “vertical and horizontal agreements, such as exclusive dealing, selective 
distribution, R&D agreements, specialization agreements, purchasing and commercialization 
agreements and agreements on standards.”94 
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Horizontal agreements that are agreements between competitors in the same market are generally 
considered riskier in terms of anti-competitive effects to the detriment of the customers. In these 
cases, the European Union guidelines are very similar to the Federal Trade Commission and 
Department of Justice guidelines on co-operation between competitors. Both regulators adopt a 
careful investigation of the positive and negative effects of the agreements. Some problematic 
agreement types, also called ‘no-go areas’ have been identified: “For horizontal agreements, 
these are basically price agreements between competitors, output fixing, and market sharing. For 
vertical agreements, retail price maintenance is the most notable ‘hardcore’ or ‘per se’ 
infringement we have in common. Both agencies have ceased to treat maximum retail price 
maintenance as a ‘no-go’.”95 
In the vertical restraints, however, the European Commission policies treat territorial and 
customer resale restrictions much more seriously as opposed to their United States counterparts. 
This difference in approaches can be attributed mainly due to the special attention by the 
European Commission on trying to establish the single market, identify and prevent anti-
competitive measures that would - instead of encouraging the single market - strengthen the 
national division of the European Union markets. Nagy (2013) explains the commonalities and 
differences between the EU and US regulatory approaches on territorial vertical constraints: 
“US antitrust law treats territorial exclusivities laxly, while in the EU absolute territorial 
protection is chased with fire and sword, albeit restrictions on active promotion (relative 
territorial protection) are, similarly, subject to effects analysis. Nonetheless, the purpose of 
market integration (single market imperative) is said to justify this deviation from sound 
economics in the EU.” 96 
He further examines the differences between the handling of inter-brand and intra-brand 
constraints, especially since the latter has been a source of some divergence since the year 2007 
Supreme Court decision in the United States on retail price fixing. 97 
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Increasing convergence is seen in the area of monopolization otherwise known as abuse of a 
dominant position. The OECD Glossary of Industrial Organization Economics and Competition 
Law defines monopolization as follows: 
“Attempts by a dominant firm or group of relatively large firms to maintain or increase market 
control through various anticompetitive practices such as predatory pricing, pre-emption of 
facilities, and foreclosure of competition. See also discussion under abuse of dominant 
position.”98 
In some areas in Europe where economic liberalization started late (especially in the former 
soviet sphere states), many of the former monopolistic companies remained in strong dominant 
positions. These have been monitored by the Commission carefully, because they are significant 
risk factors for an abuse of a dominant position, even sometimes in neighboring markets. 
One interesting case in monopolization is the complaint by UPS against Deutsche Post: 
“UPS operates in the business parcel sector in Germany, where it competes against the former 
state-owned monopolist Deutsche Post. UPS claimed that Deutsche Post was using revenues 
from its profitable letter-mail monopoly to finance a strategy of below-cost selling in business 
parcel services, which are open to competition. UPS's complaint was ultimately upheld by the 
Commission. As a result, Deutsche Post will have to create a separate legal entity for its business 
parcel services. Furthermore, in light of the foreclosure that resulted from a long-standing scheme 
of fidelity rebates granted by Deutsche Post to all major customers in the mail-order business, 
the Commission ordered Deutsche Post to abandon its rebate system and imposed on the firm a 
fine of more than US$ 20 million (€24 million).”99 
Deutsche Post was in a dominant position and has used its dominant power to undercut and keep 
from competing UPS. Such practices are very detrimental not only to customers but to the growth 
and functioning of the single market of the European Union as well. 
In conclusion, we can state that even the legal instruments, the court systems are significantly 
different in both the European Union and the United States, there is a strong emphasis on both 
sides of the Atlantic to increase the convergence between the procedures and practices, as well 
as the micro-economic analytical tools of the two competition agencies, the European 
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Commission and the Federal Trade Commission. This is even more necessary considering that 
many international companies operate both in the United States and European Union markets, 
and their competitive (or anti-competitive) practices are usually not limited to one jurisdiction. 
Moreover, there is very substantial value in the predictability of antitrust law enforcement 
practices in both jurisdictions, since such predictability will reduce the inherent risks in making 
effective marketing, production and other business strategies. This in turn will increase the 
efficiencies of the companies operating in these markets. 
Over the last decade, numerous antitrust cooperation agreements have been signed between the 
European Union and the United States, and communications at the staff level have increased as 
well. One of the more important initiatives has been the establishment of the International 
Competition Network (ICN), which is a non-governmental cooperation entity of competition 
agencies. 
“The ICN is an informal network of established and newer competition agencies with the 
common aim of addressing practical antitrust enforcement and policy issues. By enhancing 
convergence and cooperation, the ICN promotes more efficient and effective antitrust 
enforcement worldwide for the benefit of consumers and businesses.”100 
This definition by the International Competition Network highlights its informal nature and the 
practicality of the cooperation between the different members of the network. Such cooperation 
is aimed at increasing efficiencies and sharing best practices. The procedures of the ICN are 
described as follows: 
“The ICN is a results-based, project-oriented organization, which has grown from 16 competition 
agencies to 104 competition agencies in 7 years. The ICN is exclusively concerned with 
competition law. (“It is all competition, all the time”). It operates by consensus. ICN work takes 
place in practical working groups, with members and nongovernmental advisors (NGAs) 
developing materials and conducting discussions, typically via teleconference or e-mail. 
Members and experts convene at an annual conference to discuss group projects and the 
implications for competition policy and enforcement. In addition, ICN working groups organize 
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periodic workshops on specific enforcement and policy topics. ICN is not used as a forum to 
cooperate on specific cases.”101 
The growth of the network from 16 to 104 competition agencies is very impressive and goes to 
illustrate that there is significant value in standardizing the analytical tools and legal frameworks 
around the different competition agencies. This is all the more necessary considering that many 
of today’s largest companies, especially the ones that may be the target of antitrust investigations 
are operating at least on an international, but more often global scale. 
“Economic globalization has resulted in an increasing number of investigations and reviews of 
mergers, cartels and unilateral conduct that transcend jurisdictional boundaries. Agencies need 
to cooperate with each other on cross-border cases in order to reduce the risk of: (i) sub-optimal 
enforcement if an agency only has a partial picture of the situation; and (ii) inconsistent outcomes 
if different jurisdictions reach different conclusions about the same practice. The ICN helps 
facilitate cooperation and convergence, where appropriate. This is good for competition agencies, 
governments, businesses, and ultimately consumers.”102 
The value of the cooperation can thus be understood as a multiple win-win for all parties 
involved. It is beneficial for the competition agencies because they can acquire know-how on the 
“big picture” and understand the rationale of the companies that are forming their strategies on 
an international, or even on a global scale. It is beneficial for the governments because they have 
clear guidelines and references to regulate the often-multinational companies involved in the 
merger control cases. It is also beneficial for businesses, because they are better able to predict 
the outcomes of merger control investigations. Finally, it is beneficial for customers, because the 
ultimate goal of the competition agencies is to protect the customer interests, and a well-
functioning competition agency and Antitrust Law framework is paramount to ensure such 
interests. 
 
In the following section, I will look at the merger control case of General Electric and Honeywell, 
a conglomerate merger where the European Union and United States competition agencies have 
reached a different conclusion. In the previous sections, I have described many of the 
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commonalities, convergence factors and even the international cooperation, but it is also 
important to examine when they differ. 
One of the prime candidates that demonstrate a divergence in the Competition Laws in terms of 
their interpretation (especially) between the United States (US) and the European Union 
(European Union) is the case of the General Electric/Honeywell merger. This case was as 
follows. 
Before getting into details, we must understand what a “Conglomerate” is. 
“Conglomerates are large parent companies that are made up of many smaller independent 
entities that may operate across multiple industries. Many conglomerates are thus multinational 
and multi-industry corporations. Each one of a conglomerate's subsidiary businesses runs 
independently of the other business divisions; but the subsidiaries’ managers report to the senior 
management of the parent company. 
Taking part in many different businesses can help a conglomerate company diversify the risks 
posed from being in a single market. Doing so may also help the parent lower total operating 
costs and require fewer resources.”103 
Conglomerates are also large and global, in many cases with more than ten thousand or more 
workers globally in a variety of countries. Some conglomerates in the European Union include 
Red Bull GmBH, Carlsberg Group, Maersk, Alstom, Renault, PSA Peugot Citroen, and in the 
United States include Alphabet Inc, Berkshire Hathaway, Apple Inc, AT&T, Boeing, Proctor and 
Gamble, Philip Morris International. 
Owing to their size and market penetration, any merger and acquisition activities between 
conglomerates would naturally be of immense impact on the market and stakeholders in general. 
Therefore, it is essential to apply a high level of scrutiny to such activities in any regulatory 
jurisdiction, and so was the case with the proposed Honeywell-GE Deal. We look at the 
Honeywell-GE case for a detailed analysis of the commonalities and divergences through this 
example. 
In October 2001, it was reported that the General Electric Company (GE), the largest corporation 
in the world and the number one jet engine maker, will buy Honeywell, the world's largest 
provider of non-engine aerospace equipment. The CEO of GE, Jack Welch, did not expect any 
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antitrust problems, as the planned acquisition would be a conglomerate, not a horizontal one. The 
integration would merely tie together similar goods that were components of large jet aircraft. 
The agreement sailed seamlessly through the United States Department of Justice and the green 
light was given on 2 May 2001.104 
However, the European Commission attacked the merger. On 3 July 2001, the merger was 
prohibited. This development can shed light on the "Divergent" views of the European Union 
Commission the United States Department of justice and brought out the stark differences. 
The European Commission had strong reservations in four aspects: 
“(1) Eliminating competition. The merger would create a horizontal overlap in engines for 
large regional jets and corporate and small regional jets, strengthening GE's dominant 
position. 
(2) Bundling. The merged firm, having a large line of complementary products including 
products in which it was dominant or near dominant, would have the incentive to engage in 
mixed product bundling. Reflecting advantages of economic integration, including the 
enormous financial resources of GE Capital, the merged company would probably lower the 
price of the bundle while raising the stand-alone price of the products sold. The competitors, 
which would face higher costs of capital, would be unable to lower their prices to the same 
extent. Although they would reduce prices somewhat, they would lose market share and the 
profits necessary to invest in research and development, which would eventually lead to 
market exit or to the termination of key market segments. Then, the merged firm would raise 
its prices, creating or strengthening a dominant position in the manufacture of jet aircraft 
engines and in avionics and non-avionics products. 
(3) Vertical foreclosure of competing engine manufacturers. Honeywell is an important 
supplier of engine controls, such as starters, to engine manufacturers. Honeywell would have 
had the potential to delay or disrupt the supply of engine controls, or to increase rivals' costs, 
strengthening GE's dominant position in engines. 
(4) Reciprocity (using leverage to induce one's suppliers to become loyal customers), 
foreclosing avionics and non-avionics manufacturers from substantial business they would 
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otherwise have won on their merits. GE Capital provides extensive financial support to its 
potential customers, the aircraft makers, and uses its and GE's financial power to procure 
exclusive supply positions for its products. GECAS uses its buying and launching platform 
leverage to encourage aircraft makers to shift business to GE. After the merger, Honeywell's 
products would similarly benefit from this financial strength, buying power, and leverage. 
Since airlines are relatively indifferent to component selection, they would probably shift 
purchases of avionic and non-avionic products to GE. Competitors would be progressively 
marginalized and might exit the market, creating a dominant position in avionic and non-
avionic products for the merged firm.”105 
The European Commission firmly believed that given the go-ahead, the merger would result in 
the creation of dominance in the market, bundling, leverage, and cross-subsidization, all 
hazardous for the competitiveness of the Aerospace Industry in particular. Past precedents also 
clearly indicated that under the European Union laws, the merger might not find legal ground to 
sustain. 
The arguments of the United States competition agency were based around Cournot efficiency. 
“One might view the Americans' conclusion-that the merger was price lowering and therefore 
efficient and pro-competitive-as a neat trick. Their conclusion was based on the Cournot effect 
of bringing monopoly ownership of complements under joint control. If premerger GE were 
dominant in engines, which the United States authorities denied, and if Honeywell were dominant 
in avionics, which neither United States nor European authorities believed, then GE and 
Honeywell each would have been charging a supra competitive price before the merger. A 
merged GE/Honeywell would have avoided double marginalization, stopping its own two-stage 
supra competitive pricing in order to increase profits. If the theory was that Honeywell was not 
dominant pre-merger but that the merger would make it dominant (which, again, the Americans 
did not believe), then the argument would be that there was no need to fear that the merger would 
create dominance, because the combination would create incentives to curb the exploitative 
power that dominance confers. In fact, even though neither GE nor Honeywell offered proof of 
such promised efficiencies, both American and European authorities asserted that GE/Honeywell 
would lower its prices after the merger. The United States and the European Union simply came 
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to different conclusions. The United States argued that the lower prices would trigger more 
competition; European authorities insisted that the merger would be price-raising after a siege of 
low pricing. They argued that prices would rise not in the short-term, but in the medium-term, as 
the competitive structure of the market weakened, and the less advantaged competitors 
disengaged from the sectors in which GE/Honeywell had preferential access to customers.”106 
 
The American authorities therefore believed that the merger would be efficient, and the European 
authorities believed that the merger would cause prices to rise especially in the medium term. 
“Moreover, researchers and representatives of the United States antitrust agencies frequently 
criticize the E.C.’s actions. In the GE-Honeywell case, for instance, then deputy assistant attorney 
general William J. Kolasky criticized the E.C. for attempting to protect competitors rather than 
competition.”107 
We can observe their key points of difference in their assessments: 
i. Impact on prices: Americans believed the price levels would reduce through Cournot 
efficiencies coming into play, whereas the European Union felt strong market power 
would pressure prices and eventual increase in price levels. 
ii. Double Marginalization: Pursuant to a price level increase, there would be double 
marginalization as per European Union. As per the American view, there would not be 
any mark-up of prices post-merger; we would not see double marginalization. 
iii. Dominant Position: Firms, not dominant pre-merger, would both gain dominant positions 
post-merger (from the European Union point of view). Firms, not dominant pre-merger, 
would continue to remain in non-dominant positions post-merger as well (from the United 
States point of view). 
iv. Competitiveness: Competitors (less advantaged) would be eventually forced to exit in the 
medium term as price levels rise. The merged entity has preferential access to customers 
(from the European Union point of view). A medium to long-term price drop would 
occur, incentivizing even less advantaged competitors by triggering more competition 
(from the United States perspective). 
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In this chapter, I have investigated the different characteristics of the antitrust decision-making 
practices of the European Union and United States competition authorities. I have started by 
looking at the historical convergence process between the United States and the European Union 
in terms of merger control. Afterwards I have also examined some of the antitrust policies 
adopted by the European Union and the United States, both in principles and in practice as well. 
In order to show the practical side, I have used some examples both for convergence and for 
divergence. 
In conclusion I have seen that there is a very strong movement towards standardizing the different 
practices between the two jurisdictions (and even internationally). However, due to the different 
market dynamics of the European Union and the United States, the strong political will in the 
European Union to create and maintain a single market despite national boundaries, and some 
different approaches in short-term and long-term thinking, the convergence is far from complete. 
 
1.2.4. Case Studies in Antitrust 
In this chapter I will examine case studies specifically at the intersection of Patent Law and 
Antitrust Law. I have chosen these case studies to illustrate the corporate behaviour around the 
concept of patent misuse, what arrangements are usually made that harm the customer’s interests 
in order to unlawfully increase monopoly profits, discourage competition etc. These effects were 
not originally intended under patent law, but they are in the interest of the companies involved. 
In many cases millions of dollars or euros could be won at the customer’s expense that would 
otherwise be manifested as price reductions and/or quality improvements in a more competitive 
market environment. 
The phenomenon of patent misuse falls on the boundaries of Patent Laws and Antitrust Laws. 
These two legal fields, since they are fundamentally opposite in their goals, often clash when 
some companies overreach and use their temporary monopoly rights granted under Patent Laws 
in such a way that it was not intended by the legislator when originally identifying the cases and 
frameworks of patents.  
49 
 
The main goal of Patent Law is to encourage innovation and the distribution of knowledge about 
innovation by granting temporary monopoly rights to the innovator, in exchange for publishing 
the details of the invention in a generally understandable format, so that anyone reasonably 
skilled in the field can understand and apply the invention. These rights have clear boundaries 
both in terms of scope (the specifications of the patent that are published), and in time (with a 
usual term of 20 years from filing). These well-defined boundaries are necessary to prevent 
companies from various interpretations of the extent of their rights, which they could use to 
extend the benefits of their monopolies. However, as we will see a case study below, these 
boundaries are sometimes not as straightforward as intended, and competition does not simply 
spring up immediately once the patent terms expire. 
The main goal of Antitrust Law is to prevent companies from abusing their power on the market 
to decrease the threat of competition, to raise prices or decrease quality to the detriment of 
customers, or to hinder technological progress. All these actions are only examples of abusing 
market power that ultimately lead to harm in customer interests. These strategies are usually 
followed by companies to increase profits, especially via monopolies or any measures that could 
be considered anti-competitive. In essence patents are a form of abuse of market power, but a 
rare legitimate one. 
There is much scholarly debate on whether to apply Patent Law or Antitrust Law principles in 
cases when patent misuse occurs. Recent court decisions have shown examples that the judicial 
bodies, especially in the United States should apply Antitrust Law principles in such cases.108 
 
Simply using the principles of Antitrust Laws has a certain logical simplicity and appeal when 
dealing with patent misuse. Since Antitrust Law deals with the misuse of monopoly power, and 
on the surface Patent Law deals with granting such monopoly powers, it should be perfectly 
adequate to identify the cases when the patent has been misused, by examining the determining 
factors when the monopoly rights have been misused.109 This logic is even more appealing 
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considering the large quantity of legal precedents, investigations and regulations gathered under 
Antitrust Law over the decades since it has been applied.110 
However, there are significant reasons why patent misuse is a different phenomenon than a 
simple misuse of monopoly power. The first and most obvious reason is that the patent holder 
only has the right to establish a monopoly utilizing a certain invention, but the realities of market 
dynamics and the necessary investment, customer acquisition costs and procedures may and do 
provide inhibiting factors in such efforts. The threat of substitute products as a significant market 
factor could be enough to disqualify under Antitrust Law a patent holder company from having 
a monopoly position on a certain market. Another prominent example is when the customer 
acquisition costs are perceived to be prohibitively high, and thus discourage the patent holder 
from building such monopoly. However, even these cases patent misuse could still harm the 
original goal of the patent system, which is the technological advancement of society through 
encouraging innovation and the dissemination of knowledge. Simply put, it is not enough to look 
at whether a company has monopoly power on the market to determine whether they have 
misused their patent.111 
This is the exact reason why I am considering it important to showcase some cases of corporate 
behavior to look at patent misuse in practice, because focusing on Patent Law or Antitrust Law 
principles and regulations alone would not give us a clear picture on what manifestations of 
patent misuse have been happening recently. 
According to the United States Supreme Court, patent misuse can be defined “as an 
impermissible attempt to extend the time or scope of the patent grant.”112.  This definition may 
be deduced from several cases where the Supreme Court has condemned the companies that 
attempted to broaden the scope of their monopoly rights, either through trying to broaden the 
scope of protection (for example through product bundling, conditional licensing etc.) or the time 
of the time of protection (for example by signing licensing deals that reach beyond the life of the 
patent). 
One important aspect as per the rulings of the Supreme Court is that patent misuse itself only 
renders the patent unenforceable but does not invalidate the patent itself. As soon as the patent 
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misuse conditions cease to exist, the patent may be enforceable again. Such abuse of the patent 
invalidates the patent enforceability for all infringers, not only the ones directly affected by the 
abuse. For example, in the case of B. Braun Medical, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 124 F.3d 1419 
(Fed. Cir. 1997)113 , the Supreme Court decided to affirm the judgement of a lower court that 
Abbott did not infringe on Braun Medical’s patent right, but at the same time denied that Abbott 
would be entitled for payment on the damages that the patent misuse of Braun Medical has caused 
them. This affirmed the above notion that the patent itself was still valid, however not infringed 
and the misuse simply invalidated any claims Braun Medical would have had if the patent was 
still enforceable. 
In the following case study, I will take a look at a common practice from pharmaceutical 
companies called “product hopping” and how it was entangled with another anticompetitive 
behavior of not only the patent holder company, but a potential competitor and licensee as well, 
in a real-world scenario. 
Product hopping happens often in the case of pharmaceutical companies, when a patented 
pharmaceutical is nearing the lifetime of the patent, and there is a significant threat of a generic 
drug using the same formula that would enter the marketplace. The threat of generics in this case 
is highly encouraged by laws and operational practices of the drug administration agency (United 
States. Food and Drug Administration) in which a generic provider can apply in an easy 
procedure to produce a generic version of a branded (and previously patented) pharmaceutical. 
Moreover, pharmacies can also start simply exchanging the branded drug with the generic drug 
and giving that to the patients as an equivalent.  
This so-called automatic substitution in the pharmacy is the most efficient way of distributing a 
generic drug. The reason why the drug administration agency is encouraging this practice is 
because it usually results in very significant cost reductions for the customers, especially when 
experiencing competitive pressure between generic providers. 
The Federal Trade Commission has issued a brief in 2015 about this practice of product hopping, 
stating that these can easily be interpreted as a violation of Antitrust Laws. The brief explanation 
of product hopping as follows: 
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“If a brand-name manufacturer tweaks its brand-name product shortly before anticipated generic 
entry and begins eliminating the market for the original formulation, it can impede competition 
from would-be generic entrants, which have sought FDA approval to sell a generic version only 
of the original formulation but not the replacement.”114 
The companies may do this tweaking of the product formula to destroy the original brand, and 
redirect demand to the new drug before the patent expiration, to avoid the automatic substitution. 
As the brief describes, this decreases the incentives of the generic drug manufacturers 
significantly. “The brief explains, however, that the district court’s broad ruling effectively 
embraces a rule of nearly per se legality for product-hopping conduct: ‘The district court held 
that a brand company may with impunity destroy what is often the only means of generic 
distribution -- automatic substitution -- so long as generics remain hypothetically free to pursue 
new and more costly distribution alternatives, such as direct advertising to physicians.’ That 
outcome, the brief states, conflicts with the law of the Third Circuit, as well as other circuits.”115 
 
In the following case of the Federal Trade Commission vs Impax Laboratories, the Federal Trade 
Commission did not investigate the product hopping strategy itself, but another (indirect) 
consequence of product hopping, a reverse payment scheme. The reverse payment being the main 
part of the investigation, the case also involved patent invalidation, infringement lawsuits, at-risk 
(of infringement) product launch, patent licensing etc. It shows many relevant parts of the patent 
and antitrust puzzle at play in a real-world business scenario. It is also very educational regarding 
the process by which these cases are investigated, and the anti-competitive behavior is proven in 
court. 
 
Federal Trade Commission vs. Impax Laboratories 
Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. and Impax Laboratories were investigated by the Federal Trade 
Commission between March 2016 and March 2019 for several cases of anticompetitive behavior. 
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At first, the Federal State Commission sued Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc, Impax Laboratories Inc 
and Watson Laboratories Inc for blocking customer access to generic versions of branded drugs 
of Endo Pharmaceuticals. The court cases involved two drugs specifically, Opana ER, an 
extended-release opioid used as a pain killer, and Lidoderm, a topical patch used also as a pain 
reliever in cases of post-herpetic neuralgia. 
The complaint of the FTC was as follows: 
“In 2010, Endo and Impax illegally agreed that until January 2013, Endo would not compete by 
marketing an authorized generic version of Endo’s Opana ER. In exchange, Endo paid Impax 
more than $112 million, including $10 million under a development and co-promotion agreement 
signed during the same time period. Endo used this period of delay to transition patients to a new 
formulation of Opana ER, thereby maintaining its monopoly power even after Impax’s generic 
entry. In 2010, Opana ER sales in the United States exceeded $250 million. 
In May 2012, Endo and its partners, Teikoku Seiyaku Co. Ltd. and Teikoku Pharma USA, Inc., 
illegally agreed with Watson Laboratories, Inc. that until September 2013, Watson would not 
compete with Endo and Teikoku by marketing a generic version of Endo’s Lidoderm patch. In 
exchange, Endo paid Watson hundreds of millions of dollars, including $96 million of free 
branded Lidoderm product that Endo and Teikoku gave to Watson. As a result, Endo illegally 
maintained its monopoly over Lidoderm. In 2012, Lidoderm sales in the United States 
approached $1 billion. 
Endo and Watson illegally agreed that, for 7½ months after September 2013 (including the 180-
day first-filer exclusivity period for which Watson was eligible), Endo would not compete by 
marketing an authorized generic version of Lidoderm. This agreement left Watson as the only 
generic version of Lidoderm on the market, substantially reducing competition and increasing 
prices for generic lidocaine patches. As a result, Watson made hundreds of millions of dollars 
more in generic Lidoderm sales.”116 
All of the cases above involved a so-called no-AG commitment (no authorized generic 
commitment), which means that the pharmaceutical company acting as the owner of the branded 
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drug, will not market their own generic version of the branded drug, and thus will leave the 
generic competitor as the sole provider of the drug for a set period of time. Under said period the 
generic competitor will therefore enjoy a monopoly and may charge customers higher prices than 
otherwise would be possible had both companies marketed and sold competing products. These 
arrangements are especially lucrative due to the Hatch-Waxman Act which was intended to 
provide the first generic entrant on the market with additional incentives to enter competition by 
giving them a limited time to be the sole challenger to the branded product. The Federal Trade 
Commission describes the market and legal situation as follows: 
“Under federal law, the first generic applicant to challenge a branded pharmaceutical’s patent, 
referred to as the first filer, may be entitled to 180 days of exclusivity as against any other generic 
applicant upon final FDA approval. But a branded drug manufacturer is permitted to market an 
authorized generic version of its own brand product at any time, including during the 180 days 
after the first generic competitor enters the market. As the FTC has previously argued in amicus 
briefs, a no-AG commitment can be extremely valuable to the first-filer generic, because it 
ensures that this company will capture all generic sales and be able to charge higher prices during 
the exclusivity period.”117 
These no-AG commitments basically are anti-competition commitments whereby the company 
that could reasonably compete with another as allowed by the current legal frameworks for a 
certain time period is refraining to do so, in order to share the monopoly profits with a generic 
entrant. In exchange for refraining from competition the company will get reimbursement from 
the generic entrant called a reverse payment scheme. These reimbursement in turn will be funded 
by the monopoly profits the generic entrant may earn during the exclusivity period since thanks 
to the anti-competition commitment they can enjoy a monopoly position being the only legal 
provider of the generic drug. Such anti-competitive commitments and any contracts or 
agreements containing such commitments are to be handled on Antitrust Law principles. The 
Federal Trade Commission considers these reverse payment schemes and no-AG commitments 
very harmful for consumers: 
“‘Settlements between drug firms that include ‘no-AG commitments’ harm consumers twice – 
first by delaying the entry of generic drugs and then by preventing additional generic competition 
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in the market following generic entry,’ said FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez. ‘This lawsuit 
reflects the FTC’s commitment to stopping pay-for-delay agreements that inflate the prices of 
prescription drugs and harm competition, regardless of the form they take.’”118 
The double harm comes from the customers not having access to the generic alternatives and the 
additional delays of other generic competition. These harms are manifested usually in both higher 
prices and the decreased product choices as well. 
 
However, the relationship and agreements between Impax Laboratories Inc and Endo 
Pharmaceuticals Inc were much more complicated than just the reverse payment scheme. In the 
next section, I will attempt to highlight the events that unfolded in this relationship and the 
subsequent Federal Trade Commission investigation. 
 
Endo Pharmaceuticals was selling the brand-name drug Opana ER on the United States market 
with a patented formula. The patent for the formula for Opana ER was going to expire in 2013. 
After the expiration of the patent, generic competition may enter the market. In the United States, 
Congress has few acts, most famously the Hatch-Waxman Act, that encourages this generic 
entry. These acts allow companies to file simplified applications with the United States Food and 
Drug Administration, where they only must prove that the generic drug has equivalent biological 
and chemical properties to the original patented drug. When such applications are filed, the 
company that acquires the first filing date is entitled to a 180-day exclusivity period. This 
exclusivity in practice means that the United States Food and Drug Administration will not 
approve another generic to enter the market until after 180 days have passed since the first filer 
company launched their generic drug on the market. These 180 days have immense importance 
for the first filer since the profits gained during this period are equivalent to or more than the rest 
of the new generic drug's lifetime. This ease of entry for a generic is made even more prevalent 
since pharmacists are encouraged to apply automatic substitution at the pharmacy and give the 
cheaper generic to patients instead of the branded drug. However, the brand-name owner drug 
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company can still compete even in these 180 days with the first filer generic drug company by 
launching its own generic drug, called an authorized generic.119 
This legal environment provides strong incentives for generic drug companies to accept so-called 
reverse payments from the branded name drug owner company since the branded drugs are 
usually more expensive than their generic counterparts, thus if the branded drug owner can extend 
their monopoly rights illegally through such a deferred entry of generic players, they can acquire 
significant amounts of monopoly profits within the period of 180 days as well. On the other hand, 
as we discussed above, no-AG settlements can also be an option (albeit less profitable for the 
companies involved) when the generic entrant remains in the monopoly position for the 180-day 
period since the branded drug owner company will not launch their generic drug and refrain from 
competition. 
In the Impax Laboratories and Endo Pharmaceutical case Impax had an even stronger position 
than most generic first filer companies. The Food and Drug Administration approved Opana ER 
in 2006; shortly afterward, in 2007, Impax Laboratories applied and became the first filer, and 
even stated that the Endo Pharmaceutical patents were invalid, or the Impax Laboratories product 
did not infringe on them. Even though Endo Pharmaceuticals sued Impax Laboratories for patent 
infringement immediately, which delayed Impax Laboratories’ possible market entry until 2010, 
Impax Laboratories prepared an at-risk (of infringement) market entry and started to produce a 
large stock of its generic product for the market launch.120 
Endo Pharmaceutical had a lot to gain from an anti-competitive arrangement with Impax 
Laboratories, especially considering that the generic market entry would have come much sooner 
than their patent expiration, plus the 180 days extra would also have been available for Impax 
Laboratories to make money on their generic drug.  
Endo Pharmaceutical thus made the following deal with Impax Laboratories: 
“Impax received a large and unjustified payment, which included: (1) a “No AG” commitment, 
i.e., a promise from Endo not to launch an authorized generic during the 180-day exclusivity 
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period that the Hatch-Waxman Act provides to the first generic filer; and (2) an additional credit 
that Endo would pay Impax in the event the market for Opana ER declined before Impax’s entry 
date.”121 
In the first part of the settlement, the no-AG commitment itself harms customer interests, as we 
have described above. The second part of the settlement was, in essence, an insurance policy in 
case Endo Pharmaceuticals would attempt a product hopping strategy that we have described 
above and thus would destroy the market for Impax Laboratories. There was a third, less 
consequential part of the settlement granted licenses for the Endo Pharmaceutical patents to 
Impax Laboratories as well.  
Ultimately Endo Pharmaceuticals did employ the product hopping strategy and had to pay the 
credits promised, but this fact was not important from the overall anti-competition investigation. 
The investigation went as follows: 
“The Commission explained that the U.S. Supreme Court’s Actavis decision held that 
eliminating the risk of competition through a reverse payment settlement itself constitutes 
anticompetitive harm. The Commission found there was ample evidence of a risk that Impax 
could have launched a generic product before the agreed-upon date, had it not entered into the 
reverse payment settlement with Endo. The Commission, therefore, concluded that Complaint 
Counsel established a prima facie case.”122 
Therefore, the first part of the investigation aimed to prove that reverse payment harmed 
competition and therefore was detrimental to customer interests. The companies involved in the 
deal agreed to share the monopoly profits resulting from refraining from the competition. 
Therefore, the probability of competition and the value of the deal was even stronger considering 
the facts that show the preparations of Impax Laboratories for an at-risk product launch. 
“The Commission further determined that Impax failed to show a cognizable procompetitive 
rationale for its reverse payment. The Commission explained that Impax bore the burden to prove 
that any alleged benefits were adequately linked to the challenged restraint. Because Impax failed 
to argue the procompetitive benefits it identified were related to the restraint at issue, rather than 
the settlement as a whole, it failed to satisfy this burden.”123 
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Therefore, in the second part of the investigation, the burden of proof shifted to Impax 
Laboratories. They would have needed to prove that the payment has produced pro-competitive 
results (such as the patent license) or was in line with the litigation costs. Failing that, it could be 
considered reasonably established that the reverse payment was received mainly or solely in 
exchange for refraining from the competition. 
“The Commission found in the alternative that Complaint Counsel had established a viable less 
restrictive alternative.”124 
 
In the third part of the investigation, the Federal Trade Commission observed whether the deal 
the two companies signed could have the same or better implications on the competition with a 
different arrangement. This step further strengthens the case that their behavior was anti-
competitive in nature, and the anti-competitive effects could have been avoided. 
In this case study, we could observe an entangled case of a real-world contract between two 
companies in the same industry, involving patents and competition. The case involved several 
different strategies, some of them evidently anti-competitive and some regular business or 
licensing activities. In such Antitrust Law cases, a thorough understanding of the specifics of the 
company interests, the legal frameworks, and incentives are paramount to be able to draw the 
correct conclusions. Therefore, in the case studies, when I am going to examine the acquisitions 
with patent involvement, I will pay special attention to examine the specifics in detail and draw 
my conclusions accordingly. 
 
European Commission vs. Amazon, Apple 
Not only could the principle of Antitrust be recognized in Intellectual Property Rights, but in 
numerous jurisdictions, even other cases such as fair practice ethics etc., play a crucial role. The 
task for competition policy is to design a framework in which antitrust authorities play a key role 
in studying the competitive impact of a merger, and regulators play a vital role in the imposition 
and compliance of regulatory remedies. A good example is the recent European Union 
Investigation of Amazon's “Buy Box” and “Amazon Prime” label activities against violation of 
European Union antitrust laws by misuse of a dominant market position. 
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It accuses Amazon of misusing the data that it receives on its website from third-party vendors. 
The European Union argues that very large volumes of non-public seller data are used to help 
Amazon's retail sector to the detriment of other marketplace sellers in France and Germany. 
On 10 November 2020, the Commission of the European Union objected that the use of non-
public marketplace seller data would allow Amazon to avoid the typical threats of competition 
from retailers and to take advantage of its dominance in the market for the provision of 
marketplace services in France and Germany, the largest markets for Amazon in the European 
Union.125 It also anticipates a breach of European Union antitrust laws by distorting competition 
in the online retail markets. The Commission will carry out its in-depth investigation as a matter 
of priority. If proven, Amazon's marketing practices can benefit artificially from its retail deals, 
and market vendor offers that use Amazon's logistics and delivery services (the so-called 
“fulfillment by Amazon or FBA vendors”). Therefore, the operation under scrutiny may be 
counter to Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which 
prohibits the abuse of the dominant position.126 
Two antitrust inquiries emerged by the European Commission into the Apple App Store and 
Apple Pay policies to ensure the lack of unfair competition practices. It will determine whether 
the Apple rules for software developers concerning the sale of applications through the App Store 
break the European Union's antitrust rules. Although companies can put their applications at no 
cost in the App Store, Apple charges companies for the first year, 30 percent of in-app sales and 
30 percent of subscriptions, then 15 percent after that. Spotify, a music app, and Kobo, an e-
reader firm, both argue that it is unjust. According to Executive Vice-President Margrethe 
Vestager, in charge of competition policy, said in a statement: “It appears that Apple obtained a 
‘gatekeeper’ role when it comes to the distribution of apps and content to users of Apple’s popular 
devices. We need to ensure that Apple’s rules do not distort competition in markets where Apple 
is competing with other app developers, such as its music streaming service Apple Music or with 
Apple Books. I have, therefore, decided to take a close look at Apple’s App Store rules and their 
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compliance with EU competition rules.”127 The European Commission will also have a 
comprehensive Apple App Store investigation to ensure a violation of Article 82 (now Article 
102) of the EC Treaty.128 
High tech companies like Google and Facebook are under investigation by the United Kingdom 
in a related antitrust infringement case. Government plans to create a Digital Markets Unit 
(DMU) to enforce a new code to control the actions of market-dominant channels. “The unit will 
be part of the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), which has been insisting that massive 
internet media outlets have more powers to reign in.”129  
The regulator is worried about how tech companies like Google and Facebook use digital 
advertising to fuel their business models. Digital Secretary Oliver Dowden said in a statement: 
“But there is growing consensus in the UK and abroad that the concentration of power among a 
small number of tech companies is curtailing growth of the sector, reducing innovation and 
having negative impacts on the people and businesses that rely on them. It’s time to address that 
and unleash a new age of tech growth,”130 
Therefore, many case studies recognize that emerging development in technology and corporate 
ethics needs to be revised with antitrust laws. Most laws, however, are more focused on updating 
competition policy only when dominant control is violated; in fact, they neglect the competitive 
definition and lack of society's well-being in the initial process. 
“A brief understanding of Article 102 (ex-Article 82) of the European Commission Treaty - 
Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union - PART THREE: 
UNION POLICIES AND INTERNAL ACTIONS - TITLE VII: COMMON RULES ON 
COMPETITION, TAXATION AND APPROXIMATION OF LAWS - Chapter 1: Rules on 
competition - Section 1: Rules applying to undertakings - Article 102 (ex-Article 82 TEC) 
 
127
 Shead, S., & Browne, R. (2020, November 26). Google and Facebook to be scrutinized by new U.K. antitrust 
unit from next year. CNBC. Retrieved October 20, 2020, from https://www.cnbc.com/2020/11/26/google-and-
facebook-to-be-scrutinized-by-new-uk-unit-from-next-year.html  
128
 Eur-lex: Article 82 EC Treaty. (2009, 02 24). Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the 
Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by 
dominant undertakings (Text with EEA relevance). Retrieved October 20, 2020, from https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A52009XC0224%2801%29  
129
 (Shead & Browne, 2020) 
130
 Id..  
61 
 
“Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market 
or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market in 
so far as it may affect trade between the Member States. 
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading 
conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, 
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have 
no connection with the subject of such contracts.”131 
It is understood quite well that there is no clear concept of “abuse” in Article 102 (ex 82) or even 
clear concepts of the three different kinds of abuse, exploitation, exclusionary or anti-competitive 
and discriminatory behavior, as so far been developed by the European Commission, allowing 
ideas of fairness and protection of small enterprises and competitors to influence competition 
law.  
The phrase, repeated by the Community Courts that dominant companies have “special 
responsibilities” were misunderstood and implied as unspecified kinds of abuse other than the 
three well-established categories of exploitation, anticompetitive and discriminatory conduct, 
until the judgement of Atlantic Container Line AB and Others v Commission of the European 
Communities, 1998 (Joined Cases T-191/98, T-212/98 to T-214/98).132 
The competition law tradition in Europe is relatively recent; hence, competition law and 
competition economics are not clearly understood even by competition authorities or the 
competition lawyers in Europe. The risk of confusion of regulatory and competition objectives 
are most significant when a single authority European Commission has both kinds of powers. 
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In this chapter, I have reviewed the field of Antitrust Laws on anti-competitive practices, both 
from the theoretical and the practical standpoints. I have reviewed the goals of the legislators, 
both in the EU and US, along with the recent laws and regulations. I have performed a 
comparative study, by examining both the differences and commonalities of the United States 
and European Union Antitrust policies and regulation. I have reviewed anti-trust case studies 
mainly around patent misuse, to understand the motives and typical corporate behavior that 
characterizes these cases. 
These investigations highlight the intent of the often-opposing goals of the legislator and the 
companies involved in anti-trust cases. I have reviewed some especially interesting and complex 
cases where the companies have an incentive to circumvent the intentions of the legislator in both 
Anti-trust and Patent Law, coming up with ingenious ways to do so. It is, therefore, paramount 
that in my investigation of acquisitions where patents remain unutilized, I will pay attention to 
understand the incentives and behavior of the companies involved. This is especially important 
in order to come up with a feasible solution proposal that not only penalizes but incentivizes the 
companies to ultimately achieve the intents of legislator. 
 
1.3. Intellectual Property Laws 
 
In this chapter, I am investigating the field of Intellectual Property Law, and more narrowly 
Patent Law, both from the theoretical and the practical standpoints. As a theoretical overview I 
am examining the definitions of intellectual property and patents, trying to get a solid understand 
of the legislator. Then I will perform a detailed analysis of the determining factors of patents to 
be able to thoroughly understand the benefits of them, and the different effects of their so-called 
“non-working”, because they are essential to the main scenario of my thesis, acquisitions where 
patents remain unutilized. 
As a practical overview, I will examine a notable example of weaknesses of patents, the patent 
trolls, the national and international treaties and organizations that govern Patent Law, with 
special attention to the United States and the European Union. I will devote a full subchapter to 
the organization and challenges of the patent protection laws and practices in the European 
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Union, because it will help me choose and understand an appropriate case study for the scenario 
of my thesis, and the conduct of the competition authority in said case study as well.  
1.3.1. Intellectual Property 
 
“Intellectual property” “is the oil of the 21st century. Look at the richest men a hundred years 
ago: they all made their money extracting natural resources or moving them around. All today's 
richest men have made their money out of intellectual property.”- Mark Getty.133 
 
The term “Intellectual Property” is widely used by legal professionals, but there are varying 
definitions in the literature on what exact legal claims are included, considering especially the 
different national and international legal frameworks around intellectual property.134 In order to 
come to an understanding of what aspects of intellectual property are generally accepted, in this 
chapter, I am going to examine the different definitions of different national and international 
legal frameworks. I will also examine some common controversies and misunderstandings about 
the term and attempt to find an approach that I can use henceforth. 
Moore, Adam and Ken Himma (2018) define Intellectual Property as follows: 
“Intellectual property is generally characterized as non-physical property that is the product of 
original thought. Typically, rights do not surround the abstract non-physical entity; rather, 
intellectual property rights surround the control of physical manifestations or expressions of 
ideas. Intellectual property law protects a content-creator’s interest in her ideas by assigning and 
enforcing legal rights to produce and control physical instantiations of those ideas.”135 
The above definition highlights some key aspects of intellectual property: 
● Intellectual property is a non-physical property; therefore, the laws governing it are 
distinct from traditional property law. There may be some parallel concepts and 
similarities, but the regulations cannot be exactly derived from property law. According 
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to critics, “information is not the kind of thing that can be owned or possessed and is not 
something that can be property, as that notion is typically defined.” 136 
● Intellectual property is the product of original thought. The originality of thought, 
therefore, must be clearly established in every legal area of intellectual property. The 
definition leaves it up to the individual legal areas of intellectual property to define the 
rules how originality may be proven (e.g., through administrative procedures such as in 
the case of patents or litigation in the most frequent cases of copyright law).137 
● Intellectual property is supposed to protect an idea, or in other words, a human thought, 
but the idea itself cannot be proven to have originated with or created by an individual 
unless the thought is expressed in some physical manifestation. Therefore, the legal 
protection must identify and control these physical manifestations.138 
The need to identify physical manifestations of original thoughts is exactly why intellectual 
property laws have had controversies in the last decades as the digital economy, and the Internet 
has found new ways of expressions that could not be classified previously.139 One such example 
was the digital streaming music industry, where the different delivery (manifestations) of the 
content had to be clearly codified by participating countries: 
“The approach adopted by the drafters of the Internet Treaties to ensure broad, technology-
neutral communication to the public right (WCT, Article 8) and the right to make available 
(WPPT, Articles 10 and 14) has proven to be the right one. These exclusive rights apply equally 
to all types of transmissions – downloads, on-demand streaming and other types of interactive 
transmission – and ensure that right holders can negotiate fair terms with digital services across 
territories.”140 
The European Union’s legal framework defines Intellectual Property according to Articles 114 
and Article 118 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union as follows: 
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“Intellectual property includes all exclusive rights to intellectual creations. It encompasses two 
types of rights: industrial property, which includes inventions (patents), trademarks, industrial 
designs and models and designations of origin, and copyright, which includes artistic and literary 
property. Since the entry into force of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) in 2009, the European Union has had explicit competence for intellectual property rights 
(Article 118).”141 
The above definition highlights some similar points we have reviewed above: 
● Intellectual Property is related to intellectual creations. We can identify these intellectual 
creations as the physical manifestations of the human thoughts cited in the Stanford 
Encyclopedia definition as the word intellectual being another expression for human 
thought, and creation being another expression for a physical manifestation of these 
thoughts. 
● The European Union definition does not underline the necessity of originality. It 
references pre-existing laws and regulations on copyrights and industrial property; 
therefore, it leaves the burden of proof of originality as defined in those laws and 
regulations, if necessary. 
● Intellectual Property consists of two broad categories: 
○ industrial property, which includes patents, trademarks, industrial designs, 
designations of origin (such as “made in Germany”), and 
○ the copyright includes commercial protection of artistic and literary works (such 
as books, but also computer programs).142 
The World Intellectual Property Organization, the Switzerland-based specialized agency of the 
United Nations responsible for Intellectual Property protection worldwide, gives the following 
description about Intellectual Property: 
“Industrial property legislation is part of the wider body of law known as Intellectual Property 
(IP), which refers broadly to the creations of the human mind. IP rights protect the interests of 
innovators and creators by giving them rights over their creations. The Convention Establishing 
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the World Intellectual Property Organization (1967) does not seek to define IP but lists the 
following as protected by IP rights: 
● literary, artistic, and scientific works; 
● performances of performing artists, 
● phonograms and broadcasts; 
● inventions in all fields of human endeavor; 
● scientific discoveries; 
● industrial designs; 
● trademarks, service marks, and commercial names and designations; 
● protection against unfair competition; 
● ‘all other rights resulting from intellectual activity in the industrial, scientific, literary or 
artistic fields.’ ”143 
The above is not meant as a definition per se, but more as a description of intellectual property. 
It highlights some similar important points as the definitions above: 
● Intellectual Property is about the creations of the human mind. Creation could be 
understood as the physical manifestation of a thought or idea. The reference to the human 
mind is similar to the reference of (original) human thoughts.144 
● This description does not include the requirement of originality either, just like the 
European Union definition.145 
● The Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization lists the 
different areas protected by Intellectual Property legislation. This list is much more 
exhaustive than the European Union definition list or the Stanford Encyclopedia 
definition, considering all inventions and protection against unfair competition part of 
Intellectual Property law.146  
Protection against unfair competition is a fascinating topic that has drawn abundant debate, and 
is dealing with the business practices considered to harm markets' proper functioning by reducing 
 
143
 WIPO. (2016). Understanding Industrial Property. World Intellectual Property Organization Publications, 
ISBN: 978-92-805-2588-5, Retrieved October 20, 2020, from 
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_895_2016.pdf page 5 
144 (Moore, Adam and Ken Himma, 2018) 
145
 (Bux, 2020, page 1) 
146
 (WIPO, 2016, page 5) 
67 
 
transparency or distorting information on the markets.147 Article 10 bis of the Paris Convention 
identifies three main areas of unfair business practices: 
“Acts causing confusion 
An act or practice, in the course of industrial or commercial activities, that causes, or is likely to 
cause, confusion with respect to another’s enterprise or its activities, in particular, the products 
or services offered by such an enterprise constitutes an act of unfair competition. 
Even the likelihood of confusion having a detrimental effect comparable to actual confusion 
constitutes an act of unfair competition and this widely enlarges the scope of protection. For 
instance, a trademark, whether registered or not, or a product’s appearance may lead to confusion. 
Appearance of a product includes packaging, shape or other non-functional characteristic 
features of the product. 
Acts that are misleading 
A misleading act can create a false impression of a competitor’s product or services leading to 
the customer, acting on false information, suffering financial damage. Misleading acts can take 
the form of a statement giving incorrect indications or allegations about an enterprise or its 
products or services. For example, misleading statements concerning the manufacturing process 
of a product may relate to a product’s safety and create a false impression. 
Acts damaging goodwill or reputation 
Reducing the distinctive character, appearance, value or the reputation attached to a product 
could damage another’s goodwill or reputation. For instance, any act that dilutes the effect of a 
trademark is considered unfair as it could destroy the originality and distinctive character of a 
trademark. 
Other acts that could be classified as causing unfair competition include discrediting another’s 
enterprise or its activities, industrial or commercial espionage, and acting unfairly with respect 
to confidential information such as breach of contract or breach of confidence.”148 
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I consider the above unfair business practices important relating to the topic of this thesis because 
although they are forbidden by the Paris Treaty, proving them in court involves lengthy litigation 
involving case law and precedent law. Thus, larger market players could take advantage of the 
perceived high costs of litigation and use these and other actions against smaller players to coerce 
them into unfavorable trades.149 
Reviewing the above definitions, we can see several differences, especially when considering the 
boundaries (through the lists of protected areas) of the legal fields included in Intellectual 
Property. The Electronic Frontier Foundation also finds the boundaries of Intellectual Property 
Law unclear, but from a different standpoint: 
“The controversy stems from two aspects of the term ‘intellectual property.’ First, the term is 
imprecise. Sure, ‘intellectual property’ includes copyright, patent, and trademark law, but there 
is little agreement about what other kinds of legal claims law it may encompass. For example, 
some may use the term to refer to one or more trade secrets, rights of publicity, semiconductor 
masks, or industrial designs, among other things. This ambiguity can create confusion, which can 
sometimes be manipulated by those who want to clothe themselves in the perceived legitimacy 
of the three "core" legal areas. In fact, in the U.S., the term ‘intellectual property’ first came into 
wide use in the United States, when advocates of the patent system sought to lump patent law 
together with copyright law in order to gain the advantage of the relatively more secure reputation 
of copyright law in the late 1800s.”150 
 
Since most definitions of Intellectual Property law includes some kind of division or listing of 
the different fields of Intellectual Property law, and since we could see from the examples and 
controversies above, that the lists are changing with the rise of the digital economy151 and the 
appearance of more ways humans can express their thoughts, the boundaries of what is 
considered Intellectual Property are changing over time. It could also explain why apart from the 
core elements of Intellectual Property (patents, trademarks, copyrights) the definitions are 
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diverging as to what constitutes Intellectual Property. This changing definition is not new either, 
there have been philosophical debates and other critiques throughout history that have influenced 
the definitions over time.152 
 
As per the topic of this thesis, the most important inquiry area will be laws and practices 
governing patents. Patents are generally understood, and accepted innovations that benefit 
societal progress, and as such can be considered without much questioning as representing a 
value to customers. Therefore, it is enough to prove that some mergers and acquisitions involve 
patent acquisitions where this value is not realized, to prove the need for a legal framework 
preventing or managing transactions bearing this risk. Once established, the legal framework 
could encompass more areas of Intellectual Property and provide even more protection to 
preserve the values of other creations of the human mind. This could be another interesting topic 
for further research and investigation. 
1.3.2. Patents 
“A Patent is not a license to make money, it is a license to prevent others from making money.” 
– Dr. Kalyan C. Kankanala 
 
In this chapter, I will examine the different definitions of patents and the roles and effects patent 
protection is intended to have in the market and society by the legislators. I am performing this 
study to understand and underline what patents are, why they are useful, and worth the protection 
I am going to propose in the latter part of this thesis. 
1.3.2.1. Definition of Patents 
The Cambridge English Dictionary defines a patent as follows (United States definition): 
“The legal right to be the only one who can make, use, or sell an invention for a particular number 
of years.” 153 
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The definition above highlights that the patent owner can make, use, or sell an invention. By 
including the production, use, and commercial sales of these rights, this right is very similar to 
property and commercial utilization rights. The European Convention on Human Rights states in 
Article 1 Protocol 1 the protection of property and the limitations of such protections: “Every 
natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be 
deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided 
for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, 
however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to 
control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of 
taxes or other contributions or penalties.”154 Similar protections and limitations apply to patents 
as well under Intellectual Property Law. 
The definition also highlights the exclusiveness of the rights of making, using, or selling on the 
market. This exclusiveness is key to understanding the role the legislator gives to the patent in 
the marketplace. By granting them exclusive rights to make, use, or sell an invention, the 
legislator gives the patent owner monopoly rights. The World Law Dictionary gives the 
following definition for monopoly rights: “Privilege granted by an authority to a person or entity 
to exclude all others from using, producing, or selling a certain invention, product, or service.”155 
This is essentially the same definition as the Cambridge English Dictionary for a patent, only 
without the time limitation. 
Although both approaches to understand patent rights as property rights or as monopoly rights 
may be debated,156 they are very useful for understanding patents. 
Finally, the definition also highlights the limited time for the described legal protections. This 
limited-time is also important because the above monopoly rights are a temporary measure in 
which the patent owner can utilize their monopoly rights to make profits on their inventions 
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without the competitive pressures that will inevitably decrease said profits according to the laws 
of demand and supply in a competitive market in economics. 157 
The World Intellectual Property Organization gives the following definition for a patent: 
“A patent is an exclusive right granted for an invention, which is a product or a process that 
provides, in general, a new way of doing something or offers a new technical solution to a 
problem. To get a patent, technical information about the invention must be disclosed to the 
public in a patent application. In principle, the patent owner has the exclusive right to prevent or 
stop others from commercially exploiting the patented invention. In other words, patent 
protection means that the invention cannot be commercially made, used, distributed, imported, 
or sold by others without the patent owner's consent. Patents are territorial rights. In general, the 
exclusive rights are only applicable in the country or region in which a patent has been filed and 
granted in accordance with the law of that country or region. The protection is granted for a 
limited period, generally 20 years from the filing date of the application.” 158 
This definition highlights the exclusiveness of the rights to the patent owner. The definition also 
gives details on what an invention is, defining it as a product or a process that offers a new way 
of doing something or solving a problem. It clearly defines the extent of those rights as prevention 
of competition, such as preventing others from any commercial activity that would involve the 
invention. It also highlights the process of acquiring exclusive rights through a formal process 
called a patent application. It identifies a condition that such patent application will have, namely 
that the invention must be clearly described and published to the public. It also outlines the 
territorial (jurisdictional) and time limitations of the exclusive rights. It is important to note that 
patent protection applies only in the national jurisdictions where the patent has been filed or 
transferred because this will have crucial implications on the problems and proposed solutions 
identified in this thesis. 
The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines a patent as follows: 
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“a: a writing securing for a term of years the right to exclude others from making, using, or 
selling an invention 
 b: the monopoly or right so granted”159 
This definition highlights the rights of the patent owner similarly to the ones above. It also 
identifies the time limitations and the exclusivity of such rights. The important distinction here 
is that this definition includes both the monopoly right and the document (patent approval 
document) that gives such rights that could refer to as a patent. 
The United States Patent and Trademark Office defines a patent as follows: 
“A property right granted by the Government of the United States of America to an inventor 
"to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout 
the United States or importing the invention into the United States" for a limited time in 
exchange for public disclosure of the invention when the patent is granted.” 160 
This definition equates the inventor's right to a property right, which other definitions have not 
done explicitly. The important point of this right, however, is not about what the inventor can do 
with their property, but what they are able to prevent others from doing (making, using, offering, 
selling). Therefore, even though this definition uses the word property, the rights are monopoly 
rights in nature.161 This definition also highlights the fixed time and geographical limits of such 
monopoly rights. Lastly, it clarifies that this temporary monopoly right is given in exchange for 
publishing the invention when the patent is granted. 
Summarizing the above definitions, we can identify the common points about a patent: 
● It is a bundle of monopoly rights over the invention; thus, it allows the patent owner to 
prevent others from making or using the invention in any commercial activity. 
● It is limited in time and geography (jurisdiction). 
● It is given in exchange for publishing the invention in a clear and understandable way. 
Therefore, a patent may also be understood as a financial and commercial encouragement 
through temporary monopoly rights given to inventors to publish their inventions. Such 
publication would, in theory create more technological and economical benefits to society to 
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clearly cover the costs in the extra profits of the temporary monopoly162 should the inventor use 
said monopoly rights. 
Taking this definition, the following logical question is: What are the technological and 
economical benefits of a published invention to society? I am going to examine this question in 
the next chapter. 
1.3.2.2. Benefits of Patents 
In this chapter, I am going to examine the benefits of patents both from the economic and 
innovation standpoints, on a national and international level, and highlight the network effects of 
these benefits as well in each area. Finally, we will look at some criticisms the patent system has 
been facing nowadays. 
 
According to the World Intellectual Property Organization, the benefits of patents are as follows: 
“One of the main functions of the patent system is to foster technological innovation by providing 
an incentive for research and development.  The patent system also works to disseminate 
technical information and promote technology transfer.” 163 
Therefore, the main benefits of the patents can be understood through two players: the inventors 
and the general public, the society. 
● The inventors receive an incentive for their research and development efforts. 
● As an indirect benefit of the inventor incentive the society may achieve more innovation 
activity and ultimately more technological progress. 
● Through the public dissemination of technical information, the society may achieve better 
education, thus ultimately more innovation.164 
● Through knowledge transfer other inventors may also improve their own inventions, 
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Patents also have several other economical benefits by virtue of their key features like the ability 
to transfer the monopoly rights, thereby acting as financial instruments166 and creating a market 
for inventions. 
According to a study conducted at Northwestern University the “key features of the patent system 
– exclusion, transferability, disclosure, certification, standardization, and divisibility – increase 
transaction efficiencies and stimulate competition in the market for inventions. These properties 
of patents reduce transaction costs associated with transferring, licensing, cross-licensing, 
combining, implementing, and developing inventions. Patents give owners’ right to exclude 
others from making, using, or selling their inventions. Patents help convert inventions into 
transferable assets so that inventors and adopters can transact more efficiently in the market for 
inventions. Patents promote disclosure of inventions, which reduces costs of search and 
bargaining in the market for inventions. Patents provide certification of technologies, which 
decreases information asymmetry in the market for inventions. Patents provide standardization 
in IP, which reduces the costs of contracting in the market for inventions. Finally, patents allow 
greater divisibility of technology, which promotes modularity and increases gains from trade in 
the market for inventions. Patents thus generate economic benefits that are based on more 
efficient transactions and greater competition in the market for inventions.” 167 
This study emphasizes the financial asset nature of patents through which a market for the use 
and sale of inventions can take place. It also highlights how the patent system itself makes the 
inventions more standard, thus making the combined effects of inventions built on other 
inventions more precise and more efficient. Finally, because patents must be public by their 
definition, the information about patents makes the whole market of innovations more efficient. 
According to a study by the Australian Law Reform Commission, the patents have the following 
benefits: 
They promote innovation through giving incentives to research. 
“Patents promote innovation through the grant of limited monopolies, as a reward to inventors 
for the time, effort and ingenuity invested in creating new products and processes. The potential 
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for financial returns adds an incentive to the traditional rewards of scientific innovation, such as 
academic recognition and promotion within research institutions. Without the incentive provided 
by patents, private investors may be reluctant to invest, resulting in greater calls on government 
funding or a failure to develop and exploit new technology.” 168 
It’s an important thought experiment to try and imagine a world without patents, especially since 
we have been so accustomed to a world full of Intellectual Property and Patents. In such a world, 
inventors would be incentivized to hide their inventions as much as possible, knowledge would 
only spread from those institutions that are financed through public investment, since their 
returns on the research would not be coming from the competitive market. By not only allowing 
but creating an efficient market for inventions, the private equity holders and the competitive 
markets are also participating in innovation, which has arguably been one of the most powerful 
sources of wealth creation in our modern world.169 
They encourage investment and economic growth. 
“Possessing a patent may help a company to grow by capitalizing on the market potential of its 
inventions. Small companies may use patents to attract financial backing. In addition, patents 
stimulate the growth of the national industry because local companies that hold patents can attract 
overseas investment and develop products for export. Profits generated by patent exploitation can 
be invested in further research and development, which may stimulate commercial and industrial 
growth. Patents also benefit Australian companies by providing a system for trading knowledge 
internationally through licence agreements.”170 
The investment and economic growth benefits are, therefore, stemming from the growth of 
investment and economic activity both nationally and internationally. It includes 
● the encouragement of financing for small companies (since the financial backer would 
understand the economic potential of the related monopoly rights), 
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● attracting international investment, especially if the patents are transferred to other 
countries by utilizing one of the international patent treaties and schemes as we will 
discuss in the next chapter, 
● encouraging the export of the patented goods to take advantage of the monopoly rights, 
especially if transferred to other countries via the international treaties, 
● trading for monopoly rights both nationally and internationally through granting licenses, 
● utilizing the profits of all incentives above to drive even more innovation and economic 
activity.171 
They encourage resource use and knowledge sharing. 
“Patents promote knowledge sharing by requiring the details of the patented invention to be 
placed in the public domain in return for the exclusive right to exploit the invention. In the 
absence of this exchange, inventors might protect the details of new inventions through secrecy. 
By encouraging knowledge sharing, patents reduce the duplication of research efforts and 
encourage researchers to build on existing inventions. Researchers may study a patented product 
and find ways to improve upon it. Access to patented inventions may also facilitate research that 
would not otherwise be possible. For example, access to a patented research tool may enable vital 
research into the causes of a genetic disorder and lead to the creation of a genetic test or treatment. 
This research may not have occurred if the tool had remained secret.”172 
The requirement of publication of the details of the invention in case the patent is granted gives 
several benefits to research activity in society. A direct benefit is that inventors will not hide their 
inventions but may even race to publish them, since the first to file and publish will likely get the 
grants of the monopoly rights.173 The indirect benefits are coming from other researchers, who 
by virtue of accessing the patented invention’s details in a clear and understandable publication, 
are able to improve on said inventions or use said inventions to create entirely new inventions. 
Finally, researchers will be disincentivized from performing parallel research into the same 
invention once the patent is granted since they can access the public information that the 
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monopoly rights have already been granted.174 In summary, the patents exploit the network 
effects of sharing information about inventions to encourage resource use and knowledge 
sharing. 
The study is based on the foundation that innovation itself is a value to the whole of society 
through the creation of new solutions to existing problems (social needs): 
“Innovation benefits the community by creating new and improved goods and services that meet 
social needs. For example, innovations in medical research may produce new diagnostic tests or 
treatments, which improve community health.” 175 
An Iowa State University study has described the economics of patents and drew several 
conclusions about what the economic effects of patents were. The main benefits of patents they 
identified were: 
● They provide incentives for innovation. 
● They promote the dissemination of knowledge. 
● They assist in technology transfer. 
● They assist in commercialization of new technology.176 
They underline the inherent difficulty that inventors face, because their creation falls under the 
category of public goods. 
“Specifically, knowledge is a quintessential public good. Pure public goods have two basic 
attributes. First, they are non-rival in consumption, meaning that a person’s use of a public good 
does not affect the amount of it that is available for others. Second, they are non-excludable, 
meaning that it is not possible to prevent individuals from enjoying the public good once it is 
available. An example of a pure public good is national defense. It is clear that, absent of 
intellectual property rights, most discoveries and inventions would exhibit public good attributes. 
The problems that a competitive system has with public goods are readily apparent. An inventor 
may bear all the cost of an innovation, but everyone benefits (possibly to varying degrees) from 
a discovery, and thus everyone has an incentive to free ride on the innovative efforts of others. 
The inherent externalities associated with this class of public goods generate a market failure: a 
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competitive market system may be expected to provide an inefficiently low level of 
innovations.”177 
Public goods have the well-researched problem of freeloader incentivization. Since everyone has 
access to them, everyone is enjoying their benefits. But only the creators of these goods bear the 
costs. Many goods such as public safety provided by police and streetlights, rule of law provided 
by the court system, national safety provided by the air force, military and navy of a nation are 
falling in this category. Therefore, typically these goods are being produced by a system outside 
of market forces such as institutions or organizations created by governments or international 
organizations.178 The main economic benefits of the patent system come exactly from this 
realization that by involving the market economy players in innovation creation through creating 
a secondary market of monopoly rights, the whole economy benefits far more than they suffer 
the cost of the monopoly to customers. 
This is exactly the reason why recently the whole patent system has come under intense scrutiny. 
The skeptics of the patent system argue that in some cases the costs of the monopoly rights are 
greater than the benefits. Critics argue about the misuse of inappropriately understood and 
granted patents (generic patents)179, and the limiting factors on competition of the monopoly 
rights. 
“Yet, for many academics, the patent system is a ‘failure’ (Bessen and Meurer, 2008), in a ‘crisis’ 
(Burk and Lemley, 2009), and a ‘major wound’ that should be abolished (Boldrin and Levin, 
2013, p. 18). The press tends to agree: ‘abusive and frivolous lawsuits brought by holders of 
patents are costing the American economy billions of dollars.’ Antitrust policy makers seeking 
‘a proper balance between exclusivity and competition’ argue that ‘invalid or overbroad patents 
disrupt that balance by discouraging follow-on innovation, preventing competition, and raising 
prices through unnecessary licensing and litigation’ (Federal Trade Commission, 2011, p. 1). The 
Supreme Court in a series of opinions (Bilski, Prometheus, Myriad) has ruled claims for a wide 
 
177
 Id.. page 2 
178
 Cowen, T. (2008). Public Goods. The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics. Library of Economics and Liberty. 
Retrieved October 20, 2020, from https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PublicGoods.html  
179




range of subject matters as patent-ineligible. Commentators have noted the ‘hostility to patents’ 
by the Executive Branch.”180 
That said, considering the practical historical evidences whereby nations where the rule of law 
over Intellectual Property and Patents have been followed and enforced adequately for a long 
time have enjoyed immense economic growth, especially in the services and industrial sectors,181 
and considering the evidences presented in the articles cited in this chapter, it is very reasonable 
to assume that the patent system in general provides far more benefits to society than it costs, 
thus the value of patents realized through increased innovation and economic activity is such that 
its protection should be a priority of national and international governments, including the 
European Union. 
Now that we have identified the immense value of patents both from the innovation and the 
economic sides, the important question is to delineate what a patent is and what is not. In order 
to determine therefore the boundaries of patents, we have to look at the determining factors of a 
patent in a patent application process. 
1.3.2.3. Determining Factors of Patents 
In this chapter, I will examine the factors that determine whether an innovation may be classified 
as a patent, thus a monopoly right may be granted. We have to note that there are differences 
between the different national laws in this area182, but the general ideas are the same, thus we are 
going to focus on these, so as not to get lost in the national differences, but to be able to keep our 
focus on the general characteristics that make a patent. 
According to an Iowa State University study the following factors need to be satisfied to be able 
to consider an invention as a subject of a patent application and to have a reasonable chance of 
having the patent approved and the temporary monopoly rights granted: 
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“To be patentable, an innovation must be novel in the sense of not constituting part of the prior 
art or more generally of not being already in the public domain. A patentable innovation also 
must involve an inventive step, meaning that it must be non-obvious to a person with ordinary 
skills in the particular field of application. The innovation also must be useful to be patentable; 
that is, it must permit the solution of a problem in at least one application. A major element of a 
patent application is disclosure: the invention must be described in sufficient detail to enable 
those skilled in the field to practice it. The patent application also lays out specific claims as to 
the scope of the patent itself. The traditional statutory scope of patents — encompassing 
machines, industrial processes, composition of matter, and articles of manufacture — excluded 
important kinds of scientific discoveries such as laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract 
ideas. But recent developments in the use of patents for computer software, information 
technology, and biotechnology innovations are challenging a reductive interpretation of such 
exclusions.” 183 
1.3.2.3.1. Requirement of Novelty 
Therefore, the innovation must be something genuinely new, in other words “novel”, a product 
of the creativity of the human mind. For this definition to be applicable in practice the creators 
of the patent system had to find a way to determine if something was indeed new. For this they 
created a logical test to determine if the proposed innovation was already known at the time of 
the patent application. The innovation can be considered already known if it is, 
● part of the public domain of knowledge or 
● it is a part of a prior art.184 
What is the public domain? 
According to a Stanford University article by Rich Stim the public domain is the following: 
“The term “public domain” refers to creative materials that are not protected by intellectual 
property laws such as copyright, trademark, or patent laws. The public owns these works, 
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not an individual author or artist. Anyone can use a public domain work without obtaining 
permission, but no one can ever own it.” 185 
This definition is a negative one, since it basically defines that all creative materials that are not 
considered as legally protected as Intellectual Property are belonging to the public domain. 
Therefore, it is easier to define the public domain by what is not a public domain creative work. 
The consequence of a work of human creativity belonging to the public domain is that it can be 
used by anyone, that’s why it is sometimes also called the intellectual commons or information 
commons.186 
If the definition of the public domain entails those works that are not protected by Intellectual 
Property, then we are ought to examine the ways in which works can enter the public domain 
either by having been protected by Intellectual Property laws previously, or by never being under 
the protection of Intellectual Property lawyers in the first place. The latter case could have 
happened since Intellectual Property laws are a relatively recent phenomenon in history, and 
since the Intellectual Property laws themselves are only giving temporary protection to works of 
art. Even these protections have varied over time and across national and international borders 
and jurisdictions. 
“There are four common ways that works arrive in the public domain: 
● the copyright has expired 
● the copyright owner failed to follow copyright renewal rules 
● the copyright owner deliberately places it in the public domain, known as “dedication”, 
or 
● copyright law does not protect this type of work.”187 
The above definition talks about copyrights, which is - as we have seen in the chapter about 
Intellectual Property - a distinct area of Intellectual Property, separate from industrial property 
and therefore distinct from patents. Therefore, only creative works of art can belong to the public 
domain; inventions and designs covered by patents cannot. Therefore, the first method of public 
domain art creation is when a work of art loses its protection by Intellectual Property laws through 
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the expiration of such laws. In the case of copyrights, these expiration times are long, typically 
ranging from 50 years to 120 years, depending on national laws and regulations, as well as the 
type of art and the nature of the publication.188 
There are interesting cases when work is dedicated to the public domain; therefore, the copyright 
is forfeited. Although not all legal systems allow for the dedication of works to the public domain, 
especially continental laws of Europe, some alternative solutions emerged, such as licenses 
granted to the general public. Such licenses include the Creative Commons License that is used 
extensively throughout the Internet for content intended for the public domain.189 
Lastly, there are creative works of the human mind that are by their nature public, intended as 
such, and cannot become protected by Intellectual Property and copyrights, therefore they enter 
the public domain at the time of their creation. Such works of the human mind include e.g. laws 
(both national and local) and regulations. In the United States there was a legal case that had to 
determine this distinction, since local laws were protected by copyright for a while: 
“For decades, publishers of model codes-sample laws that a city or state could adopt-have 
claimed copyright. State and local laws and ordinances based on such codes often contain 
copyright notices in the publisher’s name or some other indication the publisher claims the 
copyright. In a significant victory for public domain proponents, a federal appellate court found 
that model codes enter the public domain when they are enacted into law by local 
governments.”190 
In the legal case Veeck v. Southern Building Code Congress International (SBCCI), Inc., 293 
F.3d 791, 5th Cir. 2002, the key determinant that identified whether laws are part of the public 
domain was that the law becomes a fact once enacted. Since facts and theories cannot be 
protected by copyright, laws cannot be protected after their enactment either. As SBCCI sued 
Veeck for copyright infringement. Veeck lost in the trial court, but ultimately won on appeal.191  
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“The court held that: 
● The law is always in the public domain, whether it consists of government statutes, 
ordinances, regulations, or judicial decisions. 
● When a model code is enacted into law, it becomes a fact—the law of a particular local 
government. Indeed, the particular wording of a law is itself a fact, and that wording 
cannot be expressed in any other way. A fact itself is not copyrightable, nor is the way 
that the fact is expressed if there is only one way to express it. Since the legal code of a 
local government cannot be expressed in any way but as it is actually written, the fact and 
expression merge, and the law is uncopyrightable.”192 
“A fact or a theory - for example, the fact that a comet will pass by the Earth in 2027 - is not 
protected by copyright. If a scientist discovered this fact, anyone would be free to use it without 
asking for permission from the scientist. Similarly, if someone creates a theory that the comet 
can be destroyed by a nuclear device, anyone could use that theory to create a book or movie. 
However, the unique manner in which a fact is expressed may be protected. Therefore, if a 
filmmaker created a movie about destroying a comet with a nuclear device, the specific way he 
presented the ideas in the movie would be protected by copyright.” 193 
According to the example above, only expressions of facts may be protected by copyrights. One 
can argue whether laws are facts or expressions of facts, but as far as the legal framework is 
concerned, an enacted law can and should be considered a fact. 
What is a part of a prior art? 
According to the European Patent Office, prior art can be anything that showed that the idea had 
been expressed before: 
“Prior art is any evidence that your invention is already known. The prior art does not need 
to exist physically or be commercially available. It is enough that someone, somewhere, 
sometime previously has described or shown or made something that contains a use of 








art. A piece of technology that is centuries old can be prior art. A previously described idea 
that cannot possibly work can be prior art. Anything can be prior art.” 194 
The above description gives a very broad understanding of what is prior art. Any expression of 
the idea in question that is submitted in a patent application that can be proven to have happened 
before the application itself can reasonably disprove the novelty of the invention. This expression 
of the idea may not even be a patent. Therefore, for any company or individual wishing to patent 
an invention, it is not enough to search for previous patents; they must do extensive research into 
any kind of literary or verbal expression of the idea in previous sources. Many inventors make 
the mistake of searching for previous products, especially in patent databases and when they do 
not find an equivalent one, they invest heavily in their research, only to find at the end their 
patents rejected because the idea has been expressed before. The above reasoning can also be 
applied to historical inventions, since they have been clearly expressed before, therefore cannot 
be patented, even though they do not appear in any patent databases.195 
1.3.2.3.2. Requirement of an Inventive Step 
In order to be considered for a patent application, the invention must involve an inventive step 
as well, which is non-obvious to a person skilled in the art. According to the New Zealand 
Intellectual Property Office; therefore, an inventive step is as follows: 
“An invention, so far as claimed in a claim, involves an inventive step if it is not obvious to 
a person skilled in the art, having regard to any matter which forms part of the prior art base. 
1. The Patents Act 2013 requires that a claim for an invention involves an inventive step. A 
claim involves an inventive step if it is not obvious to a person skilled in the art, having 
regard to any matter which forms part of the prior art base. 
2. An overview of inventive step was provided by Lord Hoffmann in Biogen Inc v Medeva 
plc [1997] RPC 1 at 34: 
‘Whenever anything inventive is done for the first time it is the result of the addition of a 
new idea to the existing stock of knowledge. Sometimes, it is the idea of using established 
techniques to do something which no one had previously thought of doing. In that case 
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the inventive idea will be doing the new thing. Sometimes it is finding a way of doing 
something which people had wanted to do but could not think of the inventive idea would 
be the way of achieving the goal. In yet other cases, many people may have a general idea 
of how they might achieve a goal but not know how to solve a problem which stands in 
their way. If someone devises a way of solving the problem, his inventive step will be 
that solution, but not the goal itself or the general method of achieving it.’ 
3. Whether or not a claimed invention is inventive requires investigation using an objective 
test which can be applied to any claim. The test needs to use a specific method that is 
standardized and structured, rather than impressionistic and general, so that a consistent 
approach can be taken from case to case. The test is to be decided not on general legal 
principles (though these inform the approach taken) but on the technical facts of the claim 
at issue.” 196 
The above definition shows that the judgment of the inventive step is one of, if not the hardest 
problems in evaluating a patent application. Since the inventive step involves something 
essentially new, which at the time of the patent application is already known and clearly 
expressed in the patent application a casual or intuitive assessment of whether it was indeed non-
obvious inevitably will involve the benefit of hindsight. Therefore, whether the inventive step 
was about finding a new way to achieve a previously established goal, or finding a new way to 
get some obstacles out of the way for such a goal, or indeed finding a completely new goal and 
achieving it, the investigation has to be very systematic and has to find some methodology to 
avoid the pitfalls and biases of after-the-fact human thinking.197 
The World Intellectual Property Organization suggests the following 4-step approach called a 
Pozzoli test. The 4-step approach is based on several court decisions, including: 
● Pozzoli Spa vs. BDMO SA & Anor [2007] EWCA Civ 588 
● Windsurfing International Inc. vs. Tabur Marine (Great Britain) Ltd, [1985] RPC 59 
The 4-step approach: 
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“Step 1: Identify the person skilled in the art and their relevant common general knowledge 
(CGK) 
Step 2: Identify the inventive concept of the claim in question or if that cannot readily be 
done, construe it 
Step 3: Identify what, if any, differences exist between the matter cited as forming part of 
the “state of the art” and the inventive concept 
Step 4: Viewed without any knowledge of the alleged invention claimed, do those 
differences constitute steps which would have been obvious to the person skilled in the 
art?”198 
The above framework is an adequate mental tool to assess the inventiveness of an idea since it 
represents the mindset of the person skilled in the art at the time of the invention. However, 
according to a Study on Inventive Step by the World Intellectual Property Organization, there 
are many competing definitions and practices in the national laws about the inventive step: 
“National/regional laws  
● Having regard to the relevant prior art, the invention is not obvious to a person skilled in 
the art. (majority) 
● The person skilled in the art would not have been able to easily make the invention based 
on the relevant prior art. (JP, KR) 
● The invention constitutes an inventive progress and cannot be easily created by a person 
skilled in the art. (VN) 
● Compared with prior art, the invention has prominent substantive features and represents 
a notable progress. (CN) 
● The invention differs essentially from the state of the art. (Nordic countries) 
● A feature of an invention that involves technical advance as compared to the existing 
knowledge or having economic significance or both and that makes the invention not 
obvious to a person skilled in the art. (IN)” 199 
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Most of the national patent offices follow an approach that shows examples, and the patent 
officers make their judgement following the approach taken by those examples200 (as we have 
seen above in the case of the Pozzoli test). 
“National/regional guidelines provide: 
(i) non-exhaustive exemplary reasoning, rationales, and indicators that may be applied to specific 
cases; 
(ii) technical examples. 
Lack of inventive step 
● Simple substitution of a known element from another to obtain predictable results or 
interchange of material with another known material having analogue effect. 
● Use of known technique or workshop modification to improve similar products, processes 
or devices in the same, predictable way. 
● Simple and direct extrapolation of known facts, such as change of size, form or 
proportion, without any unexpected effect. 
● Selection from a number of alternative possibilities without any unexpected effect. 
In general, technical advantages of the claimed invention over the prior art are also taken into 
account. 
Indicators that may be taken into account for the positive assessment of inventive step (case-by-
case analysis) 
● The claimed invention solved a long-felt need. 
● Particular difficulties in solving the problem. 
● Particular commercial success.  Some guidelines clarify that commercial success must 
derive from the technical features of the claimed invention.  
● The prior art taught away a PSIA from the claimed invention. 
● The claimed invention produced unexpected technical effects or results. 
● The claimed invention offers a surprisingly simple solution.” 201 
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Therefore, the exemplary reasoning works from both sides and assists the patent officers 
incorrectly judging the innovation by describing typical characteristics of, 
● A lack of an inventive step such as predictable results by simple substitution, predictable 
combination or modifications, and direct extrapolation. 
● An inventive step solving a long-identified need, technical difficulties, commercial 
success stemming from the technology etc. 
The different approaches and definitions by which a theoretical “person skilled in the art” can 
find obvious solutions through their inventive capacity are also very noteworthy. 
“A PSIA is a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton. (United States) 
A PSIA is not a dullard and has a certain modicum of creativity. (IN) 
The PSIA is capable of exercising the usual faculty of logic and rational reasons based on 
his knowledge. The PSIA has the ordinary creativity in selecting appropriate materials, 
optimizing a numerical range of the inventions, and replacing the inventions with 
equivalents (KR) or in selecting materials and changing designs (JP).  
The PSIA does not exercise inventive imagination.  The PSIA does not possess intuition or 
the skills of deduction. (CH) 
The PSIA does not question the established views regarding the relevant technology. 
(SE)”202 
The above identifiers, characteristics all try to highlight the imagined persona of the person 
skilled in the art, their capabilities, and approaches to problem-solving. Ultimately it is usually 
enough to take these assumptions, cases, and examples as well as try to imagine this persona 
making a decision to achieve an appropriate judgement on the inventive step. This is a difficult 
problem because invention by its nature is not classifiable into something known; only by 
observing it after the fact can we deduce some conclusions about it. Therefore, to make it 
operationally feasible and objective to the extent that it is possible, national legislators and patent 
offices have issued guidelines and manuals to help the patent officers decide on this crucial step 
of the investigation. The World Intellectual Property Organization publishes all such national 
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1.3.2.3.3. Requirement of Utility 
As a general requirement, utility/usefulness seems very hard to define since usefulness is a 
subjective property. What is useful for one person in one situation may not be useful to another 
person in another situation, so in order to determine what is useful from the patentability 
standpoint, we have to have very clear guidelines on what usefulness scenarios are considered.204 
“The utility requirement often has been interpreted to mean that an invention must have a real 
use that can be demonstrated. It cannot be something that merely has a speculative use or a 
possible future use. This means that someone applying for a patent needs to conduct enough 
research and testing to show that the invention has some immediate usefulness. They will need 
to describe how the invention is useful in their patent application. Otherwise, the USPTO 
probably will deny the application. 
However, a product does not need to be perfect to meet the utility requirement. If it helps achieve 
a certain goal, it can receive patent protection, even if it does not completely achieve that goal 
on its own. A stain remover does not need to remove every stain, as long as it reduces the stains 
overall. The product needs to work in the way that it is described and presumably cause some 
minor social benefit. As long as it makes life slightly easier or more efficient for some people, 
this is enough.”205 
As the Justia article describes, from the utility requirement standpoint, the legislator is usually 
very permissible since it is enough to prove a slight improvement in the lives of a small group of 
people for the innovation to be considered useful. 
As far as the clear rules are concerned, according to which a patent officer may judge this 
usefulness of a slight improvement, the United States Patent and Trademark Office published 
their internal guidelines for examining patents. According to this guideline, two requirements 
need to be met at the same time: 
“If at any time during the examination, it becomes readily apparent that the claimed invention 
has a well-established utility, do not impose a rejection based on lack of utility. An invention has 
a well-established utility if  (i) a person of ordinary skill in the art would immediately appreciate 
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why the invention is useful based on the characteristics of the invention (e.g., properties or 
applications of a product or process), and (ii) the utility is specific, substantial, and credible.” 206 
 
The person of ordinary skill in the art, the same imagined persona that was used in the 
considerations of the inventive step, appears in consideration of the usefulness as well. This 
requirement ensures that specific and special excellence is not required to judge correctly whether 
the invention is useful. Even if it is a slight improvement in a small group of people's lives, the 
utility has to be a specific improvement in some clear and credible use cases of such a group of 
people.207 
The guidelines also describe how a patent officer may determine whether the utility of the 
innovation under consideration is specific: 
“A ‘specific utility’ is specific to the subject matter claimed and can ‘provide a well-defined and 
particular benefit to the public’. In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371, 76 USPQ2d 1225, 1230 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005). This contrasts with a general utility that would be applicable to the broad class of the 
invention. Office personnel should distinguish between situations where an applicant has 
disclosed a specific use for or application of the invention and situations where the applicant 
merely indicates that the invention may prove useful without identifying with specificity why it 
is considered useful. For example, indicating that a compound may be useful in treating 
unspecified disorders, or that the compound has ‘useful biological’ properties, would not be 
sufficient to define a specific utility for the compound.” 208 
Therefore, the requirement of a specific benefit may be established only if the said benefit can 
be applied to the specific invention and is not generalized. If the benefit is claimed to cover this 
invention only because a class or type of invention has shown usefulness in the past, then the 
patent may be rejected.209 
The United States Patent and Trademark Office has also defined their guidelines for the 
consideration of the substantiality of the benefits: 
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“[A]n application must show that an invention is useful to the public as disclosed in its 
current form, not that it may prove useful at some future date after further research. Simply 
put, to satisfy the ‘substantial’ utility requirement, an asserted use must show that the 
claimed invention has a significant and presently available benefit to the public: Fisher, 421 
F.3d at 1371, 76 USPQ2d at 1230.  
Thus a "substantial utility" defines a "real world" use. Utilities that require or constitute 
carrying out further research to identify or reasonably confirm a "real world" context of use 
are not substantial utilities.” 210 
Therefore, substantiality of the utility means that the research has been done to such an extent to 
prove at least one use-case where it will provide benefits. Suspected or theorized utility is not 
acceptable for the innovation to be patentable; therefore, basic research is usually excluded from 
the category of patentable inventions. According to recent studies, this does not mean however, 
that basic research does not contribute to patentable inventions, quite on the contrary.211 
Most companies or individuals applying for patents do not have significant issues with the utility 
requirement. Their research is such that by following their self-interest, they want to establish 
whether their research has practical implications and real-world use-cases so that they can 
determine the earning potential of said inventions should they decide to commercialize them. 
The applications that do fail do so because they either do not present the patent office with enough 
information, or their utility is not credible.212 
1.3.2.3.4. Requirement of Disclosure 
As we have seen in the chapter about the Definition of Patents, the temporary monopoly rights 
of a patent are granted specifically in exchange for the publication of the invention when the 
patent is granted. This requirement is supposed to create those network effects described above 
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In order to decide whether the invention is patentable, the invention details must be clear and 
understandable enough to be put into practice by a person skilled in the art. We have reviewed 
the assumed mental capabilities and thought procedures of a person skilled in the art in the 
previous chapters.214 
However, in recent years, the requirement of disclosure has raised some controversies, 
particularly in the field of biological research, especially as related to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity. The term often used for a controversial practice is called biopiracy. 
“Often, in the search for new bioresources, researchers draw on local people’s traditional 
knowledge about the properties of a particular plant, animal, or chemical compound. When 
researchers use traditional knowledge without permission or exploit the cultures they are drawing 
from – it’s called biopiracy. Biopiracy happens when researchers or research organizations take 
biological resources without official sanction, largely from less affluent countries or 
marginalized people. Biopiracy is not limited to drug development. It also occurs in agricultural 
and industrial contexts. Indian products such as the neem tree, tamarind, turmeric, and Darjeeling 
tea have all been patented by foreign firms for different lucrative purposes.” 215 
In order to prevent such patent applications where the novelty of the invention is clearly violated, 
but where the Patent Office may not be able to properly assess the novelty because of a lack of 
publicized information available in their language or culture, there have been numerous studies 
and discussions on the proposed mandatory disclosure to the Patent Office of the origin of genetic 
resources or traditional knowledge used in the invention.216  
A technical study by the World Intellectual Property Organization has concluded the following:  
“Three broad functions have been considered for disclosure methods relating to GR/TK: 
● to disclose any GR/TK actually used in the course of developing the invention (a 
descriptive or transparency function, pertaining to the GR/TK itself and its relationship 
with the invention); 
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● to disclose the actual source of the GR/TK (a disclosure of origin function, relating to 
where the GR/TK was obtained) – this may concern the country of origin (to clarify under 
which jurisdiction the source material was obtained), or a more specific location (for 
instance, to ensure that genetic resources can be accessed, so as to ensure the invention 
can be duplicated or reproduced);  
● and,  to provide an undertaking or evidence of prior informed consent (a compliance 
function, relating to the legitimacy of the acts of access to GR/TK source material) – this 
may entail showing that GR/TK used in the invention was obtained and used in 
compliance with applicable laws in the country of origin or in compliance with the terms 
of any specific agreement recording prior informed consent, or showing that the act of 
applying for a patent was in itself undertaken in accordance with prior informed consent. 
Such mechanisms may be positively consistent with WIPO treaties, in that they are positive 
obligations (for instance, Article 4 of the Paris Convention provides that the “inventor shall have 
the right to be mentioned as such in the patent,” PCT Article 5 requires that the description in an 
international patent application “shall disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and 
complete for the invention to be carried out by a person skilled in the art”), or they may be 
implicitly consistent, in the sense that they do not conflict with treaty requirements.” 217 
According to this report, there would be several ways congruent with the current Intellectual 
Property international treaties of preventing biopiracy, but none have been implemented on an 
international scale so far. 
Therefore, scientists have adopted preventative measures to prevent such controversial practices 
from taking advantage of flaws due to imperfect information in patent systems. “Biopiracy is not 
likely to disappear any time soon. As climate change threatens, many large agribusinesses and 
researchers are patenting drought-resistant, heat-resistant, and salt-resistant genes from plants for 
future use in crop species. To counter this, many researchers are attempting to collect genes and 
publish them in scientific domains (such as the NIH’s online GenBank or various seed banks). 
By sharing genetic sequences, scientists can prevent big firms from claiming uniqueness and 
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novelty, two criteria for patents. While patents were first used to protect inventions and stimulate 
innovation, many anti-biopiracy activists and some academic and scientific circles are pushing 
for changes in the system, as it is now thought to hinder research in many important areas. For 
now, the issue of biopiracy remains at a stalemate.”218 
1.3.2.3.5. Exclusion of Abstract Ideas and Natural Phenomena 
Abstract ideas (in the definition of the United States Law) such as scientific theories about how 
certain natural phenomena, and the natural phenomena itself (e.g., the laws of physics) are not 
considered patentable in most national legal frameworks. This is due to the patent system's 
intention of encouraging directly useful information that would be applicable for some specific 
scope and use case of an invention. Basic research and scientific theories are more generic in 
nature; allowing patentability for them would endanger the patent system's objectives 
themselves.219 
In the UK legal system, a discovery, a scientific theory of a mathematical method are all excluded 
from the innovations that are considered patentable: 
“Abstract and purely intellectual ideas are excluded from patentability.  A discovery may be new 
and maybe very significant scientifically and industrially, but you cannot prevent others from 
taking advantage of that discovery per se. 
That said, discoveries, theories, and methods often lead to practical inventions, and those 
inventions are patentable. Some examples are given below. 
● The discovery that a particular known material is heat-resistant is not patentable, but a 
fireproof safe incorporating the material would potentially be an invention. 
● A material which has always existed (undiscovered) in nature is not patentable, but a 
process to isolate or extract this material may be an invention.  The isolated / purified 
material itself is also potentially patentable. 
● A theory as to how and why a known process works in the way it does is not patentable.  
However, a better understanding of the mechanism behind the process may lead to 
improvements being made.  Those improvements would be patentable subject-matter. 
 
218
 (Rose, 2016) 
219
 (United States Patent and Trademark Office, 2020) 
95 
 
● A mathematical method involving particular operations on a set of numbers to reach 
another set of numbers is not patentable.  However, an image enhancement system which 
operates on a digital image to produce an enhanced image is patentable subject-matter, 
even though a digital image is of course a set of numbers.” 220 
The examples above provide some clear distinctions and show how a general idea and a specific, 
significant invention are different. In most cases, patent officers can handily differentiate 
between the two. 
Defining, however clearly, what is and what is not an abstract idea has created serious 
controversies, especially in the field of software-related innovations.221 At the time of the creation 
of the patent system, inventions could clearly be understood as some machine or industrial 
process that would improve the lives of some individuals or companies. However, with the 
invention of the computer and the increase of software code in today’s systems, this definition 
no longer seems applicable. Nowadays, most economic sectors are using software to leverage 
innovation at an increased speed and decrease cost, compared to hardware-based innovation. Yet, 
the patentability of such inventions implemented in software has been a very ambiguous area in 
patent law. Most national legal systems are excluding software-related inventions from patent 
protection, either explicitly or under the umbrella of abstract ideas such as mathematical 
methods.222 
In the UK legal system, computer programs are explicitly named in the list of exclusions from 
patent protection, albeit with limitations: 
“SCHEMES, RULES OR METHODS FOR PERFORMING A MENTAL ACT, PLAYING A 
GAME OR DOING BUSINESS, AND PROGRAMS FOR A COMPUTER 
This exclusion, and in particular “programs for a computer”, is probably the most controversial, 
most contested, and most confusingly unclear of all the categories of the excluded subject matter. 
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Like the firework and the musical instrument examples, which are technical means to an aesthetic 
end, a technical invention which results in improved business efficiency will not be excluded as 
a business method.  For example, an improved voice recognition system which speeds up 
transcription of dictated letters is not necessarily excluded.  However, a business method 
characterized only using a computer program in carrying out the method will not be allowed due 
to the combination of excluded categories. 
A computer program may be patentable if the program provides a “further technical effect.”  For 
example, an invention involving computer software and enabling detection of the proper 
functioning of an anti-lock braking system was granted a patent.  An application, however, for a 
computer program implementing a fixed-odds betting system, was refused. 
The law on patentability of software is still developing, and it is difficult to give general 
advice.”223 
According to an article published in the WIPO Magazine, the software industry and software-
based innovations are growing rapidly and already represent more than twenty-two percent of 
the global economy, and this number will only increase. 
“Today, many technological innovations rely on software advances. Take the software-related 
innovations that have revolutionized the smartphone. Between 2009 and 2013, the total aggregate 
lines of code in the chips – the brains of the smartphone – shipped by Qualcomm increased from 
330 million to 3.3 billion. These phenomenal and unprecedented developments were the result 
of years of high-risk R&D investment. Software-implemented functionality is making an 
expanding range of everyday products safer and more efficient with higher performance. It is 
creating entirely new offerings and capabilities, such as intelligent power grids, digital 
manufacturing, real-time farm management systems, smart cities powered by interconnected 
(Internet of Things) platforms, and digital healthcare. Estimates suggest that the digital economy 
– which relies heavily on software-related innovations – already represents 22.5 percent of the 
global economy. Global R&D spending on software offerings has also grown rapidly, rising from 
USD 86 billion in 2010 to USD 142 billion in 2015, an increase of 65 percent. The United States 
has one of the most software-intensive industries in the world (see Robert J. Shapiro, The U.S. 
Software Industry: An Engine for Growth and Employment, SIIA, 2014). In 2014 alone, the 
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industry directly added an estimated USD 475.3 billion – and USD 1.07 trillion indirectly – to 
the country’s GDP, directly employing 2.5 million people and indirectly supporting some 9.8 
million jobs.” 224 
Both the cited number of jobs and the GDP numbers, especially in the United States, show that 
if the patent system is to stay relevant in today’s economy, it has to consider the software's 
innovation potential. This would be in line with the vision of the legislator originally creating the 
patent system to incentivize those inventors that come up with a novel idea and improve the 
economy and scientific progress in the country.225 This is clearly the case in most software-based 
innovations as well in more and more industries. 
In the United States, after years of ambiguity where courts have not defined the meaning of 
abstract ideas on purpose, the United States Patent and Trademark Office finally gave a definitive 
list of abstract ideas, thereby clearing some of the confusion about the eligibility of computer 
programs: “First, in accordance with judicial precedent and in an effort to improve certainty and 
reliability, the revised guidance extracts and synthesizes key concepts identified by the courts as 
abstract ideas to explain that the abstract idea exception includes certain groupings of subject 
matter: mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity, and mental 
processes. Claims that do not fall within one of these enumerated groupings cannot be 
characterized as reciting an abstract idea unless approved by the Technology Center Director, 
with approval indicated on the record in the file, and with a provided ‘justification for why such 
claim limitation is being treated as reciting an abstract idea.’ In essence, by narrowly identifying 
certain subject matter groups as being those that properly qualify for characterization as abstract 
ideas, the USPTO is effectively defining what is and what is not an abstract idea, thereby filling 
a void intentionally left ambiguous by both the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit.” 226 
This definitive list is surely a step towards more inclusive protection of software-implemented 
innovation using patents, the case laws and precedents including those from the United States 
Supreme Court are still making this area ambiguous for inventors. 
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Moreover, there are significant differences in the national legislative frameworks as well as the 
practical application of those frameworks by the national patent offices throughout the world. 
While the European Patent Convention (EPC) (Articles 2 (c) and Article 3) defines computer 
programs as such being excluded from patentability227, and while we have seen the current 
ambiguity in the U.S. patent eligibility boundary guidelines, Japan has decided to follow a 
different approach: “Japan’s Patent Act (Article 2(3)(i)), on the other hand, explicitly refers to 
computer programs as patentable subject matter. The Act states that the claimed subject matter 
must be recognized as a ‘creation of technical ideas utilizing the law of nature’ to qualify as a 
patentable invention. In general, according to the Examination Guidelines of the Japan Patent 
Office, to be patent-eligible, a claim for a software-related invention must demonstrate that 
software and hardware resources work cooperatively.” 228 
As we have seen in this chapter, while the boundaries of patentable inventions are different in 
different jurisdictions and change over time as well, the fundamental goals of the patent system 
have remained the same. As economies change and more innovation is created in fields that are 
different from the traditional statutory definitions of machines and industrial processes, the 
definitions of patentable inventions will also need to adapt to stay relevant and keep granting 
competitive advantages to the economic and scientific progress of their respective nations.229 
However, this fluidity only underlines our previous points about the value of innovation that 
patents embody and that such values should be protected. 
1.3.2.4. Weaknesses of Patents - Patent Trolls 
“A patent troll is an individual or an organization that purchases and holds patents for 
unscrupulous purposes, such as stifling competition or launching patent infringement suits.”230  
In legal terms, a patent troll is a type of non-practicing entity: someone who holds a patent but is 
not involved in the design or manufacture of any product or process associated with that patent. 
Non-practicing entities include legitimate institutions such as startups, technology transfer 
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agencies, universities, and research organizations. To differentiate patent trolls from legitimate 
non-practicing entities, they are sometimes referred to as patent-assertion companies: 
organizations that exist solely to obtain patents and profit from patent infringement claims. 231 
Due to the expensive patent litigation fee and the long period of court procedures, many 
companies who receive threats or infringement letters settle with the licensing fee regardless of 
whether they accept the patent is not genuine, or there was no infringement. It is often quicker 
and simpler for an organization to settle.232 
“Simply looking at the aggregate economic impact of patent troll demand letters, however, 
misses their fundamental emotional impact – the intense popular rage that they generate. To 
understand that, put yourself in the place of a small business owner who is victimized by a patent 
troll.” 233 
As the foregoing suggests, defining a troll is very difficult. Some would even claim that Thomas 
Edison, one of the most prolific inventors in the United States, was an early troll, seeking licenses 
for patents that he did not plan to manufacture.234 
The monetization of patents in the marketplace can spur innovation and drive economic growth 
and job creation. Many inventors just like to invent. Some have no interest in manufacturing 
anything but would prefer to go back to the lab and hunt for the next breakthrough. In trolls, 
inventors and others in the secondary market have a purchaser willing to pay for valuable patents: 
an entity that will help them reap the benefits of their efforts. It is widely recognized that patents 
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1.3.3. Patent Protection Laws and Practices Worldwide 
In this chapter, I will examine the history of Patent Law, and look at some prominent examples 
of the laws and treaties of this legal field in practice: the United States Patent Law, and the most 
important international treaties governing patent law. The understanding of the foundations of 
Patent Law, and the commonalities and differences between national and international patent 
laws and treaties is important to be able to better identify the effects and significance of patents 
in today’s globalized economy and the detrimental effects of cases when the patents remain 
unutilized. 
 
The first statutory patent system of the world developed in the city of Venice, Italy, at that time 
a maritime empire with important manufacturing industries such as glass making. Most of the 
patents in the city were granted in this field. By the 15th century, the Venetians realized that by 
establishing a system of innovation where new inventive devices are clearly described to the 
Republic of Venice's officials and granting temporary legal protection against any infringement 
for a period of 10 years, they could significantly increase the incentives of such inventors. As 
Venetians settled in other areas of Europe throughout their vast commercial interest sphere, they 
were seeking the same patent protection. This encouraged the development of patent systems in 
other European countries as well. 236 
The law that instituted the Venetian patent system is the Venetian Patent Statute of March 19, 
1474, the world’s oldest patent system: “[T]here are in this city, and also there come temporarily 
by reason of its greatness and goodness, men from different places and most clever minds, 
capable of devising and inventing all manner of ingenious contrivances. And should it be 
provided, that the works and contrivances invented by them, others have seen them could not 
make them and take their honor, men of such kind would exert their minds, invent and make 
things which would be of no small utility and benefit to our State. Therefore, decision will be 
passed that, by authority of this Council, each person who will make in this city any new 
ingenious contrivance, not made heretofore in our dominion, as soon as it is reduced to perfection, 
so that it can be used and exercised, shall give notice of the same to the office of our Provisioners 
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of Common. It being forbidden to any other in any territory and place of ours to make any other 
contrivance in the form and resemblance thereof, without the consent and license of the author 
up to ten years. And, however, should anybody make it, the aforesaid author and inventor will 
have the liberty to cite him before any office of this city, by which office the aforesaid who shall 
infringe be forced to pay him the sum of one hundred ducates and the contrivance immediately 
destroyed. Being then in liberty of our Government at his will to take and use in his need any of 
the said contrivances and instruments, with this condition, however, that no others than the 
authors shall exercise them.”237 
“This patent system already had the important characteristics of today’s national and 
international patent systems: 
● It granted temporary protection against infringements, thereby endowing the inventor 
with monopoly rights for a period of 10 years. 
● The protection was offered to inventions that passed an examination by the General 
Welfare Board. 
● The city established a registry of patents. Between the years of 1490 and 1550, over 120 
patents were granted mostly in the fields of “water mills, pumps, dredging machines, and 
similar mechanical devices.” 238 
The English patent system, from which many other common law patent systems originate, 
evolved differently, from the wide-scale grant of monopoly charters (letters patent) narrowing 
down to the fields of innovations. It became the first modern patent system that eventually 
established the concept of Intellectual Property. This helped the British Empire to become the 
engine of the Industrial Revolution. 239 
The kings of England have issued latter’s patent for monopolies they wanted to favour. These 
favours were often granted in exchange for money; therefore, the granting of such monopolies in 
the form of letters patent became a significant revenue generation source for the English Crown. 
So much so indeed that it was widely abused, and the Crown eventually granted these latter’s 
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patent to common goods such as salt as well. The name patent comes from the Latin verb “patere” 
which means “to lie open, to be accessible”.240 In case of a patent for an invention, the document 
is a letter patent, an open letter to the public. 241 
Following public demand, the Parliament of England revoked all these monopolies and allowed 
only new inventions to be eligible for such monopoly rights, temporarily for a period of 14 years 
or less. These regulations were instituted in the Statute of Monopolies of 1624. The first 
important section was Section 1, to abolish all previous monopolies and allow only the Common 
Law to govern such rights: 
“all Monopolies, and all Commissions, Grants, Licences, Charters and Letters Patents heretofore 
made or granted, or hereafter to be made or granted, to any Person or Persons, Bodies Politick or 
Corporate whatsoever, of or for the sole Buying, Selling, Making, Working or Using of any Thing 
within this Realm, or the Dominion of Wales ... or of any other Monopolies, or of Power, Liberty 
or Faculty, to dispense with any others, or to give Licence or Toleration to do, use or exercise 
any Thing against the Tenor or Purport of any Law or Statute ... and all Proclamations, 
Inhibitions, Restraints, Warrants of Assistants, and all other Matters and Things whatsoever, any 
way tending to the Instituting, Erecting, Strengthening, Furthering or Countenancing of the same 
or any of them ... are altogether contrary to the Laws of this Realm, and so are and shall be utterly 
void and of none Effect, and in no wise to be put in Use or Execution.”242 
Subsequently, in Section 6, the statute provides the exception when monopolies may be granted:  
“shall not extend to any letters patents (b) and grants of privilege for the term of fourteen years 
or under, hereafter to be made, of the sole working or making of any manner of new 
manufactures within this realm (c) to the true and first inventor (d) and inventors of such 
manufactures, which others at the time of making such letters patents and grants shall not use 
(e), so as also they be not contrary to the law nor mischievous to the state by raising prices of 
commodities at home, or hurt of trade, or generally inconvenient (f): the same fourteen years to 
be accounted from the date of the first letters patents or grant of such privilege hereafter to be 
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made, but that the same shall be of such force as they should be if this act had never been made, 
and of none other (g)” 243 
This Statute of Monopolies became the foundation of common law patent regulations in the 
British Empire and its colonies. The applications for patents were standardized further during the 
reign of Queen Anne, when a requirement to attach a complete specification on the details of the 
operation of the invention for the public was added: “In the reign of Queen Anne, the law officers 
of the Crown established as a condition of grant that ‘the patentee must by an instrument in 
writing describe and ascertain the nature of the invention and the manner in which it is to be 
performed. James Puckle’s 1718 patent for a machine gun was one of the 1sts to be required to 
provide a specification’.”244 
Some further practical implications were laid out in case law afterward, clarifying that gradual 
improvements of inventions are also patentable, even if the idea had not been implemented, but 
the specification clearly shows the possibility of such practical implementation: “Extensive 
litigation on Watt's 1796 patent for steam engines set out the important principle that valid patents 
could be granted for improvements in a known machine. It also established that a patent was 
possible for an idea or principle, even though the specification might be limited to bare statements 
of such improvements or principles, provided they come into effect or were clothed in practical 
application.” 245 
These laws became the foundation for patent law in common law countries, not only in the United 
Kingdom, but also in the United States, Australia and New Zealand. 
The philosophy of John Locke was a significant step in the development of patent law. 
“Locke's theory of property is itself subject to slightly different interpretations. One interpretation 
is that society rewards labor with property purely on the instrumental grounds that we must 
provide rewards to get labor. In contrast, a normative interpretation of this labor theory says that 
labor should be rewarded. This part of the article argues that Locke's labor theory, under either 
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interpretation, can be used to justify intellectual property without many of the problems that 
attend its application to physical property.” 246 
As Hughes argues, either the viewpoint when the granting of patents is considered a reward for 
the inventor’s labor after the fact, or as an incentive so that inventors even produce such labor, 
leads us to the conclusion that patents are the rights of the inventor, similar to property rights. 
Therefore, these rights are not simply the act of acquiring some monopoly rights, but an inherent 
attribute of the creation of works of the human mind. With these developments and related to this 
famous invention of James Watt’s steam engine, patent misuse, a negative aspect of patent law, 
has also emerged as a highly debated issue. Richard Trevitchik invented a new type of steam 
engine, so he ended up inventing around the patent held by Watt; however, this invention was 
banned until the expiry of Watt’s patent. Whether this slowed or hastened the progress of science 
is still being debated. 247 
National patent and international patent systems that have since developed are following slightly 
different rules and practices. In the following paragraphs, I will investigate the United States laws 
and regulations that are fundamental to the patent system and will continue with the international 
treaties that govern the patent system worldwide. In the next chapter, I will investigate the patent 
system's legal framework in the European Union and its specific laws and properties. 
The United States Constitution Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8, states the following: 
“The Congress shall have Power … to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.” 248 This constitutional section has many important implications 
on the United States Patent and Copyright system. As per the origins and scope of the power 
of Congress in this matter, the rights and responsibilities of Congress are to issue temporary 
monopoly rights to inventors. As to what the time and contractual limits of such monopolies 
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are, as well as what conditions the inventors must fulfill when applying for such monopoly 
right, indeed if they even have to apply or the rights are granted automatically as in the case 
of copyrights, Congress is free to decide. 249 
Thus, the Patent Act of 1793 defined the subjects of patents and their basic procedures. The 
subjects as defined here have not changed ever since. They include new and useful arts, machines, 
manufacturers or compositions of matter, or improvements on such inventions: 
“Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in 
Congress assembled, That when any person or persons, being a citizen or citizens of the United 
States, shall allege that he or they have invented any new and useful art, machine, manufacture 
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement on any art, machine, manufacture 
or composition of matter, not known or used before the application, and shall present a petition 
to the Secretary of State, signifying a desire of obtaining an exclusive property in the same, and 
praying that a patent may be granted therefore, it shall and may be lawful for the said Secretary 
of State, to cause letters patent to be made out in the name of the United States, bearing teste by 
the President of the United States, reciting the allegations and suggestions of the said petition, 
and giving a short description of the said invention or discovery, and thereupon granting to such 
petitioner, or petitioners, his, her, or their heirs, administrators or assigns, for a term not 
exceeding fourteen years, the full and exclusive right and liberty of making, constructing, using, 
and vending to others to be used, the said invention or discovery, which letters patent shall be 
delivered to the Attorney General of the United States, to be examined; who, within fifteen days 
after such delivery, if he finds the same conformable to this act, shall certify accordingly, at the 
foot thereof, and return the same to the Secretary of State, who shall present the letters patent 
thus certified, to be signed, and shall cause the seal of the United States to be there to affixed: 
and the same shall be good and available to the grantee or grantees, by force of this act, and shall 
be recorded in a book, to be kept for that purpose, in the office of the Secretary of State, and 
delivered to the patentee or his order.”250 
The Patent Act of 1952 used a slightly different language to describe the same subjects: 
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composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, 
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” 251 
Both the Acts mentioned above highlight the procedure to submit the invention of process, 
machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or an improvement in any of these areas to the 
state's representatives, practically the United States Patent and Trademark Office, part of the 
Department of Commerce. It also highlights the usefulness and novelty, and disclosure criteria 
we described in detail in the previous chapters. 
The Patent Act of 1952 also added the requirement of non-obviousness of the invention to be 
granted a patent: “A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the 
claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in Section 102 if the differences 
between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole 
would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person 
having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be 
negated by the manner in which the invention was made.” 252 
This requirement was added in order to prevent applicants from filing patents where the 
knowledge was already common or obvious, and thus making no new significant advances but 
only acquiring monopoly rights. Such practices are clearly harmful to the economic and scientific 
progress and to customers, because of the unnecessary monopoly profits that customers would 
have to bear.253 
In 2011, a new law was passed in the United States, the most significant since 1952, the Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act. This act had three provisions among which the switch from a “first 
to invent” to a “first inventor to file” system was the most significant. The United States was 
among the last countries to abolish the first to invent principle and transition into a first to file 
system through the enactment of this regulation.254 
The first inventor to file system is described in the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act as follows: 
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“SEC. 3. FIRST INVENTOR TO FILE. 
(a) DEFINITIONS.—Section 100 of title 35, United States Code, is amended— 
(1) in subsection (e), by striking ‘‘or inter partes reexamination under section 311’’; and 
(2) by adding at the end the following: 
(f) The term ‘inventor’ means the individual or, if a joint invention, the individuals 
collectively who invented or discovered the subject matter of the invention. 
(g) The terms ‘joint inventor’ and ‘coinventor’ mean any 1 of the individuals who invented 
or discovered the subject matter of a joint invention. 
(h) The term ‘joint research agreement’ means a written contract, grant, or cooperative 
agreement entered into by 2 or more persons or entities for the performance of 
experimental, developmental, or research work in the field of the claimed invention.  
(i)(1) The term ‘effective filing date’ for a claimed invention in a patent or application for 
patent means— 
(A) if subparagraph (B) does not apply, the actual filing date of the patent or the application 
for the patent containing a claim to the invention; or 
(B) the filing date of the earliest application for which the patent or application is entitled, 
as to such invention, to a right of priority under section 119, 365(a), or 365(b) or to the 
benefit of an earlier filing date under section 120, 121, or 365(c). 
(2) The effective filing date for a claimed invention in an application for reissue or reissued 
patent shall be determined by deeming the claim to the invention to have been contained in 
the patent for which reissue was sought. 
(j) The term ‘claimed invention’ means the subject matter defined by a claim in a patent or 
an application for a patent.’’ 255 
There is a rather important difference though, between the “first inventor to file” system of the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office and the “first to file” system of the European Patent 
Office. The former allows the inventor a grace period of one year whereby if they disclose their 
invention to the general public, and they file for a patent in this timeframe, their patent will get 
approved on the basis of them being the first to publish the invention, regardless of other 
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applicants for the same inventions.256 This way the United States has only partly transitioned 
between the two approaches and still gave some time for inventors to file their patent applications 
even after publication. This change is arguably maintained to allow for smaller companies, 
generally startups greater participation in the patent system, according to John Koenig: “Effective 
March 17, 2013, the U.S. patent system awards a patent to the first inventor to file an application 
— aligning with the rest of the world, according to the original U.S. patent system. But the first 
inventor to file also receives a U.S. one-year grace period until filing, from the date he or she 
makes an invention public. This means that an inventor can effectively stop-the-clock on prior 
art by making a public disclosure, use or sale of the invention. For small businesses, this grace 
period creates valuable time to seek financing, customers and sourcing, without sacrificing patent 
rights.” 257 
The Law also introduced a post-grant review of the patent to enable the opposition to be 
expressed no later than nine months from the patent approval and request to invalidate a patent 
if the patentability conditions were not met according to the opposer.258  The provisions of the 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act went into effect on March 16th, 2013. 
There are further case laws that have identified the boundaries and correct legal interpretations 
of the Patent Acts and their relationship to Antitrust and Competition Law, including the rulings 
of the Supreme Court of the United States. Some notable examples of case law that were related 
to both patents and antitrust laws are the following: 
In Kimble vs. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 576 U.S. 446 (2015) the Supreme court defended a 
previous case of 50 years earlier, Brulotte vs. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964). The case was about 
licensing contracts extending beyond the lifetime of the patent, which were ruled to be 
unenforceable by the Supreme Court in the previous case of Brulotte vs Thys Co. The main 
criticism the previous ruling received was an assertion whereby patent misuse cases should be 
judged on the basis of antitrust law principles. That assertion would also mean that contracts 
without significant anticompetitive effects should not be proscribed. Therefore, if the private 
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contract extends beyond the life of the patent, its validity should not be challenged unless it 
clearly falls under an antitrust case and affects competition negatively. The Supreme Court 
upheld the decision of the previous case law, on the grounds that patent misuse cases should not 
be judged on antitrust grounds in general, in order to preserve the balance between encouraging 
innovation and ensuring public access to innovation.259 As the Supreme Court stated: “An 
unpatentable article, like an article on which the patent has expired, is in the public domain, and 
may be made and sold by whoever chooses to do so.” 260  
In FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136 (2013) “the US Supreme Court held that “pay-for-delay” 
settlements between patent-owning drug companies and their generic competitors could be 
anticompetitive even if these settlements were within the scope of the owners’ patent rights.”261 
The Federal Trade Commission stated that such a practice should be inherently presumed to be 
anti-competitive and in the interest of sharing monopoly profits. The Supreme Court ruled that 
such practice falls under the realm of antitrust law and should be judged accordingly. The practice 
itself may or may not constitute as anti-competitive behavior, depending on the effects and 
circumstances of the reverse payment settlement; therefore, the application of such practice does 
not presume anticompetitive behavior.262  
The competition authority (the Federal Trade Commission) must investigate in a normal 
procedure and weigh according to the Rule of Reason Test as opposed to the Presumptive 
Illegality Test: “The Supreme Court had essentially four possible ways to deal with these issues: 
A. The Scope of the Patent Test: This was the majority rule, which held that if the settlement 
was within the scope of the patent and the litigation was not sham, the decision of the parties 
as to the terms of settlement would be respected. This is the rule applied to patent cases in 
general, and the question was whether it should also apply in the somewhat weird world of 
Hatch-Waxman (more on this below). 
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B. The Presumptive Illegality Test: This was the FTC’s approach, and a slight retreat from 
its initial position. To the FTC, a settlement is legal if the patent owner gives up one kind of 
property (part of his patent term), but presumptively illegal if he gives up some other kind 
of property (such as a cash payment). The original formulation of the test was that any 
payment or transfer of value of any kind (other than giving up part of the patent term) was 
not merely presumptively, but per se illegal (and the FTC urged Congress to legislate). But 
before the Court in Actavis, the FTC scaled back to requesting only that the settlement be 
presumed to be illegal and that the parties could try to justify it—to the same agency that 
had publicly announced many times that such settlements were all illegal. 
C. The Rule of Reason Test: The full, untrammeled rule of reason inquiry: whether, on 
balance, the pro-competitive aspects of the transaction outweigh the anticompetitive aspects. 
As this is the test that the Court adopted, we will speak about it in more depth below. 
D. Let Congress Fix What Congress Hath Wrought: This argument is really quite simple. 
What prompted the whole situation of odd-looking settlements was the structure that 
Congress set up in the Hatch-Waxman Act. Under that statute, a generic company can take 
a patented drug, create its own version, and do the bioequivalence testing necessary to get it 
approved, all without being deemed to have infringed the innovator’s patent.” 263 
The case law of patents and antitrust is extensive since both fields of law intersect in the area of 
patent misuse, whereby patent owners are trying to gain more monopoly profits than originally 
intended by the legislator when granting the temporary monopoly rights under patent laws in 
order to encourage innovation.264 Since it is in the interest of patent holder companies to seek 
every way in which these monopoly profits may be extended, this body of case law can be 
expected to continue to grow both in the United States, as well as around the world. 
 
In the following section, I will examine the international treaties governing intellectual property 
and patents, the organizations, and procedures they have created to allow for greater 
interoperability of the inherently national intellectual property legal frameworks. 
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The first such treaty is the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, first signed 
in 1883, then revised several times: at Brussels in 1900, at Washington in 1911, at The Hague in 
1925, at London in 1934, at Lisbon in 1958 and at Stockholm in 1967, and was amended in 1979. 
The treaty is governed by the World Intellectual Property Organization.265 
The most important provisions are defining how the national treatment of the industrial property 
should be handled, the right of priority that should be given to applications transferred to member 
countries, and the common rules for the specific types of intellectual property, including 
patents.266 The national treatment rules are the following: 
“Under the provisions on national treatment, the Convention provides that, as regards the 
protection of industrial property, each Contracting State must grant the same protection to 
nationals of other Contracting States that it grants to its own nationals. Nationals of non-
Contracting States are also entitled to national treatment under the Convention if they are 
domiciled or have a real and effective industrial or commercial establishment in a Contracting 
State.” 267 
This basic rule essentially gives equality of patent owner privileges, regardless of which member 
country the inventor first applied for the patent grant. The right of priority provision is as follows: 
“This right means that, on the basis of a regular first application filed in one of the Contracting 
States, the applicant may, within a certain period of time (12 months for patents and utility 
models; 6 months for industrial designs and marks), apply for protection in any of the other 
Contracting States. These subsequent applications will be regarded as if they had been filed on 
the same day as the first application. In other words, they will have priority (hence the expression 
"right of priority") over applications filed by others during the said period of time for the same 
invention, utility model, mark or industrial design.” 268 
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The right of priority rule, therefore, prevents applications in other countries from gaining the 
patent by parallel applications to the original inventor’s patent. It also gives the grace period for 
the inventor to decide which countries they wish to include in their patent rights, given that such 
protections and applications are not automatic because ultimately it is up to the national patent 
office to register the patent based on their own procedures.269 
The common rules are defining these exact independence criteria that a granting of a patent in a 
member state does not give any obligations to the other states to grant the patent in their countries 
as well. The refusal or termination of patents are independent as well, and there is no obligation 
to refuse or terminate a patent in case another member state does so.270 
There is an essential case for preventing patent abuse, especially when the patents are failing to 
work or working insufficiently; therefore, the customers are not able to access the innovation as 
presumed in the patent application process. The action to be followed in such cases is a 
compulsory license, which is a license not granted by the patent owner but by an authority of the 
state. As well as the compulsory license, a forfeit of a patent may be forced after sufficient time 
(2 years) from the grant of the first compulsory license has been issued. These rules have been 
defined to make the conditions under which the patent owner’s rights may be revoked or 
decreased more standardized in all member countries. 271 
Another significant treaty is the Patent Cooperation Treaty, concluded in 1970, which established 
a system for filing patents internationally, thus requesting the monopoly rights for an invention 
in many countries at the same time. Even though the granting of the patents is still in the sole 
control of the patent offices of the member countries, this allows the inventors a significantly 
easier system of application. This opportunity for the inventors can encourage innovation further, 
especially for inventions that could have international or global relevance, since there are now 
more than 150 member countries of the Patent Cooperation Treaty. 272 
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Figure 2 Patent Cooperation Treaty System 273 
An invention going through an international patent application follows these steps: 
1. A patent application is filed with one of the patent offices of the contracting states of the 
Patent Cooperation Treaty. The patent office is called a Receiving Office and may be a 
national or regional patent office, or in some cases the International Bureau in Geneva, 
Switzerland. The regional offices include among others the European Patent Office, the 
African Intellectual Property Organization, and the Eurasian Patent Organization. As a 
general rule, at least one of the applicants must be a citizen of one of the contracting 
countries in order for this filing to be accepted. Some patent office requires citizenship of 
the same country where the patent was filed. The filing date of this application is going 
to be accepted as the original filing date in each contracting country the patent application 
will proceed to in later steps.274 
2. An “International Search” is conducted by one of the International Searching Authorities 
to determine the most relevant prior art regarding the invention to be patented. This search 
will be the basis of an International Search Report and a formal opinion of the 
International Searching Authority on the patentability of the invention. The choice of the 
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available International Searching Authorities depends on the Receiving Office where the 
original patent application was filed. The International Searching Authorities include, 
among others the European Patent Office, China National Intellectual Property 
Administration, the Japan Patent Office, Indian Patent Office, the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office, Nordic Patent Institute and Visegrad Patent Institute. The search 
report may help the inventor decide which national patent offices to further submit the 
application to, considering the costs of translation and several processing fees.275 
3. The next step is the International Preliminary Examination, which aims to determine 
whether the invention is genuinely new (test of novelty), whether it involves an inventive 
step (test of non-obviousness), and is applicable to be used in the industry where the 
applicant claims (test of usefulness). Even though this Preliminary Examination step is 
optional since the three criteria above are generally considered to be common between 
national patent offices, many such offices rely on this examination heavily and grant the 
patent in their respective countries without much further investigation. Some additional 
advantages of this examination are prevalent in cases when the International Searching 
Authority has negative findings but allows the applicant to produce further documents to 
justify their claims. Such procedures involving multiple response rounds could be very 
costly both in time and money for the applicants if they had to perform them with each 
national patent office.276 
4. The application, along with the International Search Report and the formal opinion on 
patentability is published by the World Intellectual Property Organization, normally after 
18 months from the filing date.277 
5. Finally, the patent application enters the “national phase”, when the various patent offices 
where the application was intended to be transferred take over and perform their own 
investigations. The findings of neither the International Search Report nor the formal 
opinion on patentability nor the Preliminary Examination are binding for any of the patent 
offices of the contracting states, so the patentability is ultimately decided by the member 










start 30 months after the initial filing (priority date); otherwise, the international patent 
application has no effects on the regional or national applications.278 
The Patent Cooperation Treaty is a very important treaty in practical effects since many 
innovations have potential global applicability, and both the value of the monopoly rights that 
could be gained from such inventions are significantly increased, and the costs of registering 
those monopoly rights are significantly decreased by international cooperation. Furthermore, 
such a cooperative system also significantly decreases the probabilities of parallel development 
of the same invention in multiple countries as well as the exploitation of regulatory arbitrage. 
Thus, this and other international treaties make patented inventions more economically viable 
and advantageous for the inventors in today’s globalized economy.279 
The patents filed under the umbrella of the Patent Cooperation Treaty are rapidly increasing. 
While 2004 was the first year when the total number of applications filed under the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty had reached one million since the conclusion of the Treaty in 1970, the total 
number of applications is expected to reach 4 million by the end of 2020. 280 
The Strasbourg Agreement Concerning the International Patent Classification of 1971 is another 
important step in the international treaties about patents. It can be considered a continuation of 
the Paris Convention and the previous European Convention of the International Classification 
of Patents for Invention of 1954. This agreement deals mainly with extending the previously 
European classification to all the Paris Convention countries. 281 
The International Classification of Patents is a hierarchical system of categorization for patents, 
adopted by more than 100 countries since the signing of the Strasbourg Agreement. The 
classification subdivided into sections, classes, subclasses, groups, and subgroups. “The areas 
(sections) of technology are as follows: 





 OECD. (2015). Inventions across borders. In OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2015 (pp. 




 World Intellectual Property Organization. (2019, September 17). Report of the Director General to the 2019 
WIPO Assemblies. wipo.int. Retrieved October 20, 2020, from 
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_1050_2019.pdf  
281
 World Intellectual Property Organization. (1979, September 28). Strasbourg Agreement Concerning the 
International Patent Classification. Retrieved October 20, 2020, from https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/text/291858  
116 
 
● B Performing Operations; Transporting 
● C Chemistry; Metallurgy 
● D Textiles; Paper 
● E Fixed Constructions 
● F Mechanical Engineering; Lighting; Heating; Weapons; Blasting Engines or Pumps 
● G Physics 
● H Electricity” 282 
This standardized classification helps the national and regional patent organizations to achieve 
easier interoperability, especially when considering the international patent application process 
as we described above. 
The Patent Law Treaty (PLT) of 2000 has continued along the same lines of standardization. The 
aim of this treaty was the standardization of formal procedures of national and regional patent 
applications, thus making the procedures easier to inventors. The Patent Law Treaty achieves 
this by defining the maximum extent of requirements that national and regional patent offices 
may require an applicant for filing a patent application. Contracting states may provide more 
generous terms than the ones outlined in the Patent Law Treaty, but they cannot provide more 
stringent ones.283 A notable exception to this rule is the filing date requirements, where the treaty 
defines absolute requirements and not maximum ones. These requirements are described by the 
World Intellectual Property Organization as follows: 
“The PLT requires that the office of any Contracting Party must accord a filing date to an 
application upon compliance with three simple formal requirements: 
First, an indication that the elements received by the office are intended to be an application for 
a patent for an invention; 
Second, indications that would allow the office to identify or to contact the applicant (however, 
a Contracting Party is allowed to require indications on both); 
Third, a part which appears to be a description of the invention. 
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No additional elements can be required for according a filing date.” 284 
This standardization process further enhanced the predictability of the patent application 
procedures for inventors, therefore through reducing the risks, the associated perceived costs of 
applying for patents in multiple countries, as in the case of an international patent application, 
are reduced as well. The Patent Law Treaty was signed in 2000 and entered force in 2005.285 
Finally, the Budapest Treaty of 1977 deals with a special area of patents, inventions concerning 
microorganisms. The treaty requires the member states to accept the disclosure of 
biotechnological inventions by submitting the microorganisms themselves as part of the patent 
procedure regardless which national or regional authority the original patent application was filed 
at. This was especially important for biotechnological research, since requiring microorganism 
samples to be sent to every national patent office would imply significant costs for the 
applicant.286 
 
In this chapter, I have examined the history of Patent Law, and have looked at two prominent 
examples of the laws of treaties of this legal field in practice: the United States Patent Law, and 
the most important international treaties governing patent law. The understanding of the 
foundations of Patent Law, and the commonalities and differences between national and 
international patent laws and treaties will enable us to better identify the effects and significance 
of patents in today’s globalized economy and the detrimental effects of cases when the patents 
remain unutilized. 
1.3.4. Patent Protection Laws and Practices of the European Union 
In this chapter, I will examine the laws and treaties governing the legal field of patents in Europe, 
especially regarding the European Union. I am performing this examination to be able to 
understand the legal environment where I am investigating the case of acquisitions when patents 
remain unutilized, including the statistics and case study in the subsequent chapters. 
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The main regulatory body in case of patent protection in the European Union is the European 
Commission. According to the European Commission's website on patent protection they 
consider it a key asset in the technological development of the European Union: “Patents are a 
key tool to encourage investment in innovation and encourage its dissemination. The European 
Commission constantly monitors the need for and effects of patent-related legislation across the 
European Union. It is working to introduce cost-saving, efficient uniform patent protection across 
Europe and is looking at measures to enhance patent exploitation.”287 
The current situation in the European Union is still best described as a double system. In the 
previous decades many attempts have been made towards a unified patent application and court 
system in Europe, with some initiatives being very successful, while others experiencing a rocky 
road of long consultations, fragmented application into national law and even withdrawals. 
Therefore, in the quote above, the European Commission considers it one of its main goals to 
introduce a uniform patent system across Europe. There are still two ways that an inventor may 
seek protection for their technological innovations and apply for patents: through the national 
patent offices or through the European Patent system administered by the European Patent 
Office. However, even the European patents granted by the European Patent Office cannot be 
considered a unitary patent; they are rather a group of national patents in each member state of 
the European Patent Organization.288 
The trend towards a European Patent started with the so-called Community Patent. The 1975 
Community Patent Convention established a single patent application procedure for the whole of 
the European Economic Community (the predecessor of the European Union). This procedure 
unified the filing and the examination of the patent applications. There is a single prosecution 
phase executed by the European Patent Office, which is a significant difference from the 
operative procedures of the World Intellectual Property Organization, where every application 
ultimately is prosecuted on a national level (the national phase). However, since the resulting 
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patent is still essentially a national one, the litigation e.g., infringement lawsuits, are still to be 
executed on a national level.289 
Jorge Cruz (1998) describes the European patent process under the name “Munich Convention” 
very clearly290, and draws the lines of the two phases involved: “How does the Munich 
Convention work? Munich is the home of the European Patent Office, which receives and 
examines applications and then grants or refuses the respective patent. When filing a patent 
application, the applicant must indicate the Member States in which he wishes to obtain 
protection; a tax is payable for each State-known as the designation fee. Once the patent has been 
granted, it comes under the administration of the authorities of the designated countries and is 
subject to the laws thereof. In other words, the European patent system comprises two different 
phases which are complementary and cannot be separated. The first phase takes place at the 
European Patent Office, which receives and examines the application, and subsequently grants 
or refuses the respective patent. The second phase is handled by the authorities of the designated 
countries and initially consists of the validation of the granted patent by means of the filing of 
the respective translation, in accordance with the requirements of each country. Therefore, the 
patent validation process does not end with the grant-decision given by the European Patent 
Office, since it must be completed at the authorities of the designated countries.”291 The 
Luxembourg Agreement of 1989 further revised the Community Patent Convention, mainly 
dealing with translation requirements into the languages of the member states of the European 
Patent Organization.292 
The issues with the current fragmentation of the patent policy landscape in Europe is very 
significant, since it affects corporate decision making in one of the most crucial areas where 
Europe would need a truly single market: the knowledge-based economy. Even though the 
Lisbon summit in March 2000 identified the development of the knowledge-based economy as a 
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main objective of the European Union: “to make the EU, by 2010, the most competitive and 
dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with 
more and better jobs and greater social cohesion”.293 The results by 2019 are somewhat 
disappointing, the research commitments of 3% of GDP are barely met by only a few member 
countries, the majority are way behind.294 
 
The Figure below represents the R&D expenditure as % of GDP across all sectors in 2017 in the 
European Union. 
 
Figure 3 R&D expenditure as % of GDP across all sectors in 2017 in the European Union 
Source: (Chevallier, 2019) 295 
While the patent system fragmentation cannot be determined as the sole factor in explaining the 
trends why the knowledge economy goals were not met as described in the above article by 
Chevallier, he argues that countries that have retained significant industries such as Germany and 
South Korea are doing better in terms of Research & Development spending as well, and in turn 
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this investment is fueling their growth more.296 As we will see in later chapters, these are the 
exact countries strongest in patent applications and grants as well. This correlation is definitely 
worth noting. 
Martinez (2001) argues that this fragmentation of patent policies in Europe is a serious issue,297 
forming an obstacle in the way of a truly integrated single market: 
“At present there is no supranational patent; countries retain control over their patent systems 
using patent-related policies to serve their national interests. Further, innovative firms do not 
pursue worldwide patenting strategies due to costs and other strategic considerations. 
Consequently, patents create an important non-tariff barrier to trade, segment the international 
market of patented goods and generate cross-country differences in market structures. Continuing 
national differences in patent policy within the European Community (EC) constitutes the main 
obstacle to the goal of forming a truly integrated single internal market. The Luxembourg 
Convention on the Community Patent of 1975 and the Agreement relating to Community Patent 
signed in 1989-which aimed to create a unitary patent with equal effect throughout the EC-never 
entered into force, as only France, Germany, Greece, Denmark, Luxembourg, the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands ratified the Convention. The resistance of certain countries to the 
entry into force of a Community patent reflects different national attitudes towards innovation, 
depending on whether the comparative advantage of a particular country lies in innovation or in 
imitation. However, these national differences are inconsistent with the goal of the completion 
of a single internal market in the EC.”298 
There is one significant regulatory body that is still needed to establish the European 
Commission's goals of establishing a unitary patent system: a unified patent court. The road to a 
unified patent court has been long and arduous and it has still not ended. 
The Unified Patent Court was proposed in Regulation (EU) No 1257/2012 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on 17th December 2012 on implementing enhanced cooperation in 
the area of the creation of unitary patent protection. When the Unified Patent Court was proposed, 
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“NATURE OF THE PROBLEM: THE BRUSSELS I REGULATION 
As previously discussed, patents issued by the European Patent Office are issued as a bundle 
of national patents. While this bundle in theory provides protection for the patent holder 
throughout Europe, such protection is meaningless without the ability to enforce the rights 
that come with a patent.”299 
Enforcement of patent holder rights - as we will see in later chapters - is one of the major concerns 
of companies even while utilizing their patents under their own commercial efforts, or through 
different licensing schemes. Therefore, a unified system of litigation would bring immense 
benefits in terms of risk and costs to European patent holders. However, many countries have 
recently joined and have withdrawn, such as in the case of the United Kingdom and Germany. 
The UK has even ratified the United Patent Court despite Brexit in 2017.300 After the Brexit 
negotiations have turned in another direction, the United Kingdom decided to withdraw instead 
from the Unified Patent Court project in 2020.301 Germany, one of the strongest supporters of the 
Unified Patent Court is also yet to finally ratify the agreement. A final vote is expected to take 
place on the 18th of December 2020 in the Bundesrat. Apart from Germany’s decision, two other 
signatory states will still need to agree to be bound by the agreement, in order for the project to 
enter its final phase.302  
In summary: the European Union is still struggling to align the member states’ interests and unify 
the patent system throughout the European Union. Compared to the United States and China, 
each with their own large number of patents, this is a significant disadvantage and is contributing 
to the European Union falling short of its predictions in terms of strengthening its knowledge-
based economies. While the European Patent Office is able to accept applications, perform their 
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prosecution, and grant patents on a European scale, a Unified Patent Court is still missing for a 
truly unitary European patent. 
 
In this chapter, I have investigated the field of Intellectual Property Law, and more narrowly 
Patent Law, both from the theoretical and the practical standpoints. As a theoretical overview I 
have examined the definitions of intellectual property and patents to get a solid understanding of 
the legislator. I also performed a detailed analysis of the determining factors of patents to be able 
to thoroughly understand the benefits of them, and the different effects of their so-called “non-
working”, because they are essential to the main scenario of my thesis, acquisitions where patents 
remain unutilized. 
As a practical overview, I have examined a notable example of weaknesses of patents, the patent 
trolls, the national and international treaties and organizations that govern Patent Law, with 
special attention to the United States and the European Union. In this final subchapter, I have 
reviewed the organization and challenges of the patent protection laws and practices in the 
European Union. Hopefully this will help me choose and understand an appropriate case study 
for the scenario of my thesis, and to understand the conduct of the competition authority in said 





2. Acquisitions When Patents Remain Unutilized 
In this chapter, my main objective is to investigate (and hopefully prove) my first hypothesis: 
Acquisitions where patents remain unutilized are undesirable and present a significant issue. 
To investigate my first hypothesis, 
• I am first going to look at the patent statistics to understand the importance of patents in 
today’s economies. This will serve as an emphasizing factor to show why patents and 
their usage is so important. 
• Then I will try to answer the question: How are companies typically using patents? 
Therefore, I will investigate how patents are usually licensed and utilized by companies, 
especially in the Information Technology and Telecommunication sectors. 
• This is needed to come up with a method of proof and case study selection, to find a 
practical example where the effects of such an acquisition were indeed undesirable and 
significant. 
• Then I will perform the case study itself. 
• Finally, I will summarize the detrimental effects of acquisitions where patents remain 
unutilized. 
Since in this chapter I am investigating a practical issue, by including the patent statistics, the 
typical patent utilization scenarios, and a carefully selected case study, I will make sure to use 
data and evidence to determine the existence and significance of the issue. 
2.3. Acquisitions with Patent Involvement 
In this chapter, I will first examine the statistics and trends around patent applications and grants 
worldwide and in the European Union. This examination will give a general idea of how the 
patent landscape has evolved in the last decades, which countries and companies are the most 
active in patent applications. 
It is important to first look at the statistics from the so-called IP5. This is another name for the 
five largest patent offices of the world, the Korean Intellectual Property Office (KIPO), European 
Patent Office (EPO), Japan Patent Office (JPO), China National Intellectual Property 
Administration (CNIPA), and the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). These 
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offices regularly have meetings to synchronize their efforts towards an efficient global 
Intellectual Property application system. These synchronization efforts range from 
harmonization of operative procedures in the patentability criteria, through prior art search and 
efficient descriptions for public disclosure, to standardization of the Intellectual Property 
classifications. The five patent offices together handle around 85 percent of the patent 
applications of the world. 303 
The following infographic from the IP5 (fiveipoffices.org) shows the most important details 
about the patent application and grant statistics globally, by region, and in time. 
 
Figure 4 Key IP5 Statistical Indicators 2019 
Source: Five IP offices (IP5) - Key Indicators 304 
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As we can see from the statistics, the number of patent applications has been steadily rising in 
the last ten years, almost doubling from 2009 to 2019 to a total of 2.7 million patent applications 
in 2019.305 The number of patent grants has also increased significantly, following a similar trend 
of doubling between 2009 and 2019 to a total of 1.25 million patents granted in 2019, with a 6% 
increase in patent grants during the last year.306 
The majority of the patent application growth has been due to the increase in patent applications 
filed with the China National Intellectual Property Administration office, while the increase in 
the number of patent grants is distributed more among the agencies, with the China office again 
being responsible for the majority of the growth.307 
The only office where the number of patent grants decreased during the last 10 years was the 
Japan Patent Office. The United States and Europe seems to be the most diverse in terms of the 
origin of patent applications308, since only 49% of patents filed with the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office was from applicants in the United States, and 45% of patents filed with the 
European Patent Office were from the countries of the European Patent Convention. The fact 
that the rest of the applications are from countries outside these regions shows that these two 
regions are favored by companies all over the world for patent registration. This may be explained 
by many factors, among them the maturity of the Intellectual Property legislation and 
enforcement in these regions, as well as their market size, especially in the knowledge-based 
sectors.309 
The previous decade before 2009 was termed as the “global warming of patents,” whereas a large 
increase in patent application numbers was experienced worldwide owing in large part to the 
growing number of companies wishing to extend their national patents to other regions and 
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countries, rather than a large increase in national filings.310 In an increasingly globalized world 
of technology-related markets, especially in the Information and Telecommunication sectors, this 
is a perfectly reasonable corporate behavior aimed at protecting the company’s intangible assets 
overseas.311 This last decade is characterized more by the patent boom of Chinese companies, 
and the international application of those patents, especially the largest Chinese Information and 
Telecommunication companies such as Huawei and ZTE were much more active than in the 
previous decade. 312 
The World Intellectual Property Organization publishes its statistics on the working of the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty (PCT) patents (otherwise known as international patents) each year in their 
publication called PCT Yearly Review. The PCT Yearly Review 2019 edition, has included a 
special theme looking at long term statistics of the international patents, for the 40-year 
anniversary of the Patent Cooperation Treaty. This report section has several significant findings 
relevant to our investigation, so I am going to examine these each in the following paragraphs. 
Since the entry into force of the Patent Cooperation Treaty in 1978 both the number of member 
countries and the number of applications filed has risen sharply. Compared to 1978, when the 
Patent Cooperation Treaty had 13 member states, in 2018 the Treaty counted 152 countries. The 
majority of the Patent Cooperation Treaty member countries were from the high income or upper-
middle-income countries, with a combined share of 61.8% in 2018. The trend, however, is that 
the share in patent applications of the high-income countries is decreasing, and the share of the 
middle-income countries is increasing. However, the share of low-income economies was 
negligible even in 1978, and similarly in 2018. 313  We can see a correlation between the number 
of patents filed and the relative strength of economies. We can observe similar correlations when 
the world's major economies have grown over the last 40 years, how the number of patent 
 
310
 Uppenberg, K. (2010). The knowledge economy in Europe - A review of the 2009 EIB Conference in 
Economics and Finance. European Investment Bank Economic and Financial Studies, 2010(02), 1-48. Retrieved 
October 20, 2020, from https://www.eib.org/attachments/efs/the_knowledge_economy_in_europe.pdf page 27 
311
 Straus, J. (2008, March 11). Is There a Global Warming of Patents? The Journal of World Intellectual 
Property, 11, 58-62. 10.1111/j.1747-1796.2008.00334.x  
312
 WIPO. (2020). PCT Yearly Review 2020: The International Patent System. World Intellectual Property 
Organization Publications: PCT Yearly Review. Retrieved November 20, 2020, from 
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_901_2020.pdf  
313
 WIPO. (2019). PCT Yearly Review 2019: The International Patent System. World Intellectual Property 
Organization Publications - PCT Yearly Review. Retrieved November 21, 2020, from 
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_901_2019.pdf page 8 
128 
 
applications from those regions was following similar trends. It merits further scientific 
investigation and discussion whether the patent system was merely a reflection of economic 
prosperity or (at least the partial) cause of it. Arguments could be made whereby companies from 
high-income countries were able to invest more in research and development and thus file the 
resulting new inventions as patent applications; therefore, the number of patents is a mirror that 
shows the economic progress of a country. However, arguments could also be made that 
inventions from companies in middle-income countries have enabled them to protect their 
economic interests especially through the use of international patents, thus increasing the 
prosperity in their respective countries.314 The best examples of the latter case are the top patent 
applicants of China from the Information and Telecommunication sectors. 
These interpretations are not mutually exclusive. In fact, they are in line with the original 
intentions of the creators of the patent systems, according to which companies who are investing 
in research and development should be rewarded with the temporary monopoly rights, so they 
can increase the prosperity of their respective countries directly through their activities, and 
indirectly increasing the prosperity in all member countries by disclosing their inventions 
publicly.315 
The same trend can be observed from the numbers when we look at the patent applications by 
region. Until around 1995, Europe and North America collectively were responsible for 
approximately 88% of all patent applications. Since 1995 however, the share of Asia had 
increased significantly to the point when in 2009, Asia already surpassed North America, and in 
the next year, Europe as well. By 2018, for the first time in history, more than 50% of the patent 
applications originated from Asia.316 
The four countries leading in the number of total applications filed by 2018 were the United 
States with 1.15 million patent cases, followed by Japan with 640 thousand patent cases, 
Germany with 390 thousand patent cases, and finally China by 300 thousand patent cases. 
China’s rise in patent cases is even more apparent if we take into consideration that before 1993, 
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Chinese applicants filed a total of five patent applications only, so virtually all their applications 
came after the mid-1990s.317 
By 2018, the share in the number of patent applications of China has almost reached the 
corresponding value from the United States and surpassed Japan, all-around 20% of the 
international patent applications. Germany and Korea came next with around 7% each.318 
 
 
Figure 5 Distribution of PCT applications filed by origin, 1978–2018 and 2018 
Source: WIPO Statistics Database, March 2019 319 
 
Looking at the distribution by the fields of technology reveals other interesting details about the 
development of technologies worldwide over time. In the first 20 years between 1978 and 1998, 
the main fields of technology for patents were medical technology, biotechnology, organic 
chemistry, measurement, and electrical machinery, accounting for a total of around 28% of 
international patent applications. In comparison, in the last 20 years between 1998 and 2018, the 
main fields of technology for patents were computer technology, medical technology, digital 
communication, electrical machinery, and pharmaceuticals, accounting for a total of around 31% 
of international patent applications.320 
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Figure 6 Trend of the top 10 fields of technology, 1978–2018 
Source: WIPO Statistics Database, March 2019 321 
From the trends above we can highlight the rise of computers and telecommunication, and since 
the advent of smartphones, a combination of both. The developments in the smartphone patent 
space were made all the more transparent by the wide media coverage of the so-called 
‘smartphone patent wars’.322 
This patent trend is the reason why I have decided to choose a very important area of acquisitions 
when patents remained unutilized from exactly these fields of technology, the Information and 
Telecommunications industry. By highlighting a case from the most prominent technologies 
involving today’s patented innovations, I could more confidently determine the importance of 
the problem identified in this dissertation. The 4G and 5G telecom networks are an especially 
prominent and easy to understand example (involving a crucial technology to the operation of 
today’s smartphones) to investigate and determine whether their development was due to careful 
consideration on the part of the antitrust law enforcement agencies. 
The final important statistics from this report are the top companies that have applied for 
international patents during the last 40 years. The following figure shows their overall ranking 
throughout the 40 years of the period between 1978 and 2018, and their relative ranking in the 
years 1990, 2000, 2010, 2018; therefore, we can draw some conclusions on their patenting 
activities over time as well.323 
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Figure 7 Top 25 PCT applicants, 1978–2018 
Source: WIPO Statistics Database, March 2019 324 
 
The large majority of these companies are involved in digital communication or computer 
industries. There are also some notable companies from the electrical and automobile industries 
as well. Most of the companies are from Japan, Korea, China, the United States, and Germany, 
with the notable exceptions of Philips and Nokia that are headquartered in other European 
countries. We can observe the relative rise of the digital communication and computer industry 
companies that have grown to be the largest patent applicants than companies from other 
industries.325 
In the following section, I will look at the European Patent Organization statistical database, 
which are the key countries, industries, and companies in Europe who are taking advantage of 
the international patent system. 
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The European Patent Organization is an international organization responsible for the policies 
governing and granting patents based on the European Patent Convention of Munich signed in 
1973. Its objective of granting such “European patents” is executed by the European Patent 
Office, which has its headquarters in Munich and has branches in the Hague, Berlin, and 
Vienna.326 
The preamble of the European Patent Convention defines the objectives of the European Patent 
Organization as follows: 
“The Contracting States, 
DESIRING to strengthen co-operation between the States of Europe in respect of the 
protection of inventions, 
DESIRING that such protection may be obtained in those States by a single procedure for 
the grant of patents and by the establishment of certain standard rules governing patents so 
granted, 
DESIRING, for this purpose, to conclude a Convention which establishes a European Patent 
Organisation and which constitutes a special agreement within the meaning of Article 19 of 
the Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, signed in Paris on 20 March 1883 
and last revised on 14 July 1967, and a regional patent treaty within the meaning of Article 
45, paragraph 1, of the Patent Cooperation Treaty of 19 June 1970, 
HAVE AGREED on the following provisions:” 327 
The European Patent Organization has 38 member states at the moment, including all member 
states of the European Union, Albania, North Macedonia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Monaco, 
Norway, San Marino, Serbia, Switzerland, and Turkey. 328 
The European Patent Office publishes their statistics yearly, in a so-called Patent Index. The 
Patent Index of 2019 has included statistics about the patenting activity in Europe in 2019 and 
some comparisons to the previous years. The number of patent applications filed at the European 
Patent Office since 2015 has been increasing steadily, by a yearly average of 4-5%. The total 
number of patent applications in 2019 has reached about 181 thousand. The ratio of patent 
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applications from the different regions have been relatively stable, with the European Patent 
Organization member countries and the United States representing the majority. There was a 
notable rise in the patenting activity of applicants from the People’s Republic of China. European 
patent applicants represent 45%, and the United States patent applicants represent 25% of the 
total number of patent applications.329 
 
Figure 8 European Patent Application Index 
Source: European Patent Index, 2019 330 
Following the global trends, as mentioned above, the European Patent Office has received most 
of the increase in patent applications in the fields of digital communication and computer 
technologies. Together with a relatively stable number of medical technology patents, these two 
technological fields form the top 3 fields of patent applications. 331 The top applicants submitting 
patent applications to the European Patent Office in 2019 were essentially the same companies 
we saw in the global ranking, albeit their relative positions are different. From the Chinese 
companies Huawei is present as the leader of patent applications, but ZTE is notably missing 
from the statistics. Alphabet, the parent company of Google has a strong and growing presence 
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in the European Patent Office application numbers as well, head-to-head with Microsoft. The 
other companies are essentially the same as we saw in the global ranking.332 
 
Figure 9 Global Ranking Patent Application 
Source: European Patent Index, 2019 333 
The trends we have seen globally, wherein the digital communication and computer technology 
companies dominate the markets, are very similar in terms of patents in Europe. Although 
European and the United States’ companies are still very much representing the majority in 
Europe, however, Chinese, and Korean companies patenting activity has risen in the last few 
years.334 
One more important factor is the patenting activity of large versus small companies versus 
universities and public research organizations that the European Patent Office reported on. The 
large corporations are responsible for the majority of patents. However, there is a significant 
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minority of patents submitted by small and medium-sized corporations as well, amounting to 
18% in 2019.335 
 
In this chapter, I have investigated the patent statistics. They showed that the number of patents 
has been constantly growing in the last decades, especially in computers and telecom industries. 
There is also a strong correlation between the number of patents and the strength of the 
economies. Strong economies such as the United States, Germany, Japan, South Korea dominate, 
and the rise of China is also very noticeable. The large companies are holding the majority of the 
patents. These findings show the relevance and importance of the patents and their usage. The 
findings about the relationship of company size to patent ownership, as well as the significant 
technologies I am planning to use in my case study selection as well, to make my case study 
cover as much of the patent area as possible, both from the technology and from the company 
size perspectives. 
2.4. Patent Licensing and Commercialization 
In this chapter, I will try to answer the question: How are companies typically using patents? 
Therefore, I will investigate how patents are usually licensed and utilized by companies, 
especially in the Information Technology and Telecommunication sectors. I will also use the 
findings of this investigation in my method of proof for the case study in the next chapter, to 
cover the usage scenarios and determine whether important patents remained unutilized. 
There are two major business strategies for the utilization patents. Brad Woodcox (2012) 
describes the licensing/sale and commercialization scenarios of the patent as the most prominent 
utilization forms.336 
“Licensing/Sale. This scenario often arises when an inventor chooses not to pursue a startup 
company full-time but still wants to profit from the idea. The inventor conceptualizes the idea 
and may develop a prototype. In order to protect the idea, the inventor desires to obtain one or 
more patents covering the elements of the invention. The inventor will then license or sell these 
patents to another company, which is in a position to commercialize the invention. (This strategy 
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is typically viewed as a lower risk and lower reward than the second scenario, as some of the risk 
and reward is shared with the licensee or acquirer of the patents). 
In general, a granted patent will entice more demand and a higher price tag than a patent 
application, as the granted patent has clear rights while the application just has the possibility for 
future rights (and additional costs of continuing prosecution of the application). Hence, in this 
scenario, an inventor is incentivized to obtain a patent quickly in order to capitalize on the 
potential financial benefits of the granted patent. 
Commercialize. A second scenario arises when an inventor wants to directly commercialize the 
invention. This may include building, manufacturing, and/or selling the elements associated with 
the invention. In this case, an inventor would desire to utilize patents to attempt to block 
competitors and gain a competitive advantage. However, an inventor could only enforce these 
rights after the patent is granted. Further, if the company needs to raise capital, some investors 
will utilize the presence of patents in their determination to invest or not invest and the presence 
may even affect the valuation determined during the investment round. Hence, in this scenario, 
an inventor is again incentivized to obtain a patent quickly in order to capitalize on the potential 
financial benefits of the granted patent.”337 
I would argue that from the options above, the first and most obvious one is to use the patent in 
the company’s own commercial activities. These activities may include the production or 
outsourced manufacture of the invention, assembly, and marketing, sales. Marketing and sales 
also may be performed under the company’s own brand or that of a channel partner, called white-
label sales.338 If we are talking about a small company, this strategy will usually involve the 
raising of some form of capital, since the production, manufacture, assembly, marketing and sales 
activities usually require significant investment which the small company owner may not have. 
Even if they would have, they still often go for investment to share the risks with investors and 
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allocating resources to the new product line, based on careful assessment of the return on 
investment (ROI) possibilities.340 
Licensing or selling the patent is an often-used strategy as well. Not only in the case of the 
inventors that do not wish to start their own company full time as the article above mentions, but 
also in other business scenarios as well. For example, in case of an invention with a large potential 
market, building and scaling a single company, especially to many different geographies may 
require more time than desirable, and thus may decrease the overall value of the patent. In such 
cases, it is often in the patent holder’s best interest to sell or license the patent even by using an 
exclusive licensing deal to cover the customer demand in some geographies that the patent owner 
cannot immediately cover by their own commercial activities. Such exclusive licenses are widely 
used, even to the extent that the national or international patent courts allow the exclusive licensee 
to have similar rights in patent infringement lawsuits that the patent owner has. For this purpose, 
in some jurisdictions, exclusive licenses must be registered with the patent office as well.341 There 
may also be cases when the patent owner does not even plan to launch any commercial activity, 
their sole intention is to license or sell the monopoly rights of the invention and generate revenue. 
As far as our investigation is concerned both strategies are completely justified use cases, and 
both could provide the customers with access to the patented innovation. 
In general, determining whether a company has used a patent in their commercial activities is 
usually more straightforward. In case of a product patent, it is enough to look at the product 
portfolio of the company and we can determine if the patented invention was used.342 In case of 
a method or process patent it is harder, because we will have to have information about how the 
company produces its products or services. This is even more difficult in international cases 
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because the different regulatory bodies such as the United States Patent Office343 and the 
European Patent Office344 have different theoretical and practical approaches to these types of 
inventions.  
However, there are no widely accepted databases (public or otherwise) or statistics available for 
research purposes on patent licensing activities. However, there are some licensing statistics 
published by the European Patent Office according to Chapter 5.11 of the European Patent 
Guide:345 
“Licences and other rights  
5.11.008 
A European patent application may be licensed or give rise to rights in rem and may be the 
subject of legal means of execution in respect of the whole or part of the territories of the 
designated contracting states.  
5.11.009 
Rule 22 applies to the registration of the grant or transfer of a licence, the establishment or 
transfer of a right in rem and any legal means of execution affecting such an application (see 
point 5.11.003). The above standard of proof applies to the registration of licences and rights 
in rem. For the registration of legal means of execution, however, the instrument itself (the 
original or a copy thereof) must be filed. 
5.11.010 
Licences, rights in rem and legal means of execution are registered only in respect of pending 
European patent applications. No such rights are entered in the European Patent Register after 
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A licence will be recorded as an exclusive licence if the applicant and the licensee so request. 
A licence will be recorded as a sub-licence where it is granted by a licensee whose licence is 
recorded in the European Patent Register. The terms and conditions of the licences are 
governed by the national law applicable in each case.  
5.11.012 
Upon request and subject to payment of the prescribed administrative fee, a registration of a 
licence or other right will be cancelled, subject to submission of documents providing 
evidence that the right has lapsed or of a declaration by the proprietor of the right that they 
consent to its cancellation”.346 
The main advantage of registering licenses with the European Patent Office is when a company 
is licensing a patent pending invention, and the licensee’s rights need to be protected in case of 
a patent application transfer.347 However, this registration is neither mandatory, nor explicitly 
covers patents that have already been granted.348 
Therefore, if we want to get an idea about patent licensing volumes and activities, we are facing 
significant challenges to try and determine how extensively patents are actually utilized in the 
economy. 
The European Commission, realizing the relative lack of reliable information in patent licensing 
statistics, conducted a survey. The survey was conducted by the Technopolis Group Vienna in 
the year 2013.349 
The main objectives were described as follows: “The European Commission, DG Research and 
Innovation, contracted a consortium consisting of Incentim – KU Leuven Research and 
Development, KITeS - Università Bocconi and Technopolis Consulting Group as subcontractor 
to perform a study on the ‘Measurement and analysis of knowledge and R&D exploitation flows, 
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licensing behaviour of European firms. This part of the study, performed by Technopolis and 
executed between March 2012 and April 2013, is the subject of this report. It constitutes 
deliverable D2.3 as outlined by the Commission´s terms of reference. This survey has been 
commissioned against the backdrop of a growing importance of patents, as indicated by the 
soaring number of patent applications (more than 50% increase in yearly applications at the EPO 
by comparison to 10 years ago) and a much broader use of patents today other than for protective 
purposes. Such reasons include also revenue generation through licensing or the usage of patents 
to conclude cross-licensing agreements with other partners. However, data specifically on patent 
licensing is hardly available and not regularly collected. The survey provided a means to collect 
very specific and detailed data on the scope of patent licensing activities, the rationales for 
engaging into patent and technology licensing, or the question that are the main regions for the 
“trade” of patents via licensing.”350 
The report acknowledges the fact that data is scarce and infrequent, and at the same time 
highlights the importance of understanding the actual spread of licensing activities, since it is a 
major strategy of patent utilization.351 
In the next section, I will examine each of the main findings of the report and identify their 
significance in terms of my area of study: acquisitions when patents remain unutilized. 
Patent licensing is an increasingly important economic area.  
“The importance of licensing has increased over the years, as most firms report increasing 
licensing revenues over time and an increasing number of licensing deals. This can be observed 
with all major industries for which patenting is relevant. Patent licensing has to be mostly 
understood as technology licensing, as patents are rarely out-licensed on their own (i.e., licensing 
agreements usually cover more than just the patents).”352 
This underlines my point that licensing patents can be an absolutely relevant solution in cases 
where patents would otherwise remain unutilized. I will therefore include the encouragement of 
patent licensing in my proposed solutions later in this thesis. 
It is also important to note that patents are usually not licensed on their own, in order for licensing 
agreements to be relevant, effective and efficient, industrial know-how and similar forms of 
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information such as trade secrets need to be shared with the licensee as well, to enable their 
efficient operation.353 This in turn will ensure that they can provide the products or services in 
similar quality that the patent owner company could. 
● “Based on a per-firm view analysis of European patent licensors, patents are 
predominantly out-licensed to firms not affiliated with the licensors. Trade in patents via 
(out-)licensing occurs predominantly within Europe. The second most important trading 
region is North America, leaving behind Asian regions to a considerable extent. Most 
licensing occurs among competitors, and only to a smaller extent between suppliers and 
(B2B) customers. 
● The most important motives to out-license are revenue-generating motives, to ensure 
freedom-to-operate as well as stopping patent infringements. There are differences 
between SMEs and large firms, with SMEs placing more importance on revenue 
generating motives, while large firms out-license more to ensure FTO and stop 
(perceived) infringement.”354 
According to the above, licensing usually happens between competitors in Europe, and in some 
cases North American companies are also involved. Licensing an invention to a competitor may 
make sense if the potential market is large enough that both companies can make profits by better 
serving the customer demand, and the patent owner company may generate extra revenue with 
the licensing deal. In terms of our investigation, it is important to note whether such licensing 
activities are encouraged by the regulators in case of acquisitions when patents remain unutilized, 
or they were out of the scope of the activities of the regulator. 
● “The by far most important barrier for patent out-licensing is the potential loss of their 
competitive/technological edge, followed by difficulties to identify the right partners. 
Another important barrier, in particular for micro-enterprises and small firms, is that the 
patented technology may not be developed enough. We find a considerable share of firms 
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These findings are also very relevant to our topic, since the barriers to licensing may prove to be 
obstacles to the customer access to innovation as well. Especially such cases should be identified 
and prevented when patents remain unutilized so that the acquiring company may keep their 
technological advantage, without providing the superior products or services to their customers 
by utilizing the invention acquired. Even if this is just one of many cases why an acquiring 
company may choose to leave a patent unutilized, it is however very much in line with the 
findings of this survey. Another consideration as identified may be a lower profit that the 
company may receive from out-licensing compared to what was planned or expected, and these 
scenarios may ultimately also lead to patents remaining unutilized. 
● “The most important channels by which licensors get in touch with licensees are informal 
networks, followed by their own research, being contacted by the licensee and events 
such as trade fairs. Intermediaries searching on the licensor´s behalf and 
technology/licensing exchange platforms are (currently) almost irrelevant. SMEs use all 
means to get in touch with licensees more intensely than large firms.”356 
Small companies seeking out all the available channels to license their inventions is 
understandable if we consider that their interests often are in a very extensive licensing scheme, 
so that most of the profits of offering the new products or services to customers may be captured, 
in all geographies involved. On the other hand, larger companies may or may not want to utilize 
the new inventions in fear of cannibalizing their existing product line revenues or risking their 
reputation should a new product or service fail. This provides them with some incentives not to 
utilize patents, instead follow a so-called defensive patent strategy.357 Thus, these defensive 
patent strategies may lead to customers failing to get access to the patented innovation. 
● “We see a cascade of measures by which patents are shared/transferred to third parties. 
(Bilateral) out-licensing of patents is the means probably used most, followed by sale of 
patents and entering joint ventures. Patent pools are rarely used with the exception of 
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groups of companies in specific technology fields where standards play an important role. 
Patent auction events are currently irrelevant for the majority of firms.”358 
These findings point to bilateral out-licensing agreements, sales of patents and joint ventures 
being the most relevant use cases of patent licensing activities. It will be important in this thesis 
to try and investigate whether the conduct of the regulators usually involves encouragement of 
any of these scenarios to try and keep patents utilized. My proposed solution should also 
encourage licensing activities and accept sales or joint ventures as well to encourage the 
utilization of patents. 
● “The strongest motive to in-license patents is to ensure Freedom-to-Operate (FTO), 
followed by closing technological gaps and enabling rapid time to market. The most 
significant barriers are unacceptable terms of the licensor as well as the refusal of the 
potential licensors to grant licenses at all.” 359 
These findings are highlighting a possible use case, when the licensor may follow strict 
negotiation tactics to such an extent, that the potential licensees cannot reasonably make a 
licensing deal. This use case - as we will see in later chapters - has been the exact scenario when 
compulsory licenses have been issued by some governments in case of some important 
pharmaceuticals to try and supply the local market in developing countries360, and ensure 
customer access to innovation.361 In my solution proposal therefore, I will make sure to include 
some compulsory licensing options, but as a last resort incentivizing factor only, to encourage 
these voluntary negotiations to reach a conclusion. 
● “Overall, many barriers to out- and in-licensing have not been judged to be of high 
importance, and we received feedback that licensing is not a big or the biggest problem 
area for the firms in the context of putting patents to use. Other issues, such as 
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enforcement of IPR or litigation practices in jurisdictions abroad are often judged to be 
more problematic areas than licensing.”362 
For the companies involved, the costs of litigation abroad seem to be a much more pressing 
problem, than the licensing itself. However, perceived, or real difficulties and costs associated 
with such litigations may in turn discourage patent owner companies from producing, importing, 
or otherwise supplying the domestic market e.g., through licensing deals. This is also an 
undesirable outcome that developing countries may especially face, when considering that many 
companies from developing nations are often concerned with the potential need to litigate in such 
countries.363 
 
In this chapter, I investigated the patent utilization scenarios. From our discussion above, we can 
draw the following important conclusions. 
● Companies can either utilize their patents on the market, thus provide customers with 
access to innovation, under their independent commercial activities or 
● they can license them, to generate revenue or to avoid infringement that would involve 
lengthy litigation, especially in foreign jurisdictions, among other reasons.364 
● Joint ventures are also often used.365 
2.5. Acquisitions when Patents Remain Unutilized: Case Study 
In this chapter I will investigate in detail a practical case of acquisitions where patents remain 
unutilized. In order to be able to make a deliberate and careful selection of case study, I will use 
the insights uncovered in the previous two chapters. I will also use these insights to identify the 
method of proof for the case study. Finally, I will conduct the case study itself. 
2.5.1. Case selection criteria and method of proof 
As we have seen from both the global patent statistics and those of the European Patent Office, 
the key technological areas, especially in terms considering their recent growth trends, are the 
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Digital Communication and Computer Technologies fields. Therefore, I have paid careful 
attention to choosing a case study that involves these technologies. 
From the patent application statistics related to company size366, we can conclude the logical 
division of cases of acquisitions with patent involvement: 
● Small or medium-sized patent holder company acquisitions 
● Large patent holder company acquisitions. 
In the case of small or medium-sized patent holder company acquisitions, the merger and 
acquisitions control are often not enforced due to a perceived low market impact. Therefore, 
merger and control case data are hard to find. The statistics are also scarce on how many of these 
companies get acquired because these acquisitions are considered as completely private 
contracts.367 It is even harder to determine whether the patents that the small or medium-sized 
companies held were utilized or remained unutilized after the acquisition. 
In the case of a large patent holder company getting acquired, the merger and acquisition control 
is often enforced due to a perceived high market impact, to the point when even a dominant 
market position may be established. Competition case law data may thus be found much easier, 
for example in the European Union Competition Case Law databases.368 Market research is also 
more straightforward to credibly determine whether the patents under investigation were utilized 
after the acquisition, since these companies issue many press releases, and the industry analysis 
of their respective sectors will very likely include them. 
Therefore, while it may be beneficial from both the investigative coverage and the subsequent 
solution presentation sides to include the companies when merger control procedures are not 
activated, I will focus on the ones when these measures come into play. It can be an interesting 
topic of further research, especially considering the acquisitions of patent holder startup 
companies by larger players, to determine the frequency, customer effects and overall economic 
impact of such acquisitions as well.369 
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In order to prove the hypothesis of this thesis according to which there are important cases of 
acquisitions when patents remain unutilized, and to examine the detrimental effects of such 
acquisition scenarios it is sufficient to analyze the larger patent holder company acquisition data 
that involves merger and acquisition control. 
As far as the method of proof is concerned, I want to be able to determine whether the scenario 
of acquisitions where patents remained unutilized takes places in a particular acquisition. In my 
case study description therefore, I will need to investigate the utilization scenarios. I need to 
determine, 
i. whether the acquired patents were used in the independent commercial activities of the 
acquiring company after the merger and acquisition procedure ended, 
ii. whether the patents were used or improved upon by other companies active in the 
specific innovation area, which I could use as a signal of a private licensing agreement, 
iii. whether there were joint ventures between the patent acquiring company and another 
company that improved upon the patent being active in the specific innovation area. 
If none of the above patent utilization methods took place, we can consider it proven that in the 
case under study the patent remained unutilized in the markets of the acquiring company. 
Even if the patent did not remain unutilized, it’s still important to examine what information was 
considered in the merger and acquisition investigation cases by the competition authorities about 
the likelihood of the patent utilization scenarios mentioned above, whether the authority actually 
took this information into consideration. This analysis is also important to show whether the 
current merger and acquisition control procedures take into account the risk of customers losing 
access to innovation. This examination we will perform in a subsequent chapter on Protecting 
Customer Access to Innovation. 
Considering all of the above selection criteria and method of proof, in this chapter I will examine 
a case study of an important innovation area in Information and Communications Technology, 
the case of Gallium Nitride RF Power Transistors, which is used more extensively in the current 
4G LTE networks and are expected to grow both in innovation (Intellectual Property) and 
utilization in the developing 5G networks.370 I am going to analyze the case of Freescale 
Semiconductors, a former frontrunner in the GaN innovation area, that was acquired by NXP 
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Semiconductors as part of a consolidation trend in the semiconductor manufacturing industry.371 
I will attempt to show that the acquiring company almost completely abandoned the GaN product 
line and fell behind in the related Intellectual Property landscape. I will also attempt to show that 
other companies with patent portfolios independent from NXP and Freescale had to take up the 
Intellectual Property leadership and develop the Gallium Nitride Radio Frequency Power 
Transistor technology further on their own. In the next chapter, I will take this case study further 
by examining the conduct of the competition agency involved in the merger and acquisition 
investigation and show that there were no safeguards or considerations protecting the access to 
innovation of the customers, quite the opposite. 
2.5.2. The Semiconductor Industry 
In this chapter, I will examine the Semiconductor Industry, the different products and 
subcategories of products in the industry at the time of the merger control procedure, so as to 
show the technological situation and market structure before the NXP Semiconductors - 
Freescale Semiconductor acquisition. 
The European Commission Directorate-General for Competition, the department of the 
Commission performing the merger control for the NXP Semiconductors - Freescale 
Semiconductor acquisition summarized the industry as follows:372 
“The proposed transaction concerns the manufacturing and sale of semiconductor devices.   
(10) Semiconductors are materials, such as silicon, which can act as an insulator, but are also 
capable of conducting electricity. Semiconductors are at the heart of devices such as diodes, 
transistors and other electronic components, and can be found in virtually every electronic 
device today. The end-products that contain semiconductor devices range from base stations, 
mobile phones, computers, domestic appliances and cars to medical equipment, 
identification systems, large-scale industry electronics and aerospace equipment.  
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(11) Semiconductor devices are rarely bought as end-products by consumers. They are 
mainly bought by equipment manufacturers in virtually all sectors within the electronic 
equipment industry.”373 
Semiconductors therefore can be understood as the essential building blocks in today’s digital 
economies, which are a part of nearly all electronic devices, be it consumer devices or backbone 
infrastructure devices in several industries including especially the information communication 
technology sectors.374 
The semiconductors were further subdivided by the Commission’s Department of Competition 
into the following four categories: 
● Integrated circuits (ICs) 
● Discretes 
● Optical Semiconductors 
● Sensors and Actuators.375 
Integrated Circuits (IC) are defined as follows: 
“An IC is a semiconductor device composed of diodes, transistors and other electronic 
components, combined with conductive interconnect material, which controls the current and 
voltage of electricity running through it. While the first ICs consisted of a handful of components, 
over the year’s ICs have become increasingly compact and complicated. Current existing ICs 
used in electronic devices are called “microchips” or “chips” and can contain several billion 
transistors along with diodes and other electronic components.”376 
This market of the Integrated Circuits (“chips and microchips”) had at the time of the merger 
control procedure significant competition, and the two companies involved in the acquisition 
were not going to have a combined market share to cause concerns in the markets of the member 
states of the European Union. The patent landscape of these circuits is not part of our 
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investigation either, so we can safely exclude these products from this case study. The Optical 
Semiconductors are defined as follows: “Optical semiconductors are devices that have either 
luminescent or light-receiving functionalities. Luminescent devices include light-emitting diodes 
(“LED”) and laser diodes, while light-receiving devices include solar cells and photo-
detectors.”377 Since optical semiconductors were a product group of NXP Semiconductors only, 
Freescale Semiconductor was not producing, nor performing research and development in this 
area,378 therefore we can safely exclude these products from this case study as well. 
Sensors and Actuators are defined as follows in Part IV.4.1. Product market definition: 
 “(86) Sensors semiconductors are used to help to manage and transmit data from a real-
world environment for embedded processing applications. Sensors are specifically designed 
to measure externalities like pressure, temperature, magnetic fields or acceleration. 
(87) Actuators use electronic signals in order to influence the real world by performing a 
certain action.”379 
Since Actuators were not sold by and were not involved in the research and development efforts 
of neither NXP Semiconductors, nor Freescale Semiconductor, and since the market of the 
Sensors had at the time of the merger control procedure significant competition, and since the 
two companies had neither a large combined market share, nor could their products be substituted 
for each other, and since they continued unchanged as a business line after the acquisition we can 
safely exclude them from this case study as well.380 
The discrete are the main focus of this case study, since the RF power transistors and their 
innovations are falling into this category. The definition of discrete and RF power transistors are 
as follows: “Discretes are physically standalone packaged semiconductors specified to perform 
an elementary electronic function.”381 
The category of discretes can be subdivided into the following four segments: 
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● RF and microwave 
● Power transistors and thyristors 
● Rectifiers and power diodes 
● Small signal and other discretes382 
For our investigation purposes the relevant subcategory is RF and microwave, since the 
innovations in the Gallium Nitride Transistors was in this category. The RF and microwave 
technology are the one used in the Information and Communications Technology industry and 
other industries like broadcasting and military extensively. The RF and microwave technology 
can be further subdivided into four product segments: 
● RF power transistors 
● RF SST 
● RF diodes383 
The main difference between RF power transistors and SST and diodes is described as follows: 
“from a technical viewpoint, RF power transistors are typically high power (>1-watt average 
output power up to more than 1 kW) devices, whereas RF SST and RF diodes are low power RF 
devices with average output power of less than 1 watt. Additionally, there is also a significant 
price difference, as the price of RF power amplifier modules amounts to approximately USD 25, 
whereas RF SSTs for mobile handsets and RF SSTs for infrastructure are typically sold for USD 
10-20 cents and 30-120 cents respectively.”384 
The RF power transistors are used mainly in the wireless infrastructure market, in fact 60-70% 
of them are used in base stations of the mobile telecom infrastructure, providing cellular 
communications capability in 3G, 4G Long Term Evolution (LTE), and more recently 5G 
technologies, by the major telecom equipment providers who in turn are selling them worldwide 
to all telecom operators.385 
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The major telecom equipment providers were Huawei, ZTE, Ericsson, Nokia and Alcatel-Lucent, 
the RF power transistor market was dominated by them.386 The Commission investigation also 
interviewed their representatives about the forecasted effects and consequences of such a merger, 
the relative position of NXP Semiconductors and Freescale Semiconductor both in terms of 
market share, perceived quality and brand awareness, and in sustainability and market dynamics. 
We will also use some of their statements in order to highlight the perceived innovation position 
of Freescale Semiconductor before the acquisition. 
At the time of the merger control investigation and procedure (and in the 5 years since) there 
were two main technologies used to design, produce and innovate on these RF power transistors: 
● Silicon based laterally diffused metal oxide semiconductor (‘LDMOS’) 
● gallium nitride on silicon carbide substrate (‘GaN’).387 
At the time of the merger control investigation, 80-90% of the RF power devices for wireless 
carriers were produced using the LDMOS technology.388 However, industry experts generally 
agreed that Gallium Nitride RF power transistors were needed to be designed, produced and 
further innovated on by the semiconductor vendors, since the telecommunications industry was 
going to expand in the 4G LTE technologies using this underlying hardware technology. At the 
time, GaN technology was mainly used by the military, radar and satellite communications 
industries only.389 
Since NXP Semiconductors and Freescale Semiconductor had a combined market share in the 
RF power transistor market to reasonably assume the company after the acquisition will be a 
dominant player, the Commission raised concerns about the acquisition.390 
“In the market of RF power transistors, the Parties’ combined share is of [60-70]% (NXP [20-
30]% and Freescale [30-40]%). Furthermore, in the possible segment of RF Power transistors 
used in wireless infrastructure, the Parties' combined share amounts to [70-80]% (NXP [20-30]% 
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and Freescale [40-50]%). The proposed transaction thus gives rise to a horizontally affected 
market in relation to the market for RF power transistors, where the Parties have a combined 
share of more than 20%.”391 
Below I created a figure illustrating the semiconductor industry, the relevant sub-categories of 
products and markets, with the RF power transistor market and technologies at the time of the 
merger control procedure. 
 
Figure 10 Semiconductor industry, the relevant sub-categories 
2.5.3. Freescale as an innovation leader in GaN 
In this chapter, I will examine some news articles, interviews with semiconductor customers from 
the telecom equipment provider industry, and in the next chapter I will take a detailed look at 
Freescale’s patent for Gallium Nitride RF Power transistors. I am performing this analysis to 
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show that Freescale was very active, and in some market segments, could be considered the 
technological leader in this up-and-coming technology before the acquisition. 
At the end of the year 2014, Freescale launched a new wave of Gallium Nitride on Silicon 
Carbide transistors for military and industrial applications, which at the time were considered the 
highest performance devices in the market in their category. Semiconductor Today Magazine is 
the first digital-only magazine for the compound semiconductor and advanced silicon industries, 
operating since 2006392 wrote the following: “Freescale launches 100W, 2.5GHz GaN-on-SiC 
RF power transistor for military and industrial applications, 
RF power transistors supplier Freescale Semiconductor of Austin, TX, USA has introduced what 
are claimed to be the industry’s highest thermal and wideband performance GaN device with a 
125W continuous wave (CW) gallium nitride on silicon carbide (GaN-on-SiC) transistor. By 
offering extended operational bandwidth, the new MMRF5014H is suitable for wideband 
amplifiers in scientific equipment, as well as in military communications products for the US 
defense sector including jammers, radar implementations and electronic warfare (EW) 
systems.”393 Their strategic plans of further innovation in this space were also articulated: “The 
new GaN product is the first of several that Freescale plans to introduce to help push existing 
performance while addressing the stringent size, weight and power (SWaP) requirements of the 
defense industry and other markets.”394 
The customers of Freescale Semiconductor and NXP Semiconductors, the telecom equipment 
manufacturers such as Huawei, ZTE, Ericsson, Nokia and Alcatel-Lucent made the following 
statements during the interviews in the merger control procedure of the European Commission 
that illustrate the perception of Freescale as an innovation leader: “For example, one customer 
explained that, as far as LDMOS RF power transistors are concerned, ‘Freescale is the dominant 
market leader followed by NXP. Infineon remains a distant third.’ ” 395 
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In relation to Freescale, one respondent commented that “ ‘Freescale has a very strong technology 
base in LDMOS and integrated passive devices (IPD) matching elements, as well as a very strong 
plastic overmold packaging technology. Freescale also has a very broad portfolio of products in 
all RF Power applications (cellular and other). It has a very large and experienced R&D team in 
several locations worldwide. Moreover, Freescale has a very strong application knowledge and 
ability to design circuits for customers.’ Other respondents also submitted that Freescale had 
potentially the broadest and best product portfolio in the RF power transistors sector.” 396 
2.5.4. Freescale patent for High-Speed Gallium Nitride Transistor Devices 
In this chapter I will examine the important patent of High-Speed Gallium Nitride Transistor 
Devices and highlight its benefits to wireless network equipment technology development. 
The patent application was filed in 2012 and published first in 2013. Further applications on the 
same invention and further applications were going on until 2015 June, when the acquisition 
merger control procedure was going on.397 This shows the continued innovation activity of 
Freescale in the GaN transistor device area. The brief description of the invention is as follows: 
“Semiconductor devices used in high-efficiency power amplifier (HEA) applications require 
higher speed and power handling capability. To meet these operating requirements, high power 
semiconductor devices may be formed with semiconductor materials, such as gallium nitride 
(GaN) having material properties that are suitable for use in such applications. For example, high 
speed transistor switch devices, such as high electron mobility transistor (HEMT) devices, 
formed with GaN-based materials offer many advantages in RF applications, especially in HEA 
applications, by delivering high current, high breakdown voltage, and high unity gate current 
cutoff frequency (fT ). However, as the speed of the devices is increased by shrinking the gate 
length and increasing the electron concentration in the device channel, gate and drain leakage 
currents can increase and device breakdown voltage can be reduced. Attempts to reduce gate 
leakage current in such devices may adversely affect other device properties. For example, device 
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features and processing steps used to reduce leakage current can degrade the fT of the device by 
adding gate capacitance.”398 
According to the description above, the main advantage of the Gallium Nitride transistor 
technology is that it offers overall higher speeds to the equipment in which they are used by using 
more electrical power without significant danger of device breakdown.399 
First users of the technology were the military, aviation and radar as well as the satellite 
communication industries due to the higher price compared to traditional RF power transistors, 
but during the years it became more and more standard in telecom equipment in 3G, 4G LTE and 
lately 5G devices. The following article from the Microwaves & RF Magazine highlights the 
benefits that happened to 4G, and the current developments enabled in 5G by Gallium Nitride 
power transistors: “At the semiconductor level, the mainstream commercialization of gallium-
nitride-on-silicon (GaN-on-Si) has opened the door to improved RF power density, space 
savings, and energy efficiency. These improvements come at affordable cost structures that are 
on par with LDMOS at scaled volume production levels, as well as far below GaN-on-silicon-
carbide (GaN-on-SiC). In parallel, the use case for GaN has expanded beyond discrete transistors 
for high-power RF applications. The economies of scale achieved with GaN’s propagation into 
commercial 4G LTE wireless infrastructure has enabled GaN’s migration into the monolithic-
microwave-integrated circuit (MMIC) market, where it’s helping system designers achieve 
higher levels of functionality and device integration for next-generation 5G systems.”400 
In summary we can understand that without the Gallium Nitride power transistor technology, 
their high speeds of the current 4G and the future 5G mobile telecommunication networks would 
have been possible only with significantly higher prices or not possible at all.  
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The below figure is from the original patent application. It shows the manufacturing process of 
GaN Power transistors: 401 
 
Figure 11 Patent Application of GaN Power transistors 
2.5.5. Merger Control and NXP’s decision to divest 
In order to be able to go forward with the merger NXP Semiconductors decided to divest its RF 
power business and submitted their commitments to the European Commission. They would 
divest the entire RF power business, with multiple locations, including research and development 
centers and laboratories worldwide into a new company. Concerns were expressed by industry 
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players about how and whether the new company will be sustainable, but most agreed the 
business unit can act as a standalone company. 402 
The European Commission deemed it sufficient that the market concentration will not increase 
as a result of this divestment. They also expressed that they were sufficiently convinced that the 
new company will be able to continue operating both from the economic sustainability standpoint 
and the research standpoint.403 However, the investigation was only concerned with the RF power 
business of  NXP Semiconductors and made no investigations on Freescale’s RF power business 
and how it will be affected by the acquisition. 
During the merger control procedure, the Commission also received news that NXP 
Semiconductors is planning to sell the newly divested company to Jianguang Asset Management 
Co. Ltd (‘JAC’) of China.  JAC is a subsidiary of the private equity JIC Capital (‘JIC’) – a state-
controlled Chinese investment company. 404 The Commission raised some concerns about the 
US investigation in the foreign purchase of the company, especially in case of the scenario when 
such acquisition would have been forbidden by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. 
(‘CFIUS’). 
The acquisition of the newly divested company was announced in May 2015, much earlier than 
the Commission investigation issued its report asking NXP Semiconductors to fix the RF power 
market concentration issue. Considering this news, it could reasonably be assumed that NXP 
wishes not to continue its RF power business, even after acquiring Freescale. NXP published a 
press release about the scope of the acquisition: “Under the agreement, the entire scope of the 
NXP RF Power business and approximately 2,000 NXP employees who are primarily engaged 
globally in the RF Power business, including its entire management team, are to be transferred 
to an independent company incorporated in the Netherlands, which will be 100% acquired by 
JAC Capital upon closing of the transaction. Additionally, all relevant patents and intellectual 
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property associated with the RF Power business will be transferred in the sale, as well the NXP 
back-end manufacturing operation in the Philippines that is focused on advanced package, test 
and assembly of RF Power products.”405 
However, the Commission has not investigated nor raised any concerns about what will happen 
with the newly acquired RF power division of Freescale Semiconductor after the divestment and 
the subsequent Freescale acquisition, whether it will be continued in competition with the 
Chinese companies. They closed the procedure and allowed the acquisition to go forward.406 The 
acquisition of Freescale Semiconductor was closed in December 2015. 
2.5.6. GaN power transistor IP landscape today 
In the years following the acquisition the semiconductor market of Gallium Nitride transistors 
has grown immensely. In their 2020 GaN Patent Landscape report, Knowmade has written the 
following about the market: “In recent years, the radiofrequency (RF) GaN market has grown 
impressively and has reshaped the RF power device industry landscape. The GaN RF industry 
continues to ramp up, driven by telecom and defense applications, and with 5G implementation 
coming, the RF GaN market is developing fast. According to Yole Développement’s report RF 
GaN 2018, the total RF GaN market size is expected to increase from $380 million in 2017 to 
$1.3 billion by 2023.”407 
After the acquisition of Freescale Semiconductor however, both the new divested and sold 
Europe-based company called Ampleon, and NXG Semiconductors have fallen behind in the 
Intellectual Property race. The Intellectual Property landscape of Gallium Nitride power 
transistor technology is currently dominated by Wolfspeed (a Cree subsidiary company) and 
increasingly Intel, as well as different Chinese companies.408 According to a new report by 
 
405
 NXG Semiconductors. (2015, May 28). NXP Semiconductors Announces Agreement to Sell RF Power 
Business. NXP Media Center. Retrieved October 20, 2020, from https://media.nxp.com/news-releases/news-
release-details/nxp-semiconductors-announces-agreement-sell-rf-power-business page 1 
406
 European Commission. (2015, 11 12). Non-opposition to a notified concentration. Eur-Lex - Official Journal 
of the European Union, Case M.7585, 1. Retrieved October 20, 2020, from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:C2015/375/02&from=EN page 1  
407
 Knowmade. (2019, February). RF GaN Patent Landscape. Knowmade Patent & Intelligence. Retrieved 
October 20, 2020, from https://www.knowmade.com/downloads/rf-gan-patent-landscape/  
408
 Knowmade. (2020, November). RF GaN Patent Landscape 2020. Research and Markets. Retrieved November 




Knowmade: “Cree has the stronger IP position thanks to numerous fundamental patents, 
especially for GaN-on-SiC technology. Over the past 5 years, inventive activity at Cree, 
Sumitomo Electric and Toshiba stalled. These IP leaders have developed broad patent portfolios 
covering a wide range of RF GaN technology nodes. The reduced IP activity could be a sign of 
confidence in their already robust RF GaN patent portfolio. Intel and MACOM have strongly 
increased their IP activity since 2017, especially for GaN-on-Silicon technology. Intel is 
currently the most active patent applicant in the RF GaN field, with a record-high level of activity 
of patenting new inventions over the last couple of years which could, down the road, position it 
ahead of Sumitomo Electric, Fujitsu or Cree in terms of IP leadership.”409 
The following figure shows the relative Intellectual Property positions of the significant 
companies: 
 
Figure 12 Patent Leadership of Companies410 








● Wolfspeed is a spinoff of the RF power business of Cree, an LED company. The spinoff 
was announced in 2015, and completed in 2016, after the NXP Semiconductors - 
Freescale Semiconductor acquisition.411 
● Infineon, the third and relatively small market player in the years before the NXP-
Freescale acquisition, tried to acquire Wolfspeed in 2016, but the acquisition was not 
allowed by the regulator.412 
● Wolfspeed entered into a joint venture with San’aan, and later in a long-term supply 
agreement with Infineon. Ultimately Wolfspeed acquired Infineon.413 
From the reports above we can conclude that, 
● 5G development has increased the market of GaN power transistors and propelled 
innovation forward in this technology.414 
● However, NXP/Freescale, as well as the Europe-based divested company Ampleon lost 
their Intellectual Property positions almost completely in the patent landscape.415 
● The new innovative player, Wolfspeed developed their own patents and technologies, and 
cooperated with Infineon, the third largest player before the acquisition in question.416 
● Thus, the further development of GaN technology did not build upon Freescale’s previous 
innovations, but on an independent patent portfolio by other companies such as 
Wolfspeed and Intel.417 
 
In summary we can conclude that the innovation effects of the NXG Semiconductor - Freescale 
Semiconductor acquisition were not adequately considered by the European Commission, 
because their processes were focused mainly on market concentration, and the possible loss of 
innovation through dismissed utilization of patents were not included in their investigation. 
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2.6. Detrimental Effects on Customers 
According to the WIPO definition of a patent, it is a “a new way of doing something or offers a 
new technical solution to a problem” as we have discussed in the chapter about patents.418 We 
have also examined previously how patents can represent value to customers. In case the patented 
innovation remains unutilized, the problem may or may not get solved by another innovation, 
thus obstructing technological progress and the creation of market value. In the above case of 4G 
and 5G telecommunication networks, the problem and the resulting market demand was high 
enough to warrant other technical solutions than the one patented by Freescale Semiconductors 
Ltd, so alternative solutions emerged, with many new patents and innovations. However, it can 
reasonably be assumed, that not every technical problem may be solved with non-competing 
patents, thus a new company wishing to solve a problem may not have the freedom-to-operate to 
bring a solution to market without infringing on the monopoly rights of a patent acquirer 
company that did not wish to utilize said patent. In this case, the problem itself may remain 
unsolved, or the new company may incur the costs of litigation, fines and compensation to the 
patent acquirer company. Since a company itself cannot be the ultimate cost bearer, the financial 
implications of such a situation will be transferred on the owners (through shareholder losses), 
employees (through lower wages and benefits) or even the customers themselves (through higher 
prices). 
If we assume that the problem will remain unsolved, then the detrimental effects to the customers 
will be the lack of the above-mentioned benefits the patented invention would provide. Even if 
the problem eventually gets solved, the reduced number of different innovations solving the 










3. Protecting Customer Access to Innovation: Organizations 
In this chapter my main objective is to investigate (and hopefully prove) my second hypothesis: 
Current national/international organizations do not have effective measures to prevent or 
mitigate acquisitions where patents remain unutilized. 
To investigate my second hypothesis, I will examine the organizations involved in cases of 
mergers and acquisitions when patents remain unutilized. I will review their objectives, their 
current organizational structures and processes, and examine if they have any organizational (a 
dedicated department) or procedural (dedicated process) guarantees that would handle these 
scenarios and protect the customer access to innovation. By reviewing the examples of the United 
States and European Union Competition Authorities and Patent Offices I will attempt to prove 
my hypothesis that even if this legal field at the intersection of customer protection, mergers and 
acquisitions, competition laws, and patent law has sufficient legislative protection, it does not 
have sufficient organizations and procedures for the enforcement of those legal protections. 
3.3. Competition Authorities 
This chapter examines and provides a valuable foundation for future discussions about how to 
reconfigure the basic architecture of the competition authorities. The chapter focuses on 
improving the volume’s effort to show the connections between institutional arrangements and 
substantive policy outputs. “To consider possible adjustments to an existing antitrust system, the 
analysts must understand the intricate, elaborate, and often-hidden circuitry that connects the 
entire enforcement framework.”419 
“The emphasis in Institutional Structure on institutional arrangements helps correct a serious 
imbalance in the study of antitrust law. A substantial body of economic literature has examined 
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how institutional quality affects public policy.”420 After the beginning of the year 2000, the 
question of the structural architecture of the competition authorities has drawn growing attention 
for several reasons. However, not much academic study or application has centered on the 
institutional design aspects of the competition authorities. 
Liberal business regulation has natural monopolies and has given rise to a challenge in 
organizational structure policy, with more than one entity engaged in the implementation and 
drafting of competition laws and their goals. This dilemma is partially due to the fact that in 
markets with a strong monopoly aspect, regulation by market price management is often seen as 
a temporary occurrence before adequate competition has arrived. When this happens, the 
question arises of whether the competition aspects of utility regulations should be integrated into 
the broader powers and responsibilities of the competition authority and removed from the sector 
regulator, or whether both agencies should collaborate on competition issues.421 
“Deciding on the allocation of functions between the competition authority and the sector 
regulator usually depends on the extent to which competition without price regulation has been 
achieved. For example, there is usually greater deference to the role of the competition authorities 
in the telecommunications sector where competition is more advanced. In the European context, 
for example, the European Union Commission’s Directorate General for Competition plays a 
significant role. Whilst the United States has relied primarily on sector-specific rules applied by 
sector-specific institutions, New Zealand relied until 2001 almost exclusively on antitrust (i.e., 
competition) law and Australia, Chile and the United Kingdom chose a combination of both.”422 
In reality, antitrust officials appear to have the ex-post function of policing competition, reacting 
to inappropriate behavior that has already arisen, whereas sector regulators have a more ex-ante 
role of fostering competition, i.e., working to discourage anti-competitive activity in the day-to-
day operation of regulatory activities. The difference in role leads to differences in primary 
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functions. The competition authority is generally concerned with all sectors and has three main 
functions: 
● Consumer welfare and Customer Protection from Anti-competitive practices. 
● Remedies for anti-competitive behaviour, such as collusion and control of the power of 
the incumbent to limit competition; 
● Ensuring the merger of companies would not substantially limit competition: in the 
energy market for example, mergers and acquisitions which aim to re-aggregate the roles 
of the electricity supply industry, such as generation and distribution, which the reform 
sought to disaggregate in order to encourage competition.423 
Both market regulation and compliance mechanisms consist fundamentally of two components: 
regulatory regulations and institutional frameworks for the execution of policies, implemented 
to ensure the effectiveness of every framework. And the structure of the two elements is 
interdependent. Transparent comprehension of the experience and adaptation of the laws by the 
authorities applying those policies is of critical significance. 
“Good rules remain a dead letter if there is no efficiently run organization with the processes to 
implement them. Conversely an efficiently managed authority cannot compensate for 
fundamental flaws in the rules which it is to implement. And the rules must be shaped in a way 
that they can be implemented within the real-world constraints to which the organization is 
subject - such as limited resources. Academic attention focuses mainly on the legal instruments 
and not so much on the organizational side. One reason for this is probably that competition 
policy and enforcement is still mainly a subject for lawyers. Another reason could be that it is 
not easy for outsiders to obtain detailed and comprehensive information about the interior 
workings of a competition authority.” 424 
Hence focus must be more into implementing an institution that has transparency and better 
distribution of the duties in order to meet the goal and objectives of the competition policies. 
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Focusing just on the amendment of laws will not bring the desired results but must have a more 
solution-oriented team and proactive in taking actions. 
3.3.1. United States Competition Authorities 
In recent cases it is observed that a large number of countries have adopted a competition law 
and new competition authority to implement it. There has been an increasing demand on the part 
of developing countries for guidance on the institutional design they should adopt for their newly 
created competition institution. At the same time many prominent and influential authors 
discussed and argued on the focus of new competition authority organizational structure and 
understood the issues of competitional practices and interpretation of the competition laws 
altogether.  
Competition Authorities generally operate in compliance with the competition laws and policies 
of the nation. In the USA, competition officials are split into 1. Department of Justice, and 2. 
Federal Trade Commission. 
The first agency Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice is part of the executive branch 
of the government. Its location in the Department of Justice, rather than in a department more 
specifically charged with economic policy, follows from the Sherman Act’s origins as a criminal 
statute. It suggests a tradition of prosecution, as much as of policy analysis. The second agency, 
the Federal Trade Commission, is an independent body, located politically and geographically 
between the legislature and the executive. One reason for its creation was to bring greater 
technical expertise to competition policy. 425  
A glimpse of the organizational structure of the Department of Justice agency tackling 
competition law in the United States.  
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Figure 13 Organizational structure of the United States Department of Justice 426 
Image source: https://www.justice.gov/agencies/chart 
The subject of inquiry in Institutional Structure is a regulatory regime with astonishing, 
distinctive characteristics. No system of the United States law (maybe no body of law in any 
jurisdiction) decentralizes the decision to prosecute more than the antitrust regulatory regime. 
J. Kirkwood and R.H Lande found in 2008 and as Hovenkamp observed in 2013 the reality is 
that the United States enforcement agencies have consistently followed a consumer welfare 
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3.3.2. European Union Competition Authority 
“The aim of EU competition policy is to safeguard the correct functioning of the single 
market.”428  
‘European Competition Authorities’ (ECA) is a discussion forum set up by the competition 
authorities within the European Economic Area, the European Commission, and the European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA) supervisory authority.429   
The European Commission, along with the national competition authorities, directly enforces the 
competition laws of the European Union, Articles 101-109 of the Treaty on the Operation of the 
European Union (TFEU), to make the economies of the European Union perform easier by 
ensuring that all firms compete reasonably and fairly on their merits. This will benefit customers, 
companies and the European economy as a whole.430 
The role of the European Commission is described by the European Union Fact Sheet of the 
European Parliament as follows:  
“The Commission is the EU institution that has the monopoly on legislative initiative and 
important executive powers in policies such as competition and external trade. It is the principal 
executive body of the European Union and is formed by a College of members composed of one 
Commissioner per Member State. The Commission oversees the application of Union law and 
respect for the Treaties by the Member States; it also chairs the committees responsible for the 
implementation of EU law. The former comitology system has been replaced by new legal 
instruments, namely implementing and delegated acts.” 431 
The European Commission is considered one of the world’s most sophisticated antitrust 
enforcers, handling a wide scale of matters ranging from company mergers, commercial 
competition issues, cartels, and state aids. 
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The European Union ensures that competition is not distorted, and it is fair, by applying similar 
rules for every company within the European Union. The applicable legal basis for the 
Commission’s activities is as per Chapter 1 of the European Union Treaty, which lays down the 
basis for Community rules on competition. The Treaty prohibits State aid, although there are 
exceptions that should be justified, for example, services of general economic interest. It must be 
demonstrated that they do not distort competition in such a way as to be contrary to the public 
interest.432 The competition laws are also established by the European Union to guarantee equal 
competition while allowing room for creativity, unified standards and the growth of small 
enterprises. “The Commission also monitors planned mergers and acquisitions of companies if 
their combined businesses exceed specified revenue thresholds. Over the past 10 years (2009-
2019), the Commission has approved over 3000 mergers and rejected nine. Importantly, the 
Commission has the right to assess mergers between non-EU companies if they carry out a 
significant part of their business in the EU.”433 
The European Commission has four major functions to play: 
It proposes laws to Parliament and the Council; it manages the policies of the European Union 
and manages the budget; and enforces European Law (together with the Court of Justice). It is 
empowered to represent the European Union on the international arena, for example by 
negotiating arrangements between the European Union and other countries. 
The Deputy General Competition policy areas include antitrust, merger, liberalization, state aid 
and international cooperation. Antitrust issues are understood as all agreements and conduct 
prohibited under Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
Merger issues are governed by Commission Regulation (EC) No 802/2004 implementing 
Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 and its annexes. Liberalization issues are regulated 
according to Article 106 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. State aid issues 
are regulated with a goal of ensuring that government interventions do not distort competition 
within the EU by unfairly favouring one company or a subset of companies over others as per 
 
432
 EUR.LEX. (2020, August 11). Summaries of EU Legislation: Competition. eur-lex.europa.eu. Retrieved 
September 7, 2020, from https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/summary/chapter/competition.html?root_default=SUM_1_CODED%3D08&locale=en 
433
 (Szczepański, 2019) 
169 
 
Articles 107 - 109 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. International 
cooperation between competition agencies is pursued to make the European Union competition 
enforcement both more effective and efficient. 
The organization structure to handle the areas of work shows in the chart below with a detailed 
look at who reports to whom and the true power structure of the new European Union 
Commission. 
 
Figure 14 Organizational Structure of the European Commission434 
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Image Source:  https://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/directory/organi_en.pdf 
The Directorate-General for Competition (DG COMP) is a Directorate-General of the European 
Commission, located in Brussels. “DG Competition is primarily responsible for directly 
enforcing Articles 101 to 109 TFEU. The Commission has fully delegated its powers to the DG 
to examine the case and manage the due process.”435 The DG Competition is responsible for the 
development and application of competition policy for the European Union. More importantly, 
the European Union's antitrust body is not DG Competition, but the European Commission. 
It has a dual role in antitrust enforcement: an investigation role and a decision-making role. The 
notoriously secretive Directorate-General for Competition of the European Commission has 
broad powers to prosecute, including search and seizure in Member States, and to penalize 
infringements in European Union competition law.  
The Director-General is one of the most professional antitrust regulatory agencies in the world 
alongside the United States agencies, i.e., the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of 
Justice's Antitrust Division. “Comparative information on the effectiveness of different 
competition authorities is scarce. The Global Competition Review assessed DG Competition, 
together with the US authorities, as an 'elite global enforcer', mentioning the high total value of 
cartel fines and the Google investigation as its main achievements.”436 
3.3.3. Case Study on the European Commission Decision 
In this chapter, I am going to examine the conduct of the European Commission as the relevant 
competition authority in the merger control case study I cited above: NXP Semiconductors vs. 
Freescale Semiconductor. I will examine this case specifically from the innovation protection 
viewpoint to determine the role the European Commission played in this specific case. My main 
goal is to understand whether they should take into account the innovation protection aspects as 
per the current regulation and whether they did take it into account in the case under investigation. 
According to the Founding Treaty of the European Union, in antitrust cases, the innovation 
aspects need to be examined as well. Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union 437 states the following: 
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“Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market 
or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market in 
so far as it may affect trade between the Member States. Such abuse may, in particular, 
consist in: 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading 
conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, 
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have 
no connection with the subject of such contracts.”438 
According to section b of Article 102, limiting production, markets, or technical development to 
the customers' prejudice is clearly a case of patent misuse. A merger control case where it can be 
reasonably assumed that a significant patent will remain unutilized, therefore, should include 
considerations preventing such misuse. The merger control procedure allows the Commission to 
use several tools to enforce that such outcomes do not happen, one of which is commitments they 
may require from the merging companies.439 
In the following chapter, I will describe my proposed solution, where I will propose they do so 
and will explain some procedure that would - in my opinion - very likely achieve the desired 
outcome while not preventing the mergers and acquisitions outright.  
However, in the case of the Freescale acquisition by NXP, the European Commission was 
concerned mainly with market concentration. The Commission raised concerns, specifically in 
the market for RF power transistors, where - if the acquisition was allowed - the combined market 
shares were expected to reach up to 60–70%. Therefore, the Commission proposed the 
commitment that NXP divest their RF power business: “The First Commitments consist of the 
divestment of NXP's entire RF Power business (the “RF Power business”) as a fix-it-first solution 
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aiming to eliminate the entire overlap between the Parties’ activities in RF Power transistors for 
all applications.” 440 
Following the Commission’s proposal, NXP Semiconductors mitigated the market concentration 
issues by selling their RF Power transistor business to Chinese JAC Capital, so they can acquire 
Freescale and utilize Freescale’s other business lines, not involving the RF Power transistors 
directly.441 The acquisition was subsequently approved by the Commission. The acquisition 
involved NXP Semiconductor’s existing RF Power business at the time. After the Freescale 
acquisition was closed, NXP did not rebuild the core RF Power business and thus the Freescale 
patent was left unutilized.442 
This decision by the European Commission ended up not having any serious consequences, since 
other competing patents took the place of this innovation as we have previously discussed in the 
case study.443 But there is no evidence that the Competition Agency considered the innovation 
aspects of this acquisition as it was related to the Gallium Nitride RF power transistor patents 
held by Freescale Semiconductors. They certainly did not propose any commitments to ensure 
that those patents shall remain utilized. 
3.4. Patent Offices 
In this chapter I will first look at what options inventors have to represent their interests, including 
patent agencies and patent attorneys. Then I will examine the operation of the United States and 
European Patent offices. 
Patent agencies help companies and individuals with patent issues and other intellectual property 
rights (IPR) and infringement of the IPR. They help in providing protection of the company’s 
products and ideas 
“A patent agency will often be involved right from conception of an idea to acquisition of the 
patent, or even longer - just because a company has obtained its patent does not mean that the 
patent agency’s job is done.” 444 
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Patent agencies can play the role of a consulting partner in connection with the selection of an 
appropriate form of protection, and help customers to prepare patent applications for submission 
to their respective Intellectual Property Office or patent applications outside the jurisdictions and 
monitor rights and cases of attempted infringement.  
“A patent agency or a legal firm specializing in intellectual property rights will often also be able 
to assist your company in connection with legal proceedings relating to intellectual property 
rights, e.g., in the event of patent disputes. In case of infringement of intellectual property rights, 
a patent agency will be able to represent the Intellectual Property Rights holder.” 445 
Apart from the IPR cases, some patent agencies and legal firms specializing in intellectual 
property rights also handle various other agreements involving intellectual property rights. 
Examples include transfer agreements for trademarks or domain names, or adviser in connection 
with licensing discussions and the preparation of license agreements, if the company is looking 
to license out any of its intellectual property rights, such as a patent, design or trademark.446 
However, there are two types handling the Intellectual property issues from a US perspective, 
that is patent agent and patent attorney. Although both handle the Intellectual Property Right 
matters, there is yet a difference in their duties.  
Patent agents specialize in obtaining patents like attorneys, they're able to prepare, file, and 
prosecute patent applications as well as appear in front of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board. 447 
According to United States attorney experts, the capacity to practice law makes the difference 
between patent attorneys and patent agents. “A patent attorney has attended law school and taken 
and passed an examination for registration to practice law in that state. A patent agent is not a 
lawyer and cannot provide any legal advice, including advice on patent licensing or patent 
infringement. Only lawyers can draft contracts or non-disclosure agreements or represent you in 
any legal proceedings involving state or Federal court.”448  
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The European Patent Attorney is defined as, “Qualified professional representatives appointed 
to act on behalf of an applicant to draft a patent application and/or to accompany the application 
through the various stages of the patent grant procedure.”449 
3.4.1. United States Patent and Trademark Office 
The United States has been very progressive in setting up a patent enforcement agency far earlier 
than the rest of the world.  A brief history of the office is described by Thomson Reuters/FindLaw 
(2016): “Congress established the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to issue 
patents on behalf of the government. The Patent Office as a distinct bureau dates from the year 
1802, when a separate official in the Department of State who became known as ‘Superintendent 
of Patents’ was placed in charge of patents. The revision of the patent laws, enacted in 1836, 
reorganized the Patent Office and designated the official in charge as Commissioner of Patents. 
The Patent Office remained in the Department of State until 1849 when it was transferred to the 
Department of Interior. In 1925 it was transferred to the Department of Commerce where it is 
today. The name of the Patent Office was changed to the Patent and Trademark Office in 1975 
and changed to the United States Patent and Trademark Office in 2000. For over 200 years, the 
basic role of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has remained the same: 
To promote the progress of science and the useful arts by securing to inventors the exclusive 
right to their respective discoveries.”450 
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO or Office) is an agency of the U.S. 
Department of Commerce. Their task is to grant patents to protect inventions and to register 
trademarks. It serves the needs of inventors and companies with regards to their technologies and 
corporate goods and the recognition of services. It also advises and supports the President of the 
United States, the Secretary of Commerce and other government agencies in matters concerning 
both domestic and global aspects of intellectual property. The Office promotes industrial and 
technical knowledge through the protection, classification and distribution of patent information. 
 
449
 European Patent Office. (2020, February 07). European Patent Attorney. www.epo.org. Retrieved July 13, 
2020, from https://www.epo.org/service-support/glossary.html  
450
 Thomson Reuters Findlaw. (2016, June 20). The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. FindLaw. Retrieved 





Hence it can be analyzed that the United States Patent and Trademark Officers handle wide duties 
in protecting the rights of new inventions and innovations.451 
In carrying out its relevant patent duties, the United States Patent and Trademark Office reviews 
applications and grants patents on inventions where the applicants are entitled to them, publishes 
and disseminates patent information, records allocations of patents, maintains search files for 
United States and international patents, and maintains a search room for public use in the review 
of patents and records released. Copies of patents and official documents are made available to 
the public by the Office. It offers training to professionals on the provisions of the patent statutes 
and regulations and publishes the Manual of Patent Examining Procedures to explain these 
requirements.452 Different roles are conducted with respect to trademarks. By preserving 
intellectual endeavors and promoting technical advancement, the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office aims to maintain the technological edge of the United States. The United States 
Patent and Trademark Officers also disseminates patent and trademark knowledge that 
encourages an awareness of intellectual property rights and enables the creation and sharing of 
new technology around the world.453 
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The image of the organizational chart of USPTO: (Figure 15) 
 
Figure 15 United States Patent and Trademark Office Organizational Chart 
Source: U.S Patent and Trademark Office Organizational Chart454 
In the recent case regarding constitutional issues in the decision making of the Patent authorities 
by Arthrex v. Smith & Nephew, 2019, a patent owner who lost at the Patent Trial and Appeal 
Board (PTAB) level, successfully contended before the Federal Circuit that the appointment of 
the Administrative Patent Judges was unconstitutional. “Applying the test set forth in Edmond 
v. United States, 1997, where the Federal Circuit considered: 
1. whether an appointed official weather has the power to review and reverse the officers' 
decision; 
2. the level of supervision and oversight an appointed official has over the officers; and 
3. the appointed official's power to remove the officers.”455 
 
454
 United States Patent and Trademark Office. (2018, September 20). Patent Cooperation Treaty. USPTO - 
Patents - International Protection. Retrieved October 20, 2020, from https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-
started/international-protection/patent-cooperation-treaty  
455
 Pramod Chintalapoodi. (2020, November 16). SUPREME COURT TO DECIDE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 





It is argued that “the only two presidentially-appointed officers that provide direction to the 
USPTO are the Secretary of Commerce and the Director. Neither of those officers individually 
nor combined exercises sufficient direction and supervision over Administrative Patent Judges 
(APJs) to render them inferior officers. Because the Federal Circuit found that APJs were 
‘principal officers,’ it concluded that their appointments by the Secretary of Commerce violated 
the Appointments Clause.”456 The controversy of the case Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc. 
2019, demanded for a new hearing before a new panel “because the Board's decision in this case 
was made by a panel of APJs that were not constitutionally appointed at the time the decision 
was rendered.”457 “If the Supreme Court decides that the PTAB judges were appointed 
unconstitutionally, then all those 10,000 decisions by the PTAB to date could be open to 
challenge – leading to chaos in the patent law system.”458  
Therefore, in my analysis, careful planning for legislative bodies, and the understanding of 
transparency in patent law needs to be organized. 
3.4.2. European Patent Office 
The European Patent Organization is an intergovernmental organization set up on 7 October 
1977, on the European Patent Convention (EPC) signed in Munich in 1973. It has two bodies, 
the European Patent Office and the Administrative Council.459  The two organs of the European 
Patent Organization, one is the European Patent Office (EPO), which acts as an executive body 
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Figure 16 Organizational Structure of the European Patent Organization 
The image of the organizational structure of the EPO 460  
The composition and functioning of these two organs: The European Patent Office (EPO) and 
the Administrative Council, are explained below: 
1.  Administration of the European Patent Office (EPO) 
EPO headquarter is in Munich with several branches in the Hague, Berlin, Vienna, and Brussels. 
“The European Patent Office (EPO) is headed by a president who is answerable to the 
Administrative Council. Assisted by a Vice-President, the President of the EPO ensures of the 
day to day functioning of the EPO and its branches; preparing and implementing budget; and 
may propose the amendment of the EPC, general regulations or decisions that fall within the 
competence of the Administrative Council. He appoints EPO employees, decides on promotion, 
and exercises disciplinary authority over the employees, and summits annual management 
reports to the Administrative Council.”461 Hence, the President of the EPO’s administrative task 
focuses mostly on decision making and appointment of employees, preparing annual 
management reports only within the Administrative council.  
2. Department of EPO 
For proper functioning, the EPO follows eight parts of structural examination guidelines and has 
distributed the task into several departments.  
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“The Guidelines for Examination give instructions on the practice and procedure to be followed 
in the various aspects of the examination of European applications and patents in accordance 
with the European Patent Convention and its Implementing Regulations. 
The Guidelines have the following eight-part structure: 
● Part A: Guidelines for Formalities Examination 
● Part B: Guidelines for Search 
● Part C: Guidelines for Procedural Aspects of Substantive Examination 
● Part D: Guidelines for Opposition and Limitation/Revocation Procedures 
● Part E: Guidelines on General Procedural Matters 
● Part F: The European Patent Application 
● Part G: Patentability 
● Part H: Amendments and Corrections”462 
In consideration of the above guidelines, Mario Egbe Mpame (2018) describes the different 
departments of the European Patent Office in detail:463 
“The departments of the EPO include: a Receiving Section; Search Divisions; an Examination 
Divisions; Opposition Divisions; a Legal Division; Boards of Appeal; and an Enlarged Board of 
Appeal. While the Receiving Section is responsible for the examination on filing and the 
formality examination of patent applications, the Search Divisions conduct search and draw 
search reports as a preliminary stage for determining novelty. The Examining Divisions is 
responsible for conducting the substantive examination of European Patent applications. In this 
regard, each of the Examining Divisions consists of three technically qualified examiners, and 
even oral proceedings are carried out before the Examining Division. The Opposition Divisions 
are responsible for the examination of oppositions against any European patent. Depending on 
the field, the division consists of three technically qualified examiners, at least two of whom shall 
not have taken part in the proceedings for grant of the patent to which the opposition relates. 
While the Legal Division is responsible for decisions relating to entries in the Register of 
European Patents, and the registration on and deletion from the list of professional 
representatives, the Boards of Appeal are responsible for the examination of appeals from 
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decisions of the Receiving Section, the Examining Divisions and Opposition Divisions, and the 
Legal Division. The Enlarged Board of Appeal on its part, is a five-member board that is in 
charge of deciding on points of law referred to it by Boards of Appeal; giving opinions on points 
of law referred to it by the President of the European Patent Office, and deciding on petitions for 
review of decisions of the Boards of Appeal.”464 
As we can see from the review of the procedural guidelines and the organizational setup of the 
European Patent Office, although it handles every matter of the patent applications, there is a 
lack of patent authority or guidelines for the protection of customer access to innovation. 
3.5. Conclusion 
“If the government objects to monopoly prices for new inventions, it should stop granting 
patents. It will be absurd to grant patents and stop depriving them of any value by forcing the 
patentee to sell at a competitive price.” - Ludwig von Mises.465 
Through the detailed examination of the definition, roles, responsibilities, and operational 
procedures of competition authorities as well as patent agencies in both the United States and the 
European Union we could not find organizational or procedural guarantees that the protection of 
customer access to innovation would be enforced to a satisfactory degree. In fact, by examining 
a case study when a patent remained unutilized after a decision of the European Commission, we 
could see a situation where the objectives of preventing market concentration and encouraging 
the use of invention ended up in conflict with each other. While judging from the subsequent 
events, the decision of the European Commission was the right one, in this case, it was not due 
to careful planning on the effects on the customer access to innovation, but merely due to other 
companies finding other ways to innovate. Therefore, I consider it sufficiently warranted that a 
new operational unit, e.g., a new office of the Competition Authority, be set up to protect the 
customer access to innovation and ensure this aspect of mergers and acquisitions is explicitly 
represented in all merger control procedures.  
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Chapter Four  
4.  A Solution Proposal: An Innovation Protection Office 
In this chapter, I am going to investigate my third hypothesis first, to establish the legal 
background, and then examine a proposed solution for the problem we identified with mergers 
and acquisitions when patents remain unutilized. 
My third hypothesis is as follows: 
There is sufficient legal basis to prevent or mitigate acquisitions where patents remain unutilized. 
I will focus my investigation on the European Union, both on the foundational laws and the 
merger control procedure aspects, but will discuss the principles and also include the relevant 
international treaties. This will hopefully illustrate how the proposed solution and its legal basis 
can be applied in other jurisdictions as well, where the legal foundations are similar. 
The solution I am proposing is the establishment of an Innovation Protection Office whose sole 
purpose is to represent the interests of enabling and maintaining customer access to innovation 
represented by patents in merger and acquisition cases falling currently under the umbrella of the 
competition authority. This office would provide reports, and practical recommendations, 
including analytical, contractual, and in some cases, regulatory actions that the competition 
agency may consider in their procedures to approve or deny a merger or acquisition. This new 
office would also perform audits on the aforementioned actions in cooperation with the Patent 
Office in order to monitor their effectiveness and finetune the operational framework and 
methodology by which it operates and advises the competition agency, and ultimately if 
necessary, to facilitate the initial legal action in case of non-compliance. 
In order to appropriately define the organizational structure, the objectives, and the operational 
methodology of the new office, I decided to first examine a possible theoretical framework to 
help me in designing the operational system holistically, by following a top-down approach. This 
framework will allow me to take into account concepts and values the new organization should 
follow and encourage, such as sustainability considerations of the current economic conditions 
as well as equity of rights, from customer rights through the rights of companies to perform the 
mergers and acquisitions to achieve efficiencies, all the way to patent owner’s rights. 
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Subsequently, to illustrate how the new office will operate, I will explain its primary roles and 
objectives, organization structure, and operative relationships with other organizations such as 
the competition authority itself and the patent offices. 
Afterward, I will examine the analytical and legal processes and methodologies the office is 
going to use in analyzing the mergers and acquisitions prior and post-Merger and Acquisition to 
assist the competition authority’s decision-making procedure and influence policy-making or 
facilitate initiation of legal actions. The list of these legal and analytical processes and 
methodologies is not intended to be interpreted as an exhaustive list, rather a starting toolkit by 
which the office may start its operations. I purposefully included dedicated processes so that the 
office may improve the effectiveness of their operations both in advising the competition 
authority and policymakers and facilitating legal actions. 
4.3. Legal Background 
In this chapter I will attempt to investigate my third hypothesis: 
There is sufficient legal basis to prevent or mitigate acquisitions where patents remain unutilized. 
I will focus my investigation on the European Union, its treaties and its merger control procedure, 
and the national and international treaties around the “patent non-working” scenario. Even 
though this investigation will focus on the EU, I believe the applicability of the proposed solution, 
the Innovation Protection Office, especially its Prior and Post Merger and Acquisition processes 
are much wider. These processes are designed based on fundamental rights around fair 
competition, general merger control procedures, and international treaties around patent non-
working which may be applicable in many other jurisdictions as well. However, this thesis does 
not aim to discuss the differences and commonalities of international legal frameworks in this 
area. The investigation of this hypothesis is rather an example on the minimum set of rules an 
organization can use to prevent or mitigate acquisitions where patents remain unutilized. 
The first question I will investigate is whether the European Union foundational laws and treaties 
cover the case of acquisitions where patents remain unutilized. The relevant treaty to this patent 
misuse case is the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, especially Article 102 about 
the abuse of a dominant position. 466 It states the following:  
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“Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market 
or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market in 
so far as it may affect trade between the Member States. Such abuse may, in particular, 
consist in: 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading 
conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, 
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have 
no connection with the subject of such contracts.” 467 
According to section b of Article 102, limiting production, markets, or technical development to 
the customers’ prejudice is clearly a case of patent misuse. Therefore, in antitrust cases, the 
innovation aspects need to be examined as well. A merger control case where it can be reasonably 
assumed that a significant patent will remain unutilized, therefore, should include considerations 
preventing such misuse. 
Since in the case of European Union competition law, the European Commission, and its 
Directorate-General for Competition along with national competition authorities is responsible 
for directly enforcing Articles 101 to 109 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union468, I will investigate the European Commission’s merger control procedures next, to 
identify which steps if any are applicable to examine the patent misuse cases. 469 
The EU merger control procedure involves the following steps: 
“Notification 
The Commission must be notified of any merger with an EU dimension prior to its 
implementation. Companies may contact the Commission beforehand to see how to best prepare 
 
467
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468 European Commission Directorate-General for Competition. (2020, July 29). Directorate-General for 
Competition. European Commission Directorates General. Retrieved October 20, 2020, from 
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Mergers. Retrieved April 20, 2021, from https://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/procedures_en.html 
184 
 
their notification. There are pre-prepared templates used to notify their mergers, based on the 
complexity of the case. 
Phase I investigation 
After notification, the Commission has 25 working days to analyse the deal during the phase I 
investigation. More than 90% of all cases are resolved in Phase I, generally without remedies. A 
phase I review may involve the following: 
• Requests for information from the merging companies or third parties; 
• Questionnaires to competitors or customers seeking their views on the merger, as well as 
other contacts with market participants, aimed at clarifying the conditions for competition 
in a given market or the role of the merged companies in that market. 
Remedies 
If the Commission has concerns that the merger may significantly affect competition, the 
merging companies may offer remedies ("commitments"), i.e. propose certain modifications to 
the project that would guarantee continued competition on the market. Companies may offer 
remedies in phase I or in phase II. 
The Commission analyses whether the proposed remedies are viable, and sufficient to eliminate 
competition concerns. It also takes into account the views of market participants in a market test. 
If remedies are accepted, they become binding upon the companies. An independent trustee is 
then appointed to oversee compliance with these commitments. 
Phase II investigation 
Phase II is an in-depth analysis of the merger's effects on competition and requires more time. It 
is opened when the case cannot be resolved in Phase I, i.e. when the Commission has concerns 
that the transaction could restrict competition in the internal market. A phase II investigation 
typically involves more extensive information gathering, including companies' internal 
documents, extensive economic data, more detailed questionnaires to market participants, and/or 
site visits. 
The final decision 
Following the phase II investigation, the Commission may either: 
• Unconditionally clear the merger; or 
• Approve the merger subject to remedies; or 
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• Prohibit the merger if no adequate remedies to the competition concerns have been 
proposed by the merging parties. 
Judicial review 
All decisions and procedural conduct of the Commission are subject to review by the General 
Court and ultimately by the Court of Justice. The companies or other parties demonstrating an 
interest can appeal within 2 months of the decision.”  470 
From the above procedures the Phase I and Phase II investigation steps are perfectly adequate 
for the Commission to investigate 
• whether the merger and acquisition case involve patents by checking the patent 
ownerships and patent portfolio of the merging companies, 
• perform a risk assessment that patents may remain unutilized. 
In case the risk assessment is positive, they may use the merger control remedy procedure by 
requiring commitments from the merging companies, which commitments will become legally 
binding. 
Finally, to determine the applicable remedies, we must examine the cases of patent utilization. 
As we have identified before, companies can use patents in two main ways: they can use them in 
their independent commercial activity (production, sales, import) or as granting rights to other 
companies to supply the market (voluntary licensing, selling the patent rights outright, joint 
venture). Failing to acquire any of the above commitments, there is another powerful tool 
available for the Competition Authority to encourage and ensure utilization of the patents: 
compulsory licensing. Therefore, in the next section I will investigate international treaties and 
some national laws that govern compulsory licensing. 
Although I am suggesting that compulsory licensing shall be used as a last resort, its usage, and 
publication to the companies involved in the merger control procedure is expected to have a 
significant incentivizing factor in seeking other options such as voluntary licensing, patent rights 
sale, or joint ventures.471 




 (Radauer & Dudenbostel, 2013, page II) 
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“In some cases, national authorities may license companies or individuals other than the 
patent owner to use the rights of the patent without the consent of the patent owner.” 472 
The compulsory licensing practices and regulations are different in each of the 38 contracting 
States of the European Patent Convention, with some significant divergence in the applicability 
of the compulsory licenses as well. Since Germany has the strongest patent activity in Europe, I 
will take a look at the German example in more detail in the following section. In Germany, the 
legal basis for compulsory licensing is defined in Section 24 (1) of the Patent Act (Patent Gezets). 
The relevant sections in our investigation are the following: 
“it must be demonstrated that: (1) the applicant has tried, within a reasonable period of time, 
unsuccessfully to obtain permission from the proprietor of the patent to use the invention on 
reasonable commercial terms and conditions; (2) the public interest calls for the grant of a 
compulsory licence.”473 
The German regulations are therefore in line with my suggestions that the compulsory licensing 
may only be used as a last resort, when voluntary licensing agreements have been pursued before, 
but where the patent owner was not willing to offer reasonable commercial terms and conditions. 
While in most countries compulsory licensing practices are restricted to pharmaceutical 
inventions, where the public interest is much more evident to determine,474 the German regulation 
includes some special provisions in terms of the semiconductor industry as well. Section 24 (4) 
of the Patent Gesetz describes the applicability only in the case of anti-competitive practices: 
 “A compulsory licence under subsection (1) may be granted for a patented invention in the 
field of semiconductor technology only where this is necessary to eliminate those anti-
competitive practices pursued by the proprietor of the patent which have been established in 
court or administrative proceedings.”475 
Since patent misuse falls under the umbrella of anti-competitive practices, the German 
regulations have an explicit clause supporting the last resort action I am proposing. 
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The Patent Gesetz, Section 24 subsections (5), (6), and (7) also apply in our case, since the 
proposed Innovation Protection office is specifically trying to prevent the non-working of patents 
described in in Section 24 of the Patent Gesetz, subsections: 
“(5) Where the proprietor of the patent does not apply the patented invention in Germany or 
does not do so predominantly, compulsory licences in accordance with subsection (1) may 
be granted to ensure an adequate supply of the patented product on the German market. 
Import shall thus be equivalent to the use of the patent in Germany.  
(6) The grant of a compulsory licence in respect of a patent shall be admissible only after the 
patent has been granted. The compulsory licence may be granted subject to limitations and 
made dependent on conditions. The extent and the duration of use shall be limited to the 
purpose for which the compulsory licence was granted. The proprietor of the patent shall be 
entitled to remuneration from the proprietor of the compulsory licence, such remuneration 
being equitable in the circumstances of the case and taking into account the economic value 
of the compulsory licence. Where, in relation to recurrent remuneration payments due in the 
future, there is a substantial change in the circumstances which governed the fixing of the 
amount of remuneration, each party shall be entitled to require a corresponding adjustment. 
Where the circumstances upon which the grant of a compulsory licence was based no longer 
apply, and if their recurrence is improbable, the proprietor of the patent can require the 
withdrawal of the compulsory licence. 
(7) A compulsory licence in respect of a patent may be transferred only together with the 
business involved in exploiting the invention. A compulsory licence in respect of an invention 
which is the subject matter of a patent with an earlier filing or priority date may be transferred 
only together with the patent with a later filing or priority date.” 476 
In line with the German legislation, I am proposing that import shall be deemed sufficient access 
to innovation to customers as well. National trade policy is not in the scope of the proposed 
Innovation Protection Office, only the protection of the customer’s access to innovation. 
On an international level, the TRIPS Agreement and the subsequent Doha Declaration are the 
most important treaties to consider in terms of compulsory licensing. The Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights is a World Trade Organization Agreement that took effect in 
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January 1995. The TRIPS agreement provides flexibility to countries to determine their public 
interest and thus define their compulsory licensing measures.477 The Doha Declaration affirmed 
the rights of (especially developing) countries to these flexibilities in the protection of the health 
of their citizens.478 
Bond and Saggi (2012) explains that the threat of compulsory licensing itself may be enough to 
convince the patent holder to change their behavior479: “Exactly when a country can issue a 
compulsory license is not explicitly addressed by TRIPS although it does mention national 
emergencies, other circumstances of extreme urgency, and anti-competitive practices as possible 
grounds for compulsory licensing. Overall, it appears that countries seeking to use compulsory 
licensing have a fair bit of discretion at their disposal, something that has been a source of major 
concern for pharmaceutical companies and other supporters of strong intellectual property rights. 
For example, it is far from clear as to what constitutes reasonable commercial terms? Similarly, 
how much remuneration to the patent-holder is adequate? Available evidence suggests that patent 
holders have tended to receive fairly low royalty rates when compulsory licensing has occurred. 
Even though compulsory licensing is permitted under TRIPS, it has not often been used by 
developing countries. Of course, for the option to invoke compulsory licensing to matter, 
compulsory licensing need not be used: the threat to issue a compulsory license can impact the 
behavior of patent-holders to the advantage of developing countries thereby making its use 
unnecessary.”480 
In this chapter, I have investigated the legal basis of the solution proposal, the new Innovation 
Protection Office, with a focus on the European Union. I have found that the current laws, 
regulations and procedures are adequate to ensure the utilization of patents in merger control 
cases. The European Commission’s responsibility clearly includes the examination of these 
patent misuse cases as well, and its merger control procedures, especially the Phase I and Phase 
II investigations and the Remedies process allows for legally binding commitments to be made 
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that can ensure patent utilization. Finally, I have investigated the international treaties and some 
national laws around compulsory licensing which may strengthen the power of the merger control 
process and encourage the companies to find solutions for patent utilization. 
4.4. A Theoretical Framework of Organization Design 
 
In this chapter, I will create a theoretical framework for organization design, that will serve as a 
basis for the following chapters. I am going to use this top-down design framework based on 
different abstraction levels to make sure that the concepts and values of society are properly 
represented in the proposed organization’s objectives, structure and operational methodology. 
I am calling this top-down framework the Abstract Pyramid, which represents the abstraction 
aspect of the framework. It has been convenient to use the ladder of abstraction principles in 
expounding theories, first popularized by S.I Hayakawa.481 The ladder of abstraction aims to 
reduce the effort in explaining certain non-trivial theoretical concepts by drilling down from the 
base concept and reaching a real-world analogy or otherwise practical application. The idea of 
abstraction ensures that as the reader moves through the pyramid, they gain a deeper 
understanding of practical applications of the abstract concepts, as was previously explained. The 
bidirectional movement concept is a critical element in the idea. The higher levels represent a 
general or pointed concept or idea, which, as we move through the lower levels, undergoes 
translation into a more practical and quantifiable outcome. The figure below illustrates the 
hierarchy of the theoretical framework from the top-level concepts all the way to the scenarios 
and actions that should be followed by the organization. 
 
481 Semanticist S. I. Hayakawa, an American linguist, had a significant insight on how we absorb information at 




Figure 17 Abstract Pyramid: Framework proposal 
Any solution to stakeholders' problems (producers and customers) on anti-competitive actions 
between two firms needs to perform holistically and sustainably. A holistic solution means the 
main concepts and values of a society are taken into account, as well as the interests of its 
stakeholders. A sustainable solution in this context means such a system that not only takes into 
account all relevant values of society, and the interests of its stakeholders, but also aligns said 
interests in order to incentivize behavior that implements and enhances such values. 
In this theoretical framework I will attempt to follow the approach by United Nations on 
Sustainable Development482 on the means of implementation: 
 
482 United Nations. (2012, June 22).  Report of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development. 






Scenarios and Actions 
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“We reiterate that each country has primary responsibility for its own economic and social 
development and that the role of national policies, domestic resources and development strategies 
cannot be overemphasized. We reaffirm that developing countries need additional resources for 
sustainable development. We recognize the need for significant mobilization of resources from 
a variety of sources and the effective use of financing, in order to promote sustainable 
development. We acknowledge that good governance and the rule of law at the national and 
international levels are essential for sustained, inclusive and equitable economic growth, 
sustainable development and the eradication of poverty and hunger.” 483 
The approach by the United Nation reaffirms the role of national policies, and development 
strategies. But it also underlines that such policies and development strategies follow the values 
of society as well. These concepts and values represent the first layer in my theoretical framework 
for organizational design. These values could range from Equality, Sustainability, Freedom of 
Expression to many others, depending on the society and its priorities. Some of the philosophical 
approaches of the last decades on Equality484, Justice485 also advocate that linking of theoretical 
concepts and values to practical institutions and virtues of life486, otherwise these concepts and 
values are meaningless and void for society. 
In case of the Innovation Protection Office, I will attempt to include the following concepts and 
values in their mission and operations, in line with the above United Nations approach: 
• Rule of Law 
The design of the new office will make use of existing legal frameworks and respect the current 
laws, regulations and practices. 
• Sustainability 
The design of the new office will make use of incentives to steer stakeholders into following 
behaviors that are in line with the concepts and values described here. 
• Fair Competition 
 
483 Id.. page 48 
484 Arneson, J. Richard. (1989). Equality and Equality of Opportunity for Welfare. Vol 56, Philosophical studies. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00646210 
485
 Sen, A. (2011, May 31). The Idea of Justice (Reprint edition ed.). Belknap Press: An Imprint of Harvard 
University Press. ISBN-13 : 978-0674060470 page ix-x 




The design of the new office will aim to enable fair competition and discourage, prevent or even 
punish anti-competitive behavior. 
• Access to Innovation 
The design of the new office will aim to increase access to innovation i.e. the adequate supply of 
the market at reasonable price and quality. 
• Intellectual Property Protection 
The design of the new office will aim to respect the legal right of Intellectual Property to 
encourage innovation, so long as those rights do not interfere with the other values cited above. 
The second layer of the abstraction pyramid is the representations of the concepts/values in our 
current legal frameworks. These representations mean elements of the legal framework such as 
international treaties, national laws and government decrees. In my thesis some of these 
important treaties and laws are the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, the 
Patent Cooperation Treaty, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the TRIPS 
Agreement, the Doha Declaration, the Patent Gesetz etc. 
The third layer are the interventions, which are all the institutions, organizations that are 
established to enforce and implement the representations as cited above. In my thesis these can 
be the national or regional patent offices and competition authorities, including their current 
processes around the Patent Cooperation Treaty and the merger control procedures respectively. 
The new Innovation Protection Office of the competition authorities, with its proposed 
organizational structure also belongs in this layer. 
The fourth layer are the individual scenarios and actions that should be followed by the 
institutions and organizations to ensure that the values defined at the top are achieved, and at the 
same time, the representations of the international treaties, national laws and government decrees 
are adhered to. In my thesis these scenarios and actions can be the prior and post-merger and 
acquisition processes I am proposing in the next chapters for the Innovation Protection Office. 
I have summarized in the table below the different levels of the Abstract Pyramid as they relate 







Level In the proposed solution: Innovation Protection Office 
L1: Concepts and Values Rule of Law 
Sustainability 
Fair Competition 
Access to Innovation 
Intellectual Property Protection 
L2: Representations Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 
Patent Cooperation Treaty 




L3: Interventions Organizations: 
• European Patent Office, United States Patent and 
Trademark Office, National Patent Offices 
• European Commission Directorate-Generale for 
Competition, United States Federal Trade Commission 
and Department of Justice, National Competition 
Authorities 
• Innovation Protection Office 
Procedures: 
• Patent Cooperation Treaty Procedures 
• Merger Control Procedures 
• Innovation Protection merger control advisory 
L4: Scenarios Prior Merger and Acquisition processes 
Post Merger and Acquisition processes 
Figure 18 Abstract Pyramid levels for the proposed Innovation Protection Office 
In this chapter, I have created a theoretical framework for organization design, that will serve as 
a basis for the following chapters. This top-down design framework based on different 
abstraction levels will help in making sure that the concepts and values of society are properly 
represented in the proposed organization’s objectives, structure and operational methodology. 
4.5. Objectives of the Innovation Protection Office 
 
In this chapter, I will define the objectives of the Innovation Protection Office. This definition 
will be essential to understand the practical role the Innovation Protection Office will play, and 
to be able to design an applicable organizational structure and the necessary external relationships 
the office should have. The definition of the objectives is also important to be able to capture the 
laws and regulations (in other words, the legal framework) the Innovation Protection Office will 
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take advantage of, to deliver said objectives. Finally, the objectives and the legal framework will 
determine what practical operational methodology the department will be able to follow. 
 
In the following discussion I am going to use the following definition: 
The Innovation Protection Office is a proposed advisory body to the Competition Authority 
responsible for analyzing and recommending preventative or remedial action for cases of 
mergers and acquisitions when customer access to innovation is likely to be (or have been) 
severely decreased, temporarily or permanently. 
The above definition states that the Innovation Protection Office is a proposed advisory body to 
the Competition Authority. A competition authority (also called competition regulator or 
economic regulator) is a government agency responsible for regulating and enforcing 
competition laws and may also enforce customer protection laws as we have discussed in 
previous chapters. Ensuring customer access to innovation in case of patents remaining unutilized 
after some mergers and acquisitions falls both under the enforcement of competition laws, 
namely the merger control regulations of the antitrust laws, and customer protection laws insofar 
as access to patented technologies and products are considered customer rights. Therefore, the 
proposed office is best established in the Competition Authority. 
Since not all national or regional competition authorities have the clear and statutory powers to 
protect customer rights in addition to regulating and enforcing competition law, the establishment 
of the Innovation Protection Office may need to take place in another government agency in 
some countries. For the purposes of our study, I am going to assume that the theoretical 
Competition Authority is responsible for customer protection as well, at least as far as mergers 
and acquisitions are concerned. This assumption is not unreasonable considering that in the case 
of European Union competition law, the European Commission, and its Directorate-General for 
Competition along with national competition authorities is responsible for directly enforcing 
Articles 101 to 109 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.487 As we have 
discussed in the previous chapters, Article 102 states that the abuse of a dominant position 
includes any “limits to production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of 
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consumers”,488 thus preventing such abuses is clearly the responsibility of the competition 
authority. 
Another important part of this definition is that the newly established Innovation Protection 
Office will be an advisory body to the Competition Authority. Since many competition 
authorities have organizational structures divided along functional lines or sometimes along 
industries it is reasonable to establish an organizational entity that is cross-functional. In case the 
competition authority divides work based on the industries being regulated, this advisory body 
may also act in a cross-functional manner since the innovations covered by patents may be used 
in many industries. 
Furthermore, as we will discuss below, the roles of the proposed Innovation Protection Office 
are clearly of an advisory nature to influence the decision-making of the merger control 
organization of the competition authority. 
The definition states that the role of the Innovation Protection Office is related to merger and 
acquisition cases where the customer access to innovation is likely to be (or - in the cases of 
mergers that already happened - have been) severely decreased. As far as this study is concerned, 
we define the customer access to innovation as the availability of patented products or services 
on the domestic market for customers (either via domestic production or import). By patented 
products or services, we mean both product and process patents necessary for the availability of 
said goods for the domestic markets in at least similar quality and price as they exist in other 
countries. It is necessary to include the minimum quality and price assurances as well, otherwise 
the domestic customers may not be able to access said innovations, as we will discuss below in 
subsequent chapters about compulsory licensing. 
Since the cases when the Innovation Protection Office will provide relevant advice to the merger 
control procedures involve only those cases when at least one of the companies involved in the 
merger and acquisition is a patent owner, it is not necessary that each merger and acquisition case 
goes through the analysis phase of this advisory body. This allows for a more detailed analysis 
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The above definition also highlights that the detrimental effects on customer access to innovation 
may not necessarily be permanent, some mergers and acquisitions will not outright disable the 
customers of the domestic market from buying the patented products or services at the usual 
quality or price, but they may delay such access deliberately or inadvertently. This is especially 
important in cases when licensing (voluntary or compulsory) is prescribed by the competition 
authority as a merger control criterion, but such licensing alone will not automatically and 
immediately grant customers access to the products or services in question. 
The definition identifies analysis and the recommendation of preventative and remedial actions 
as the main responsibility of the Innovation Protection Office. Such actions include proposing 
some additional merger control criteria on patent utilization as gatekeeper conditions for the 
mergers or acquisition to be approved, follow-up on the previously accepted merger and 
acquisition commitments and proposing actions in case of non-compliance or undesired 
outcomes. 
The definition leaves it up to the Innovation Protection Office to determine in their analysis 
whether the effects of the loss of customer access to innovation are significant enough to impose 
merger control criteria or post-merger litigation for failure to comply. This flexibility is necessary 
since the efficient operation of the markets requires the mergers and acquisitions of companies 
in general, therefore the costs and benefits of the innovation protection mechanisms must be 
weighed carefully. Especially considering that either voluntary licensing merger criteria or 
especially compulsory licensing merger criteria may limit the patent owner’s rights, therefore 
large-scale usage of such measures may ultimately affect the innovation encouraging effects of 
patents. 
4.6. Organizational Structure 
In this chapter I will design a proposed structure for the Innovation Protection Office that could 
deliver on the objectives highlighted in the previous chapter. The organizational structure 
proposed above is not the only structure that would enable the office to achieve its goals, but it 
is a viable option. In designing this structure, I have taken into account the usual organizational 
structures of competition authorities, such as the organization of the Directorate-General for 
Competition of the European Commission discussed in previous chapters. While this proposed 
organizational structure is fully compatible with the current European Union competition 
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authority, it is not exclusive to this authority. I have deliberately highlighted the operational 
responsibilities and the roles each manager, taskforce or department may have in this 
organization, as well as the external relationship with the patent office, so that a similar structure 
may be established in other (national or international) competition authorities. 
According to the definition discussed above the Innovation Protection Office will have the 
following operational responsibilities: 
1. Prior-Merger and Acquisition: 
a. Analysis of Merger and Acquisition cases where patent ownership is involved 
b. Risk assessment on patents remaining unutilized 
c. Recommendations on additional merger control criteria to ensure customer access 
to innovation 
2. Post-Merger and Acquisition: 
a. Analysis of compliance with merger control commitments 
b. Analysis of effects on customer access to innovation 
3. Improving operational effectiveness and influence policymaking 
To cover the above responsibilities, I am proposing the following organizational structure: 
 
Figure 19 Proposed Organizational Structure for Innovation Protection Office 
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The manager responsible for the Innovation Protection Office’s operations may be called the 
Chief Adviser and report directly to the Deputy Director responsible for Merger Control. This is 
desirable since the reports and recommendations of the Innovation Protection Office are intended 
to be used in the merger control procedures of the Competition Agency. 
The Chief Adviser and Lead Advisers should work closely with the Patent Office to identify and 
understand the effects of patents on customers, especially considering the factors influencing the 
ability of companies to bring to market the products and services relying on patents such as 
industrial know-how, dependent patents and licensing considerations. That is why I included the 
Patent Office Director in an advisory capacity in the organizational chart. 
Since the analysis and recommended actions differ significantly prior to the Merger and 
Acquisition procedure and post the Merger and Acquisition, I am proposing the establishment of 
two departments in the office, one responsible for the analysis and recommendations directly 
influencing the merger control criteria (Prior Merger and Acquisition Department), and the other 
responsible for the analysis and recommendations of previously approved mergers, the 
commitments therein, their compliance and the actual effects they had on the customer access to 
innovation. Each department may have further subdivisions if necessary, such as one based on 
markets and industries. It would allow different workforces to specialize in specific industries. 
This subdivision may follow the merger and acquisition department’s division by industry if 
there is one in place, or it may follow the international patent classifications as well. Efficient 
understanding of the industrial applicability and know-how of the different patents or patent 
portfolios of the companies involved in the Merger and Acquisition case is paramount for the 
Innovation Protection Office's reasonably efficient operation. 
The responsibility of recommending improvements on the operational effectiveness and policy-
making is logically best left assigned to the Lead Adviser of the Post-Merger and Acquisition 
department since they are the ones assessing the effects of the merger control criteria and the 
effectiveness of the Competition Law and Intellectual Property Law regulations in preserving the 
efficient market conditions while maintaining the customer access to innovation. 
4.7. Operational Methodology 
In this chapter, I will describe a possible operational methodology whereby the Prior Merger and 
Acquisition objectives and the Post-Merger and Acquisition objectives of the Innovation 
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Protection Office may be achieved. To define this operational methodology, I have taken into 
consideration the legal framework described above, as well as the organizational structure 
proposed in the previous chapters. Therefore, I have divided the operational process descriptions 
into two subchapters: Prior-Merger and Acquisition, Post-Merger and Acquisition that 
corresponds to the departments of the office I proposed, based on the operational responsibilities 
in each area. 
The following process is not the only one that would achieve the desired objectives of the 
Innovation Protection Agency. However, it is intended as an initial operational framework, to be 
improved upon and changed as necessary, based on the results that will be gathered in the Post-
Merger and Acquisition investigations. 
I will describe the processes below following a linear approach a merger and acquisition case 
will go through. This will enable an easier understanding of how the different aspects of analysis, 
recommendation, commitments and follow-up came into play, and how the Innovation Protection 
Office will track each of them. 
4.7.1. Prior Merger and Acquisition 
 
As discussed above, the Prior Merger and Acquisition responsibilities of the Innovation 
Protection Office will include: 
1. Analysis of Merger and Acquisition cases where patent ownership is involved. 
In order for a merger and acquisition case to even enter serious analysis, a preliminary search 
needs to be conducted. Since the patent ownerships can easily be determined using the public 
patent search databases, a software-controlled process may even automate this preliminary 
search. Therefore, only those cases would arrive at the Innovation Protection Office that will 
have actual investigation relevance. 
The Analysis of the Mergers and Acquisitions will need to identify which patents each company 
has, which patents are they using currently in their direct industrial and commercial operations 
on the domestic markets, whether they are producing the products or offering the services 
domestically, importing them or are not supplying the market currently. A further possible 
utilization is when a patent owner company is licensing their patent to another company that 
offers or is planning to offer the patented products or services in the domestic market. The 
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analysis needs to cover the quality and price of such products and services as well, both 
domestically (if available) and internationally. This aspect of the analysis is also important 
because the scenario of patents remaining unutilized in the domestic market may involve quality 
compromises or availability issues through prohibitive price setting, especially in the cases of 
developing countries. 
The analysis should be comprehensive and involve all stakeholders from the companies involved 
in the merger control procedure to their suppliers, the current and prospective customers, further 
inventors wishing to innovate on the company’s patent etc. In order to achieve this 
comprehensive analysis, widely used analytical tools such as SWOT or PESTEL analysis may 
be used. 
2. Risk assessment on patents remaining unutilized 
The next step is the risk assessment, which needs to examine all the current merger control 
criteria, and the compatibility of such criteria with patent utilization. This risk assessment phase 
alone would have identified the issues in the NXP Semiconductors - Freescale Semiconductor 
case study we have discussed above. 
Furthermore, the risk assessment needs to identify if the patented products or services are offered 
currently on the domestic market, the likelihood that the market operation of the merged company 
will change and affect the availability, the quality or price of such products or services. In case 
the products or services are not yet available, the likelihood of market entry of each company 
without the merger, of the merged company after the merger, or a market entry of another 
company through licensing needs to be determined. 
3. Recommendations on additional merger control criteria to ensure customer access to 
innovation 
The final step is the recommendations on additional merger control criteria for the competition 
authority’s merger control procedure. This phase is only necessary if the risk assessment phase 
showed significant risks, or when the analysis and risk assessment identified the innovation as 
so important to the domestic customers that despite the relatively low risk, some contingency 
measures are still recommended to be included in the merger control commitments required from 
the merged company. 
For the recommendations that may be offered by the Innovation Protection Office to the 
Competition Authority I am suggesting a three-step approach: 
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1. If commitments from the merged company can be credibly offered that they will produce, 
import or otherwise supply the domestic market at a reasonable quality or price 
(compared to other markets) under their own industrial and commercial operations, then 
such commitments shall be required. 
2. Otherwise, voluntary licensing agreements, patent sale agreements or joint venture 
agreements shall be required to be shown to the competition authority, whereby another 
company can credibly be accepted to produce, import or otherwise supply the domestic 
market at a reasonable quality and price. In order to make it more credible that the 
company licensing the patent will actually be able to offer the products or services at the 
expected quality and price, commitments to share industrial know-how may also be 
included as additional merger control criteria. 
3. At the same time, when the voluntary licensing negotiation is taking place, a contingency 
mechanism involving a compulsory licensing proposal shall be submitted by the 
Innovation Protection Office and shared with the companies involved in the merger 
control procedure. The publication of such a compulsory licensing proposal may 
incentivize the company to finalize a voluntary licensing deal instead and render the 
contingency option void. 
4.7.2. Post-Merger and Acquisition 
As we discussed in previous chapters, the Post-Merger and Acquisition responsibilities of the 
Innovation Protection Office will be as follows: 
 
1. Analysis of compliance with merger control commitments 
This analysis will only be necessary for cases where merger control commitments on innovation 
protection were both recommended by the Innovation Protection Office and incorporated into 
the merger control procedure by the Competition Authority. 
In these cases, the main goal of this analysis is to examine whether the commitments to produce, 
import or otherwise supply the domestic market were met, either through the merged company’s 
own industrial and commercial activity or through licensing to another company and providing 




2. Analysis of effects on customer access to innovation 
This analysis should be conducted for every case when the Innovation Protection Office was 
involved, whether or not the merger control recommendations were applied and incorporated into 
the merger control procedure by the Competition Authority. This is recommended because there 
may be cases when the Innovation Protection Office suggested merger control measures, but they 
were not applied. These cases will provide valuable data for comparative study on the effects 
where such controls are applied versus on cases where such controls were not applied. 
The main goal of this analysis is to understand which processes and recommendations have 
worked well in each industry to protect the customer access to innovation while maintaining 
efficient operation of the markets through justified mergers and acquisitions. 
In case the above commitments were not sufficiently met, or despite the commitments having 
been met the customer access to innovation still is not at the level planned either due to problems 
in availability, quality or price, the analytical reports of the Innovation Protection Office shall 
suggest remedial actions: 
1. Fines or other penalties for failing to comply may be imposed on the companies involved. 
2. Further commitments such as voluntary or compulsory licensing, sale or joint venture 
agreements, and knowledge transfer of industrial know-how may be required. 
3. In extreme cases, applicable legal sanctions as per the country’s Patent Law may be 
recommended to be initiated in case the patent continues to be “non-working” in the 
domestic market. 
4. Improving operational effectiveness and influence policymaking. 
This responsibility of the Post-Merger and Acquisition Department should be conducted on a 
regular basis, preferably based on statistics gathered from the previous two types of analysis. The 
first objective of this activity is to provide objective metrics to influence the change of procedures 
of the Competition Authority. The second objective is to influence policy making in the country, 
especially regarding patent regulations, compulsory pricing, patent working requirements, and 







“There is no more neutrality in the world. You either have to be part of the solution, or you're 
going to be part of the problem.” - Leroy Eldridge Cleaver 
 
In these chapters, I have introduced a solution to handle the problem I am investigating in this 
thesis, mergers and acquisitions when patents remain unutilized. The proposed solution of an 
Innovation Protection Office as an advisory body established as part of the Competition 
Authority was described extensively regarding its objectives, with an example of a possible 
organizational structure and operational methodology. I have also determined that such a solution 
does not require a change to the current laws and regulations in most countries. It can take 
advantage of existing, albeit not often-used provisions in national and international patent laws 
and treaties, as well as practices already employed by the Competition Authority such as merger 
control criteria commitments from the companies involved in the merger control procedure.  
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Chapter Five  
5. Conclusion 
 
In this dissertation, my goal was to review from all sides the practical scenario when important 
patents remain unutilized by the companies after the merger or acquisition happens. I did not 
only aim to analyze the legal framework of this scenario, including the laws and regulations 
involved and the organizations involved in the enforcement of said laws, but I set out to suggest 
a practical solution as well. The solution is aimed at either preventing such scenarios, identifying 
the companies involved, holding them accountable, and/or enabling them to ultimately provide 
the customers with access to the innovation through their own activities or through licensing 
activities. 
 
The methodology I used was the following: 
I examined the three legal fields Mergers and Acquisitions, Competition Law and Intellectual 
Property Law, their definitions, the objectives of the legislator, some of their most important 
practical implications in the fields where they intersect from the perspective of our study: 
Mergers and Acquisitions, Antitrust Laws and Patents. Wherever I deemed it beneficial for 
understanding, I included studies of the United States and European Union legal frameworks in 
each area, as well as some recent case studies. I performed this study to get a sufficiently deep 
understanding of each area to be able to determine the adequacy of the current national and 
international laws and treaties to cover my scenario of mergers and acquisitions when patents 
remain unutilized from the regulation standpoint. 
 
Then I investigated the practical implications of acquisitions when patents remain unutilized by 
examining the available statistical economic data on this subject. For the purposes of my study, 
however, this study served only as an emphasizing factor on the magnitude of the problem. Then 
I proceeded to illustrate the problem with a case study of a European merger control case when 
two semiconductor companies were involved in an acquisition, and an important patent for 
today’s 4G and 5G telecom networks was left unutilized after said acquisition. The eventual 
further development of the technology was not because of careful planning and assessment on 
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the part of the European Competition Authority, but because of independent technological and 
industrial development of other companies, mainly in the United States and China. 
After explaining the detrimental effects of such scenarios, I proceeded to show that even though 
the current national and international laws and treaties may provide adequate legal protection 
against such cases, there are not enough organization and procedural guarantees established in 
the organizations currently responsible for enforcing the regulations. To show the current 
organizational structures and processes, I again looked at two of the most progressive 
organizations in the enforcement of the aforementioned legal frameworks, the United States and 
European Union Competition Authorities and Patent Offices. 
 
Finally, I have designed a solution proposal that could be implemented by regulators interested 
in solving the problem I presented. The proposed solution is an Innovation Protection Office 
acting as an advisory body to the Competition Authority by analyzing the effects of mergers and 
acquisitions on customer access to innovation both prior- and post-the mergers and acquisitions 
and recommending preventative or remedial actions. The preventative and remedial actions 
suggested ranged from commitments of industrial and commercial activity to voluntary and 
compulsory licensing, patent sale, or joint venture establishment, all the way to recommending 
legal sanctions applicable under the current national and international legal frameworks. My 
proposed solution has the added benefit of influencing the Competition Authority procedures and 
policymakers by evidence-based analysis of the effectiveness of its procedures in protecting 
customer access to innovation. 
 
In summary, I found that the implications of my study on protecting the customer access to 
innovation may be applicable to all countries where the Competition Authority and the Patent 
Office does not have sufficient organizational or procedural guarantees. However, considering 
that access to patented innovation in quality and affordable products and services is usually a 
more significant issue in developing nations, my findings may be especially relevant to the 
legislators and the Competition Authorities in these countries. 
 
Although this dissertation has focused on patents and the availability of patented inventions to 
customers, the field of Intellectual Property is much more comprehensive, and it may warrant 
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further studies to discover if there are other necessary fields of Intellectual Property where 
customer access is impacted when companies are merging or are getting acquired. Another 
important research topic that directly relates to this study would be to try and determine the effect 
of mergers and acquisitions on the loss of customer access to patented innovation in cases when 
merger control procedures are not even getting involved since it falls under the radar of dominant 
or potentially dominant market shares. Such cases include the acquisitions of patent holder 
startup companies by larger players, where the frequency, customer effects, and overall economic 
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